Feasible mitigation actions in developing countries

Energy use is not only crucial for economic development, but is also the main driver of greenhouse-gas emissions. Developing countries can reduce emissions and thrive only if economic growth is disentangled from energy-related emissions. Although possible in theory, the required energy-system transformation would impose considerable costs on developing nations. Developed countries could bear those costs fully, but policy design should avoid a possible 'climate rent curse', that is, a negative impact of financial inflows on recipients' economies. Mitigation measures could meet further resistance because of adverse distributional impacts as well as political economy reasons. Hence, drastically re-orienting development paths towards low-carbon growth in developing countries is not very realistic. Efforts should rather focus on 'feasible mitigation actions' such as fossil-fuel subsidy reform, decentralized modern energy and fuel switching in the power sector

Output-based allocation of emissions permits for mitigating the leakage and competitiveness issues for the Japanese economy

The adoption of domestic emissions trading schemes (ETS) can impose a heavy burden on energy-intensive industries. Particularly, energy-intensive industries competing with foreign competitors could lose their international edge. Although the abatement of CO2 emissions in industrialized countries entails the reduction of their energy-intensive production, a corresponding increase in the production of energy-intensive goods in countries without CO2 regulations may lead to carbon "leakage." This paper examines the effects of various allocation methods of emissions permits in the Japanese ETS on the economy and CO2 emissions using a multiregional and multisector computable general equilibrium model. Specifically, we apply the Fischer and Fox (Land Econ 83(4):575-599, 2007) model to the Japanese economy to address carbon leakage and competitiveness issues. We compare auction schemes, grandfathering schemes, and output-based allocation (OBA) schemes. We further extend the model by examining a combination of auctions and OBA. Though the auction scheme is found to be the best in terms of macroeconomic impacts, the leakage rate is high and the harm to energy-intensive sectors can be significant. OBA causes less leakage and damage to energy-intensive sectors, but the macroeconomic impact is undesirable. Considering all three effects-leakage, competitiveness, and macroeconomics-we find that combinations of auctions and OBA are desirable