Do High Interest Rates Defend Currencies During Speculative Attacks? New evidence

A recent paper by Kraay (2003) documents the lack of any systematic association between monetary policy and the outcome of a speculative attack. This paper extends Kraay’s work by introducing an improved measure of monetary policy and an additional country-specific fundamental, short-term corporate debt, to capture balance sheet vulnerabilities emphasized by the recent currency crises literature. The results show that for low levels of short-term corporate debt, raising interest rates lowers the probability of a successful attack. This effect decreases and eventually reverses for higher levels of debt. These findings contrast earlier empirical evidence and imply a fundamental reconsideration of the role of monetary policy during currency crises.speculative attacks; currency crises; monetary policy; short-term debt

Stock prices and output growth: an examination of the credit channel

When stock market values fall, we know that investors expect lower economic growth in the future. But can stock market declines actually affect future growth? There is some evidence that they can-through the credit channel.Stock - Prices

On the Market Discipline of Informationally-Opaque Firms: Evidence from Bank Borrowers in the Federal Funds Market

Using plausibly exogenous variation in demand for federal funds created by daily shocks to reserve balances, we identify the supply curve facing a bank borrower in the interbank market and study how access to overnight credit is affected by changes in public and private measures of borrower creditworthiness. Although there is evidence that lenders respond to adverse changes in public information about credit quality by restricting access to the market in a fashion consistent with market discipline, there is also evidence that borrowers respond to adverse changes in private information about credit quality by increasing leverage so as to offset the future impact on earnings. While the responsiveness of investors to public information is comforting, we document evidence that suggests that banks are able to manage the real information content of these disclosures. In particular, public measures of loan portfolio performance have information about future loan charge-offs, but only in quarters when the bank is examined by supervisors. However, the loan supply curve is not any more sensitive to public disclosures about nonperforming loans in an exam quarter, suggesting that investors are unaware of this information management

Do High Interest Rates Defend Currencies During Speculative Attacks? New Evidence

A recent paper by Kraay (2003) documents the lack of any systematic association between monetary policy and the outcome of a speculative attack. This paper extends Kraay’s work by introducing an improved measure of monetary policy and an additional country-specific fundamental, short-term corporate debt, to capture balance sheet vulnerabilities emphasized by the recent currency crises literature. The results show that for low levels of short-term corporate debt, raising interest rates lowers the probability of a successful attack. This effect decreases and eventually reverses for higher levels of debt. These findings contrast earlier empirical evidence and imply a fundamental reconsideration of the role of monetary policy during currency crises

Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking:evidence from internal loan ratings

We analyze the effect of deposit insurance on the risk-taking behavior of banks in the context of a quasi-natural experiment using detailed credit registry data. Using the case of an emerging economy, Bolivia, which introduced a deposit insurance system during the sample period, we compare the risk-taking behavior of banks before and after the introduction of this system. We find that in the post-deposit insurance period, banks are more likely to initiate riskier loans (i.e., loans with worse internal ratings at origination). These loans carry higher interest rates and are associated with worse ex-post performance (i.e., they have higher default and delinquency rates). Banks do not seem to compensate for the extra risk by increasing collateral requirements or decreasing loan maturities. We also find evidence that the increase in risk-taking is due to the decrease in market discipline from large depositors. Finally, differences between large (too-big-to-fail) and small banks diminished in the post-deposit insurance period

Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking: Evidence from internal loan ratings

We analyze the effect of deposit insurance on the risk-taking behavior of banks in the context of a quasi-natural experiment using detailed credit registry data. Using the case of an emerging economy, Bolivia, which introduced a deposit insurance system during the sample period, we compare the risk-taking behavior of banks before and after the introduction of this system. We find that in the post-deposit insurance period, banks are more likely to initiate riskier loans (i.e., loans with worse internal ratings at origination). These loans carry higher interest rates and are associated with worse ex-post performance (i.e., they have higher default and delinquency rates). Banks do not seem to compensate for the extra risk by increasing collateral requirements or decreasing loan maturities. We also find evidence that the increase in risk-taking is due to the decrease in market discipline from large depositors. Finally, differences between large (too-big-to-fail) and small banks diminished in the post-deposit insurance period.