331 research outputs found

    Gauge-Invariant Localization of Infinitely Many Gravitational Energies from all Possible Auxiliary Structures, Or, Why Pseudotensors are Okay

    Get PDF
    The problem of finding a covariant expression for the distribution and conservation of gravitational energy-momentum dates to the 1910s. A suitably covariant infinite-component localization is displayed, reflecting Bergmann's realization that there are infinitely many conserved gravitational energy-momenta. Initially use is made of a flat background metric or connection (or rather, all of them), because the desired gauge invariance properties are obvious. Partial gauge-fixing then yields an appropriate covariant quantity without any background metric or connection; one version is the collection of pseudotensors of a given type, such as the Einstein pseudotensor, in_every_ coordinate system. This solution to the gauge covariance problem is easily adapted to any pseudotensorial expression or to any tensorial expression built with a background metric or connection. Thus the specific functional form can be chosen on technical grounds such as relating to Noether's theorem and yielding expected values of conserved quantities in certain contexts and then rendered covariant using the procedure described here. The application to angular momentum localization is straightforward. Traditional objections to pseudotensors are based largely on the false assumption that there is only one gravitational energy rather than infinitely many.Comment: Proceedings of the DPF-2009 Conference, Detroit, MI, July 27-31, 200

    The Relevance of Irrelevance: Absolute Objects and the Jones-Geroch Dust Velocity Counterexample, with a Note on Spinors

    Get PDF
    James L. Anderson analyzed the conceptual novelty of Einstein's theory of gravity as its lack of ``absolute objects.'' Michael Friedman's related concept of absolute objects has been criticized by Roger Jones and Robert Geroch for implausibly admitting as absolute the timelike 4-velocity field of dust in cosmological models in Einstein's theory. Using Nathan Rosen's action principle, I complete Anna Maidens's argument that the Jones-Geroch problem is not solved by requiring that absolute objects not be varied. Recalling Anderson's proscription of (globally) ``irrelevant'' variables that do no work (anywhere in any model), I generalize that proscription to locally irrelevant variables that do no work in some places in some models. This move vindicates Friedman's intuitions and removes the Jones-Geroch counterexample: some regions of some models of gravity with dust are dust-free, and there is no good reason to have a timelike dust 4-velocity vector there. Eliminating the irrelevant timelike vctors keeps the dust 4-velocity from counting as absolute by spoiling its neighborhood-by-neighborhood diffeomorphic equivalence to (1,0,0,0). A more fundamental Gerochian timelike vector field presents itself in gravity with spinors in the standard orthonormal tetrad formalism, though eliminating irrelevant fields might solve this problem as well

    Null Cones and Einstein's Equations in Minkowski Spacetime

    Full text link
    If Einstein's equations are to describe a field theory of gravity in Minkowski spacetime, then causality requires that the effective curved metric must respect the flat background metric's null cone. The kinematical problem is solved using a generalized eigenvector formalism based on the Segr\'{e} classification of symmetric rank 2 tensors with respect to a Lorentzian metric. Securing the correct relationship between the two null cones dynamically plausibly is achieved using the naive gauge freedom. New variables tied to the generalized eigenvector formalism reduce the configuration space to the causality-respecting part. In this smaller space, gauge transformations do not form a group, but only a groupoid. The flat metric removes the difficulty of defining equal-time commutation relations in quantum gravity and guarantees global hyperbolicity

    Null Cones in Lorentz-Covariant General Relativity

    Get PDF
    The oft-neglected issue of the causal structure in the flat spacetime approach to Einstein's theory of gravity is considered. Consistency requires that the flat metric's null cone be respected, but this does not happen automatically. After reviewing the history of this problem, we introduce a generalized eigenvector formalism to give a kinematic description of the relation between the two null cones, based on the Segre' classification of symmetric rank 2 tensors with respect to a Lorentzian metric. Then we propose a method to enforce special relativistic causality by using the naive gauge freedom to restrict the configuration space suitably. A set of new variables just covers this smaller configuration space and respects the flat metric's null cone automatically. In this smaller space, gauge transformations do not form a group, but only a groupoid. Respecting the flat metric's null cone ensures that the spacetime is globally hyperbolic, indicating that the Hawking black hole information loss paradox does not arise.Comment: groupoid nature of gauge transformations explained; shortened, new references, 102 page

    Light Cone Consistency in Bimetric General Relativity

    Get PDF
    General relativity can be formally derived as a flat spacetime theory, but the consistency of the resulting curved metric's light cone with the flat metric's null cone has not been adequately considered. If the two are inconsistent, then gravity is not just another field in flat spacetime after all. Here we discuss recent progress in describing the conditions for consistency and prospects for satisfying those conditions.Comment: contribution to the Proceedings of the 20th Texas Symposium on Relativistic Astrophysics; 3 pages, 1 figur

    Underconsideration in Space-time and Particle Physics

    Get PDF
    Unconceived alternatives could threaten scientific realism. The example of space-time and particle physics indicates a generic heuristic for quantitative sciences for constructing potentially serious cases of underdetermination, involving one-parameter family of rivals T_m (m real and small) that work as a team rather than as a single rival against default theory T_0. In important examples this new parameter has a physical meaning (e.g., particle mass) and makes a crucial _conceptual_ difference, shrinking the symmetry group and in some cases putting gauge freedom, formal indeterminism vs. determinism, the presence of the hole argument, etc., at risk. It is proposed that the idea of a philosophically "serious rival" involves a theory's plausibility (prior), its fit to data (likelihood), and its making a philosophical (not merely empirical) difference, giving a kind of philosophical expected utility. Methodologies akin to eliminative induction or tempered subjective Bayesianism are more demonstrably reliable than the custom of attending only to "our best theory": they can lead either to a serious rivalry or to improved arguments for the favorite theory. The example of General Relativity (massless spin 2 in particle physics terminology) vs. massive spin 2 gravity, a recent topic in the physics literature, is discussed. Arguably the General Relativity and philosophy literatures have ignored the most serious rival to General Relativity
    corecore