Belief bias during reasoning among religious believers and skeptics

We provide evidence that religious skeptics, as compared to believers, are both more reflective and effective in logical reasoning tasks. While recent studies have reported a negative association between an analytic cognitive style and religiosity, they focused exclusively on accuracy, making it difficult to specify potential underlying cognitive mechanisms. The present study extends the previous research by assessing both performance and response times on quintessential logical reasoning problems (syllogisms). Those reporting more religious skepticism made fewer reasoning errors than did believers. This finding remained significant after controlling for general cognitive ability, time spent on the problems, and various demographic variables. Crucial for the purpose of exploring underlying mechanisms, response times indicated that skeptics also spent more time reasoning than did believers. This novel finding suggests a possible role of response slowing during analytic problem solving as a component of cognitive style that promotes overriding intuitive first impressions. Implications for using additional processing measures, such as response time, to investigate individual differences in cognitive style are discussed

Causality in collective filtering

In this paper, we describe a proposal for improving the practice of web-based collective filtering, in particular for what regards discussions and selection of issues about policy, based on the intuitive concept of causality. Causality, especially when presented in visual form, is especially suited to the task since it is intuitive to understand and to use, and at the same time, it's rich enough to create a semantic network between the representations of real world facts. We give some examples of the suggested system workflow and we present guidelines for its implementation

On the Reception and Detection of Pseudo-profound Bullshit

Although bullshit is common in everyday life and has attracted attention from philosophers, its reception (critical or ingenuous) has not, to our knowledge, been subject to empirical investigation. Here we focus on pseudo-profound bullshit, which consists of seemingly impressive assertions that are presented as true and meaningful but are actually vacuous. We presented participants with bullshit statements consisting of buzzwords randomly organized into statements with syntactic structure but no discernible meaning (e.g., “Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena”). Across multiple studies, the propensity to judge bullshit statements as profound was associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style, supernatural belief). Parallel associations were less evident among profundity judgments for more conventionally profound (e.g., “A wet person does not fear the rain”) or mundane (e.g., “Newborn babies require constant attention”) statements. These results support the idea that some people are more receptive to this type of bullshit and that detecting it is not merely a matter of indiscriminate skepticism but rather a discernment of deceptive vagueness in otherwise impressive sounding claims. Our results also suggest that a bias toward accepting statements as true may be an important component of pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity

It’s Still Bullshit: Reply to Dalton (2016)

In reply to Dalton (2016), the authors argue that bullshit is defined in terms of how it is produced, not how it is interpreted. They agree that it can be interpreted as profound by some readers (and assumed as much in the original paper). Nonetheless, they present additional evidence against the possibility that more reflective thinkers are more inclined to interpret bullshit statements as profound

Unclaimed Prize Information Increases the Appeal of Scratch Card Games

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Gambling Studies on 03 Nov 2020, available online:https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14459795.2020.1826558.Previous research suggests that intuitively appealing, yet uninformative unclaimed prize information is capable of biasing gambling-related judgments when people compare scratch cards that vary in the number of unclaimed prizes. However, it is unknown if the mere presence of unclaimed prize information alters a game’s attractiveness. Using an online crowdsourcing platform, we recruited 402 U.S. residents to participate in an online study. In a within-subjects design, participants made four gambling-related judgments (likelihood of winning, excitement to play, urge to gamble, and hypothetical card purchasing) for scratch cards presented with and without unclaimed prize information. Compared to cards presented without unclaimed prize information, those with unclaimed prize information were judged as more likely to win, produced more excitement to play, a greater urge to gamble, and were chosen more often during a hypothetical purchasing task. Therefore, unclaimed prize information increases the appeal of scratch card games, and may be an important aspect of the scratch card gambling environment to consider from a harm reduction perspective.Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC

Exploring relationships between problem gambling, scratch card gambling, and individual differences in thinking style

Background and aims: Scratch cards are a popular form of lottery gambling available in many jurisdictions. However, there is a paucity of research that examines associations between individual differences in thinking style, participation in scratch card gambling, and problem gambling severity. Methods: In three studies, we sought to examine the relationships among these variables in large, online samples of participants. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI), the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale, and self-reported their frequency of scratch card gambling. Results: Throughout all three studies, specific associations were reliably established. Specifically, negative associations were observed between participants’ CRT and PGSI scores, as well as between participants’ CRT scores and scratch card gambling frequency. In addition, we found a positive association between problem gambling severity and scratch card gambling frequency. Finally, problem gambling severity was shown to correlate positively with participants’ willingness to pay for irrelevant information in a scratch card gambling scenario. Discussion and conclusions: Overall, we observed that problem gambling severity is associated with an individuals’ thinking style and scratch card gambling behavior. This study adds to the existing literature examining problem gambling, and highlights the role of thinking style in understanding gambling behavior and problematic gambling

Using the Game of Mastermind to Teach, Practice, and Discuss Scientific Reasoning Skills

The code-breaking game Mastermind, which can be played in minutes at no cost, creates opportunities for students to discuss scientific reasoning, hypothesis-testing, effective experimental design, and sound interpretation of results