CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE PEOPLE — A DEMOCRATIC MYTH

Nauk da je narod nositelj ustavotvorne vlasti već je od Francuske revolucije općepriznati odgovor na pitanje o porijeklu i stupnju valjanosti ustavnoga zakona, koji kao najviša norma državnoga pravnog poretka nema iznad sebe nikakvu drugu normu pozitivnoga prava. Ali taj nauk promašuje političku zbilju. On ni po teoriji države nije uvjerljiv. Narod nije subjekt djelovanja, već samo subjekt referencije. Nauk o ustavotvornoj vlasti naroda demokratski je mit. Kao takav je viševalentan: utemeljenje revolucije ili zabrana revolucije određuju hoće li se postojeći ustavni poredak srušiti ili legitimirati. Ni kao legitimacijska teorija, nauk o ustavotvornoj vlasti ne donosi spoznajni dobitak. Jer djelotvornost ustava ne ovisi o njegovu porijeklu, već o prihvaćanju na koje nailazi ovdje i danas kod svojih adresata, i državnih tijela i građana. O uspjehu valjanosti ustava odlučuje se ovdje i danas.The maxim that the people is the agent of the constituent power has, since the French revolution, been a universally accepted answer to the issue of the origin and the degree of validity of constitutional law which, as the ultimate norm of a state’s legal order has no other higher positive law norm. But that maxim disregards political reality. Neither is it convincing from the point of view of the theory of state. The people is not the subject of activity but only of reference. The maxim on the constituent power of the people is a democratic myth. As such it is polyvalent: the reinforcement of revolution or its prohibition determine whether the existing constitutional regime is to be overthrown or legitimised. The doctrine of the constituent power of the people is not cognitively rewarding as a theory of legitimation, either, since the effectiveness of a constitution does not depend on its provenance but on the reception it gets here and now from its addressees: state agencies and citizens

CONSTITUTION AS HOMELAND. ON THE GERMAN SUPPRESSION OF THE STATE

Autor smatra da je riječ domovina nestala iz političkog jezika i da je zamjenjuje nepolitička riječ: identitet. Ovim se otvara pitanje: što je Nijemcu identitet ako ga država ne može ponuditi? Kao posljedica Hitlerova razdoblja tradicija postaje problem tako da se identitet sada vezuje za ustav. Autor nadalje razmatra posebnosti njemačkog ustavnopravnog sustava kojim je stari državni rezon zamijenjen “ustavnim rezonom”. Na ovaj način patriotizam postaje “ustavni patriotizam”, a ustav domovina. Konsenzus o ustavu koji je bio rezultat općeg pristajanja na antitotalitarizam doveli su u pitanje studenti 1968. godine. Tada je antitotalitarizam zamijenjen antifašizmom, ali se razvila i čitava politička kultura neposluha protiv institucija koja je ustav proglasila “životnom laži sustava”. Oporavak sustava dugo je trajao, ali je njime rehabilitirano državno u ustavnoj državi. Međutim, ovim se ne obnavlja individualnost njemačke državnosti, tj. država ne postaje domovinom. Premda autor smatra da je ovo zastarjelo, ipak naglašava da bi konsenzualna osnova bila šira kad bi Nijemci bili u mogućnosti biti ono što po svojoj povijesti i položaju ustvari jesu, a ne samo ono što bi po ustavu trebali biti.The author argues that the word homeland disappeared from the political language and that it has been replaced by the unpolitical word: identity. This raises a question: what is identity to a German if the state cannot provide it? The consequence of Hitler’s legacy is that the tradition is troublesome so that the identity is now linked with the constitution. The author looks into the idiosyncrasies of the German constitutional/legal system by which the old state thinking has been replaced with the “constitutional thinking”. In this way patriotism becomes “constitutional patriotism”, and the constitution becomes the homeland. The consensus about the constitution – the result of the general acceptance of antitotalitarianism – was challenged by students in 1968, when this antitotalitarianism was replaced by antifascism. At the same time, however, an entire political culture of disobedience against institutions evolved, and declared the constitution the “system’s life’s lie”. The system took a long time to recover, but it rehabilitated the state authority within a constitutional state. Nevertheless, this has not restored the individuality of German statehood i.e. the state does not become the homeland. Although the author is aware that this idea is outmoded, he nevertheless points out that the consensual base would be broader if Germans were allowed to be what they are by their history and their position, and not only what they should be according to the constitution

BETWEEN ETHOS OF PROFESSION AND PARTY LOYALTY: DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENTS ON THEIR OWN AFFAIRS

