397 research outputs found
An On-Device Federated Learning Approach for Cooperative Anomaly Detection
Most edge AI focuses on prediction tasks on resource-limited edge devices
while the training is done at server machines. However, retraining or
customizing a model is required at edge devices as the model is becoming
outdated due to environmental changes over time. To follow such a concept
drift, a neural-network based on-device learning approach is recently proposed,
so that edge devices train incoming data at runtime to update their model. In
this case, since a training is done at distributed edge devices, the issue is
that only a limited amount of training data can be used for each edge device.
To address this issue, one approach is a cooperative learning or federated
learning, where edge devices exchange their trained results and update their
model by using those collected from the other devices. In this paper, as an
on-device learning algorithm, we focus on OS-ELM (Online Sequential Extreme
Learning Machine) to sequentially train a model based on recent samples and
combine it with autoencoder for anomaly detection. We extend it for an
on-device federated learning so that edge devices can exchange their trained
results and update their model by using those collected from the other edge
devices. This cooperative model update is one-shot while it can be repeatedly
applied to synchronize their model. Our approach is evaluated with anomaly
detection tasks generated from a driving dataset of cars, a human activity
dataset, and MNIST dataset. The results demonstrate that the proposed on-device
federated learning can produce a merged model by integrating trained results
from multiple edge devices as accurately as traditional backpropagation based
neural networks and a traditional federated learning approach with lower
computation or communication cost
The Apostles\u27 Victory over Simon Magus: the Frescoes of the Basilica of San Pietro in Tuscania
Perceived Information Revisited II: Information-Theoretical Analysis of Deep-Learning Based Side-Channel Attacks
In conventional deep-learning-based side-channel attacks (DL-SCAs), an attacker trains a model by updating parameters to minimize the negative log-likelihood (NLL) loss function. Although a decrease in NLL improves DL-SCA performance, the reasons for this improvement remain unclear because of the lack of a formal analysis. To address this open problem, this paper explores the relationship between NLL and the attack success rate (SR) and conducts an information-theoretical analysis of DL-SCAs with an NLL loss function to solve open problems in DL-SCA. To this end, we introduce a communication channel for DL-SCAs and derive an inequality that links model outputs to the SR. Our inequality states that mutual information between the model output and intermediate value, which is named the latent perceived information (LPI), provides an upper bound of the SR of a DL-SCA with a trained neural network. Subsequently, we examine the conjecture by Ito et al. on the relationship between the effective perceived information (EPI) and SR and clarify its valid conditions from the perspective of LPI. Our analysis results reveal that a decrease in NLL correlated with an increase in LPI, which indicates that the model capability to extract intermediate value information from traces is enhanced. In addition, the results indicate that the LPI bounds the SR from above, and a higher upper bound of the SR could directly improve the SR if the selection function satisfies certain conditions, such as bijectivity. Finally, these theoretical insights are validated through attack experiments on neural network models applied to AES software and hardware implementations with masking countermeasures
On the Success Rate of Side-Channel Attacks on Masked Implementations: Information-Theoretical Bounds and Their Practical Usage
This study derives information-theoretical bounds of the success rate (SR) of side-channel attacks on masked implementations. We first develop a communication channel model representing side-channel attacks on masked implementations. We then derive two SR bounds based on the conditional probability distribution and mutual information of shares. The basic idea is to evaluate the upper-bound of the mutual information between the non-masked secret value and the side-channel trace by the conditional probability distribution of shares given its leakage, with a help of the Walsh–Hadamard transform. With the derived theorems, we also prove the security of masking schemes: the SR decreases exponentially with an increase in the number of masking shares, under a much more relaxed condition than the previous proof. To validate and utilize our theorems in practice, we propose a deep-learning-based profiling method for approximating the conditional probability distribution of shares to estimate the SR bound and the number of traces required for attacking a given device. We experimentally confirm that our bounds are much stronger than the conventional bounds on masked implementations, which validates the relevance of our theorems to practice
Perceived Information Revisited
