A contractual approach to discipline self-dealing by controlling shareholders

In this paper we model the relationship between a controlling shareholder and outside investors when the presence of the controlling shareholder generates valuable self-dealing investment opportunities. These self-dealing operations generate private benefits for the controller but they may also be profitable for the outside investors. Our analysis proves that regulation of self-dealing opportunities is necessary to facilitate access to funding when self-dealing is not verifiable, and explains why current regulation does not simply ban all self-dealing operations. We then analyze the two alternative existing enforcement mechanisms, which are based on disclosure and approval rules (Rules-based regime) and/or on litigation rules (Standard-based regime). While both prove effective at facilitating access to funding, we show that an alternative penalty default regulation could improve overall efficiency by providing incentives for the controller and the outside investors to opt-out and implement the first-best contract

The promise of reward crowdfunding

Research Question/IssueWe study reward crowdfunding (RC), the most innovative segment of the crowdfunding market, where, instead of a debt or equity contract, fund providers are promised some good or service in the future in exchange for their contribution to the funding of the investment project under a contract that does not penalize the creator's failure to deliver. The existing economic and legal literature is puzzled by the platform's use of this seemingly inefficient contract where a standard pre-sale contract would appear to work better. Research Findings/InsightsCounterintuitively, we prove that the no-penalty contract is the optimal contract between creators of unknown talent and early adopters of their products when creators can benefit from being discovered as talented and from the goodwill generated by delivering on their promise to early adopters. Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur analysis contributes to understanding RC by showing that the no-penalty RC contract, far from being an inefficiency, is a contractual innovation specifically designed for talent discovery. We also contribute to the literature on relationship contracts, showing that even in a one-shot game, it is possible to sustain a contract in the desire to build a reputation that will be useful in a future contract with a third party. Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur analysis has important policy implications on how backers should be protected. Standard measures of consumer or investor protection may be counterproductive.María Gutiérrez‐Urtiaga gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Comunidad de Madrid and the EU's European Social Fund through grant S2015/HUM‐3353 EARLYFIN‐CM and from the European Regional Development Fund through grant FEDER UNC315‐EE‐3636

Identificando algunas causas del fracaso en el aprendizaje de la recursividad: análisis experimental en las asignaturas de programación

La recursividad es una herramienta muy potente para la solución de problemas complejos, sin embargo constituye uno de los conceptos más difíciles de entender por los alumnos cuando están aprendiendo a programar. En este artículo se describe una experiencia desarrollada en las asignaturas de Fundamentos de Programación I y de Metodología de la Programación en la Escuela Superior de Informática en Ciudad Real, que tenía como objetivo identificar las necesidades del alumnado a la hora de enfrentarse a la asimilación del concepto de recursividad. El hecho de haber realizado la experiencia en distintos cursos nos ha servido para identificar empíricamente los aspectos que más dificultades les suponen en distintas etapas de su aprendizaje. El estudio que se presenta en este artículo nos ha permitido contrastar la opinión y experiencia de los distintos grupos de estudiantes. Las conclusiones de esta experiencia y las lecciones aprendidas permitirán diseñar en el futuro una herramienta para la visualización de la recursividad que se adapte a las distintas necesidades del alumno, dependiendo de la etapa de aprendizaje en la que se encuentre.SUMMARY -- Recursion is a powerful tool for solving complex problems but it really is one of the most difficult concepts for students to understand when learning to program. This article describes the experience developed in the subjects of Fundamentals of Programming I and Programming Methodology in the School of Informatics in Ciudad Real in order to identify the needs of students when faced with the assimilation of recursion. The fact that the experience has been carried out in different courses has allowed us to identify empirically those aspects more difficult for the understanding of recursive algorithms at different stages of the learning. The study presented in this article allows us to contrast the opinion and experience of different groups of students. The conclusions of this experience and the lessons learned will enable design a tool for visualization of recursion to suit different needs depending on the student's learning stage

Consejeros dominicales minoritarios y buen gobierno corporativo

The capital companies law allows the appointment of constituency directors tothe board without the concurrence of the majorityas amechanism to empower minority shareholders.The proportional representation system (art. 243 LSC) intendsto give voice to minority shareholders, in line with the most innovative trends in corporate governance and shareholder activism. The presence of minority directors on the board raisesissues of interestfor our Law. First, the fittingof directors appointed by minority or controlling shareholders in the legal status of directorship. Because directors are naturally dependent on the shareholder who appoints them, they suffer from a conflict of loyalties between serving the company or their dominus. Company Law tries to mitigate it through the duty of independence (art. 228 d) LSC), or abstention rules forconflicts of interest (art. 228 c) LSC). Second, the competitor doctrine, enshrined inarticles 229.1 f) and 224.2 LSC, applies only to minority directors, and works as a shield to prevent these minority directors from entering the board without the consent of the controlling shareholder. Ultimately, the pro-majority biasprevailing among the Spanish doctrine leads to an asymmetric treatment of controlling directors compared to minority directors and lowers the quality of corporate governanc