Autor polazi od Lockeove klasične teze da su i vladari i vladani podčinjeni općim zakonima, a njihova se zloupotreba sprječava institucijskim sredstvima diobe vlasti. Pravilo prema kojem nitko ne može biti sudac u vlastitoj stvari bezuvjetno vrijedni u sudskim i upravnim postupcima. Problem nastaje kad se ta pravna misao prenosi na parlament. Naime, u radu parlamenta ukida se nespojivost mandata zakonodavne i izvršne vlasti, jer izvršna vlast dobiva dominantan utjecaj na nastanak i sadržaj zakonodavstva. Osim toga, Temeljni zakon (Grundgesetz) osigurava zastupniku identitet za njegovo ponašanje pri glasovanju i jamči mu imunitet od kazne za određena djela, koju ostali građani ne bi mogli izbjeći. Ova relativna sloboda i nevezanost zastupnika ispravlja se pravilnikom o ponašanju zastupnika koji osobito naglašava potrebu njegova etičkog držanja. Povrede pravila ne sankcioniraju se toliko moderatnim pravom koliko politički. Autor smatra da se odlučivanje u vlastitoj stvari ne može općenito prenijeti na parlament. Ustav ne samo da za određene materije dopušta odluke o vlastitoj stvari nego ih čak iznuđuje. No u nedostatku tuđega nadzora mora porasti samonadzor, a to znači da parlamentarci moraju sami prakticirati pravnu poslušnost, kako bi zakoni postali zbiljski za sve sudionike. Ne sili samo etički i politički pritisak zastupnike na pravno ponašanje nego i zakoni vrše koristan pritisak na njih da se pobrinu kako bi njihova rješenja odgovarala javnome dobru.The author’s starting point is Locke’s classical thesis that the rulers and the ruled are subject to universal laws and that their abuses are prevented by the institutional means of power sharing. The rule according to which nobody can be a judge in their own affairs unconditionally applies in all court or administrative proceedings. The problem arises when this legal thinking is applied to parliaments. Namely, in parliamentary work the incompatibility of the mandates of the legislative and the executive branch is annulled since the executive power gains the upper hand in the composition and substance of the legislature. Besides, The basic law (Grundgesetz) provides MPs with indemnity in their voting behaviour and guarantees to them immunity from punishment for certain acts which other citizens would not be able to get away with. This relative freedom and independence of MPs is corrected by the rule books on the behaviour of MPs which envision the necessity of their ethic conduct. The violations of the rules are sanctioned not so much by moderatorial law as by political means. The author’s opinion is that deciding on their own affairs cannot be universally granted to parliaments. Constitutions allow, even call for, certain decisions on one’s own affairs to be made. However, due to insufficient outside control, self-control must be increased, which implies legal obedience on the part of MPs so that laws become meaningful for all participants. Besides the ethic and political pressures which force the MPs to behave in a law-abiding manner, laws also exert positive pressure on them to see to it that their decisions serve the public good

NATION AS POLITICAL UNITY

Preporod nacija iznenadio je i šokirao njemačke intelektualce koji nacionalnu državu smatraju povijesno prevladanom slijedeći nove uzore: ujedinjenu Europu, svjetsku zajednicu odgovornih država, globalizaciju tržišta, univerzum ljudskih prava. Suprotne tendencije u suvremenom svijetu obilježava napuštanje golemih političkih jedinstava na čije su mjesto došle manje države, utemeljene na nacionalnoj osnovi. Čini se da politička sloboda dovodi do formiranja nacionalnih država na osnovi demokratskog ustava. U tom procesu javlja se potreba za uvidom u odnos nacionalne države i demokracije, a ključ za objašnjenje njihova odnosa nalazi se u pojmu naroda. Državljanstvo posreduje između naroda, u njegovoj realnoj pojavnosti kao socijalne skupine, i demokracije kao ustavnoga načela. Ono daje personalnome državnom elementu pravno ustrojstvo na kojemu se može graditi demokratski oblik države, te jamči pravno primjenljivo svrstavanje i ograničavanje.The revival of the nation has shocked German intellectuals who think that the nation-state is historically obsolete and that new models should be upheld: the united Europe, a world community of responsible states, globalisation of markets, a universe of human rights. The contrary tendencies in today’s world are marked by giving up on huge political entities which have been replaced by smaller nationality-based states. It seems that political freedom leads to the formation of nation-states based on democratic constitution. This process requires looking into the relation between the nation-state and democracy. The key for the explanation of their relationship can be found in the notion of nation. Citizenship mediates between the people (in its real manifestation as a social group), and democracy as a constitutional principle. It gives to the state as a personal entity legal structure on which to build a democratic form of the state and guarantees legally applicable taxonomies and limitations