In this study, we present new analytical metrics for evaluating the performance of side-channel attacks (SCAs) by revisiting the perceived information (PI), which is defined using cross-entropy (CE). PI represents the amount of information utilized by a probability distribution that determines a distinguishing rule in SCA. Our analysis partially solves an important open problem in the performance evaluation of deep-learning based SCAs (DL-SCAs) that the relationship between neural network (NN) model evaluation metrics (such as accuracy, loss, and recall) and guessing entropy (GE)/success rate (SR) is unclear. We first theoretically show that the conventional CE/PI is non-calibrated and insufficient for evaluating the SCA performance, as it contains uncertainty in terms of SR. More precisely, we show that an infinite number of probability distributions with different CE/PI can achieve an identical SR. With the above analysis result, we present a modification of CE/PI, named effective CE/PI (ECE/EPI), to eliminate the above uncertainty. The ECE/EPI can be easily calculated for a given probability distribution and dataset, which would be suitable for DL-SCA. Using the ECE/EPI, we can accurately evaluate the SR hrough the validation loss in the training phase, and can measure the generalization of the NN model in terms of SR in the attack phase. We then analyze and discuss the proposed metrics regarding their relationship to SR, conditions of successful attacks for a distinguishing rule with a probability distribution, a statistic/asymptotic aspect, and the order of key ranks in SCA. Finally, we validate the proposed metrics through experimental attacks on masked AES implementations using DL-SCA
Toward Optimal Deep-Learning Based Side-Channel Attacks: Probability Concentration Inequality Loss and Its Usage
In this paper, we present solutions to some open problems for constructing efficient deep learning-based side-channel attacks (DL-SCAs) through a theoretical analysis. There are two major open problems in DL-SCAs: (i) the effect of the difference in secret key values used for profiling and attack phases is unclear, and (ii) the optimality of the negative log-likelihood (NLL) loss function used in the conventional learning method is unknown. These two problems have hindered the accurate performance evaluation and optimization of DL-SCAs. To address the problem (i), we clarified the strict conditions under which the use of different correct keys in profiling and attack phases affects the performance of DL-SCA. For the problem (ii), we then analyzed the relationship between the NLL loss and direct performance metrics of DL-SCAs (i.e., success rate (SR)/guessing entropy (GE)) and proved that the minimum NLL loss is sufficient but not necessary to achieve the optimal distinguisher of DL-SCA. This explains why DL-SCA succeeds even when the NLL loss is large and motivated us to design a new loss function. Based on the above analysis result, we also propose a new loss function called the probability concentration inequality (PCI) loss function. We derive the PCI loss as an upper bound of GE and a lower bound of the SR using a probability concentration inequality. Minimizing the PCI loss during training can directly optimize the GE and SR of the subsequent attack phase. In this paper, we describe the characteristics of PCI loss and NLL loss and introduce a new learning method that takes full advantage of the characteristics. We also analytically investigate the difference between the PCI loss and ranking loss reported in a previous work for a similar purpose and explain the advantage of PCI loss over the ranking loss. Finally, we validate the analysis and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed DL-SCA using the PCI loss through experimental attacks on public datasets
Splicing inhibition induces gene expression through canonical NF-κB pathway and extracellular signal-related kinase activation
AbstractSplicing, a process for mRNA maturation, is essential for correct gene expression after transcription. However, recent studies also suggest that splicing affects transcription, but its mechanism remains elusive. We previously reported that treatment with spliceostatin A (SSA), a specific splicing inhibitor targeting the splicing factor SF3b, leads to transcriptional activation of a small subset of genes. To investigate the underlying mechanism we utilized luciferase reporters driven by the Interleukin 8 (IL-8) and cytomegalovirus (CMV) promoters, as both recruit a similar set of transcription factors. We also found that SSA treatment led to increased extracellular signal-regulated protein kinase (ERK) activity and that chemical inhibition of ERK also led to decreased promoter activation. Systematic deletion studies suggested that NF-κB activation is mainly responsible for SSA-induced promoters activation
Formal Analysis of Non-profiled Deep-learning Based Side-channel Attacks
This paper formally analyzes two major non-profiled deep-learning-based side-channel attacks (DL-SCAs): differential deep-learning analysis (DDLA) by Timon and collision DL-SCA by Staib and Moradi. These DL-SCAs leverage supervised learning in non-profiled scenarios. Although some intuitive descriptions of these DL-SCAs exist, their formal analyses have been rarely conducted yet, which makes it unclear why and when the attacks succeed and how the attack can be improved. In this paper, we provide the first information-theoretical analysis of DDLA. We reveal its relevance to the mutual information analysis (MIA), and then present three theorems stating some limitations and impossibility results of DDLA. Subsequently, we provide the first probability-theoretical analysis on collision DL-SCA. After presenting its formalization with a proposal of our distinguisher for collision DL-SCA, we prove its optimality. Namely, we prove that the collision DL-SCA using our distinguisher theoretically maximizes the success rate if the neural network (NN) training is completely successful (namely, the NN completely imitates the true conditional probability distribution). Accordingly, we propose an improvement of the collision DL-SCA based on a dedicated NN architecture and a full-key recovery methodology using multiple neural distinguishers. Finally, we experimentally evaluate non-profiled (DL-)SCAs using a newly created dataset using publicly available first-order masked AES implementation. The existing public dataset of side-channel traces is insufficient to evaluate collision DL-SCAs due to a lack of substantive side-channel traces for different key values. Our dataset enables a comprehensive evaluation of collision (DL-)SCAs, which clarifies the current situation of non-profiled (DL-)SCAs
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