81 research outputs found
Incentives and tranche retention in securitisation : a screening model
This paper examines the power of different contractual mechanisms to influence an originator's choice of costly effort to screen borrowers when the originator plans to securitise its loans. The analysis focuses on three potential mechanisms: the originator holds a "vertical slice", or share of the portfolio; the originator holds the equity tranche of a structured finance transaction; the originator holds the mezzanine tranche, rather than the equity tranche. These mechanisms will result in differing levels of screening, and the differences arise from varying sensitivities to a systematic risk factor. Equity tranche retention is not always the most effective mechanism, and the equity tranche can be dominated by either a vertical slice or a mezzanine tranche if the probability of a downturn is likely and if the equity tranche is likely to be depleted in a downturn. If the choice of how much and what form to retain is left up to the originator, the retention mechanism may lead to low screening effort, suggesting a potential rationale for government interventionsecuritisation, retention requirements, tranching, screening incentives
Daily CDS pricing in emerging markets before and during the global financial crisis
In this paper, we study the determinants of daily spreads for emerging market sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) over the period April 2002âDecember 2011. Using GARCH models, we find, first, that daily CDS spreads for emerging market sovereigns are more related to global and regional risk premia than to country-specific risk factors. This result is particularly evident during the second subsample (August 2007âDecember 2011), where neither macroeconomic variables nor country ratings significantly explain CDS spread changes. Second, measures of US bond, equity, and CDX High Yield returns as well as emerging market credit returns turn out to be the most dominant drivers of CDS spread changes. Finally, our analysis suggests that CDS spreads are more strongly influenced by international spillover effects during periods of market stress
An international survey of stress tests
In the summer of 2000, central banks from the Group of Ten countries surveyed large international banks about their use of stress tests_a risk management tool that measures a firm's exposure to extreme movements in asset prices. The survey findings highlight the risks that most concern financial institutions and clarify how these institutions use stress tests in their overall risk management programs.Risk management ; Risk assessment ; Financial services industry
European banks\u27 US dollar funding pressures
article describing the woes of European banks and how money flowed between US and European branche
Manager- und transaktionsspezifische Determinanten der Performance von Arbitrage CLOs
Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Determinanten der Performance europĂ€ischer Arbitrage Collateralized Loan Obligations fĂŒr das Jahr 2009. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf der Bedeutung der performanceabhĂ€ngigen VergĂŒtung des CLO-Managers, den Eigenschaften des CLO-Managers und der Transaktionscharakteristika als mögliche Einflussfaktoren der Rating Performance. Es wird gezeigt, dass Transaktionen, bei denen dem CLO-Manager eine Incentive Management Fee gewĂ€hrt wird, mit einer höheren Wahrscheinlichkeit herabgestuft werden als Transaktionen ohne Incentive Fee. Dieser Befund bestĂ€tigt die Hypothese, dass durch die Incentive Fee Risikoanreize fĂŒr CLO-Manager geschaffen werden. Des Weiteren wird ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen der Erfahrung bzw. der GröĂe eines CLO-Managers und der Rating Performance festgestellt. Der Einfluss des Managers auf die Performance einer CLO-Transaktion wird auch an den weiteren in der Studie herangezogenen managerspezifischen Charakteristika wie Typ und Unternehmenssitz bestĂ€tigt. FĂŒr die Transaktionscharakteristika wird hingegen im betrachteten Untersuchungszeitraum kein signifikanter Einfluss auf die Rating Performance nachgewiesen
Optimal Opacity on Financial Markets
We analyze the incentives for information disclosure in financial markets. We show that borrowers may have incentives to voluntarily withhold information and that doing so is most attractive for claims that are inherently hard to value, such as portfolios of subprime mortgages. Interestingly, opacity may be optimal even though it increases informational asymmetries between contracting parties. Finally, in our setting a government can intervene in ways that ensure the liquidity of financial markets and that resemble the initial plans for TARP. Even if such interventions are ex-post optimal, they affect incentives for information disclosure and have ambiguous ex-ante effects
Incentives and tranche retention in securitisation: a screening model. NBB Working Paper 177, October 2009
This paper examines the power of different contractual mechanisms to influence an originator's choice of costly effort to screen borrowers when the originator plans to securitise its loans. The analysis focuses on three potential mechanisms: the originator holds a "vertical slice", or share of the portfolio; the originator holds the equity tranche of a structured finance transaction; the originator holds the mezzanine tranche, rather than the equity tranche. These mechanisms will result in differing levels of screening, and the differences arise from varying sensitivities to a systematic risk factor. Equity tranche retention is not always the most effective mechanism, and the equity tranche can be dominated by either a vertical slice or a mezzanine tranche if the probability of a downturn is likely and if the equity tranche is likely to be depleted in a downturn. If the choice of how much and what form to retain is left up to the originator, the retention mechanism may lead to low screening effort, suggesting a potential rationale for government intervention
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