Corruption, Clients, and Political MacHines a Response to Professor Issacharoff

Responding to Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 118 (2010) In his comment on political corruption, Professor Samuel Issacharoff questions traditional accounts that aim to squeeze money out of politics entirely. Instead, he focuses on the danger that political spending will promote private influence over government policy. In this response, Professor Stephen E. Sachs argues that private influence is itself too broad a category to control, and that campaign finance policy should be restricted to a more manageable scope. Professor Sachs argues that if protecting the government from private influence is too diffuse a goal, we can at least attempt to protect the government from itself, by ensuring that it does not channel public resources into self-sustaining political machines

Judging the Law of Politics

In this Review Essay I explore the rights-structure debate that has captivated the attention of election law scholars. The Essay juxtaposes the recent work of a leading individualist Professor Richard Hasen\u27s new book, The Supreme Court and Election Law, against the recent work of a leading structuralist, Professor Richard Pildes\u27 recent Foreword to the Harvard Law Review. I argue that even though the rights-structure debate produces much heat, it does not significantly advance the goal of understanding and evaluating the role of the Court in democratic politics. I aim to return election law to a dualistic understanding of the relationship between rights and structure, an understanding that prevailed in the early articulation of structuralism\u27s relevance to judicial review of democratic politics. I shall argue that election law cases cannot be divided into neat categories along the individual rights and structuralism divide. Election law cases raise both issues of individual and structural rights. Therefore, the label attached to election law claims is immaterial. The fundamental questions are what are the values that judicial review ought to vindicate and how best to vindicate those values. These are questions that transcend the rights-structure divide

Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr

Baker v. Carr is one of the Supreme Court\u27s most important opinions, not least because its advent signaled the constitutionalization of democracy. Unfortunately, as is typical of the Court\u27s numerous forays into democratic politics, the decision is not accompanied by an apparent vision of the relationship among democratic practice, constitutional law, and democratic theory. In this Article, Professor Charles revisits Baker and provides several democratic principles that he argues justifies the Court\u27s decision to engage the democratic process. He examines the decision from the perspective of one of its chief contemporary critics, Justice Frankfurter. He sketches an approach, described as constitutional pluralism, for thinking about Baker and other cases involving judicial supervision of democratic politics. Using constitutional pluralism as an interpretive tool, he argues that the aim of judicial involvement in democratic politics ought to be to vindicate specific democratic principles. To the extent that a challenged democratic practice serves multiple and legitimate democratic ends, the federal courts should respect the judgment of democratic actors

Election Law and White Identity Politics

The role of race in American politics looms large in several election law doctrines. Regrettably, though, these doctrines’ analyses of race, racial identity, and the relationships between race and politics often lack sophistication, historical context, or foresight. The political status quo is treated as race-neutral, when in fact it is anything but. Specifically, the doctrines rely upon sanguine theories of democracy uncorrupted by white identity–based political calculations, while in fact such calculations, made on the part of both voters and political parties, are pervasive. In this Article, I appraise the doctrine pertaining to majority-minority voting districts, racial gerrymandering doctrine, the doctrine governing ballot access disputes, and campaign finance doctrine through the lens of white identity politics. Drawing from research in political science, sociology, and history, I argue that these doctrines are blighted by what I identify as “racial blind spots” that are inconsonant with political reality. Given the role that courts play in enunciating these doctrines, their failure to meaningfully engage with the significance of white identity politics renders their governing frameworks and remedial prescriptions inapt. The Article concludes by offering a number of suggestions, both doctrinal and legislative, for how to mitigate white identity politics