Who gets labour market training? : Access biases of social investment in Finland

Policy access biases worry social policy scholars because they generate Matthew effects that exacerbate socioeconomic divides. Yet, access biases in many social investment policies, like training during unemployment, remain under-researched. Such access biases may be detrimental to a critical objective of social investment: to improve and uplift workers with precarious economic prospects. We focus here on access bias in training provided by public employment services against lower-educated workers. They are vulnerable to unemployment and fractured employment and should thus be targeted for training. While there is burgeoning attention on access biases in training against disadvantaged youths and non-citizens, fewer studies have focused on similar access bias against lower-educated workers. We highlight that access bias against such workers may stem from their lower willingness and demand for training, as well as policy design, informal eligibility criteria and caseworkers' creaming practices. We suggest, however, that greater availability of training opportunities may ease this access bias against lower-educated workers. Using the Finnish Income Distribution survey data (2007-2012), we find evidence of training access bias: primary-educated workers are significantly less likely to participate in training than upper secondary and vocationally educated workers. Concurrently, our results show that availability of training is not significantly associated with the extent of training access bias against primary-educated workers. With a Nordic welfare model that prioritizes training to remedy labour market vulnerability and stresses that access to benefits and services is based on need, Finland represents a least likely case to find such access bias in training. We therefore consider these results worrying: if it is found here, it may be prevalent in countries with other welfare models.Peer reviewe

Status decline and welfare competition worries from an automating world of work : the implications of automation risk on support for benefit conditionality policies and party choice

In West European economies, there is growing concern about the extent to which workplace automation affects employment patterns, and thus the level of risk which workers may face from such labour market disruption. There are also worries that elevated automation risk may generate substantial political fallout, namely automation-driven grievances that feedback into the political process. In this regard, I ask: how does automation risk affect individual workers’ support for social policies and party choice? I focus particularly on its impact on workers’ support for benefit conditionality policies and radical right parties. I argue that the impact of automation risk on these two political outcomes may be traced to automation-vulnerable workers’ fear of status decline and concern about welfare competition. These worries may emanate from workers’ elevated automation risk, even if they do not actually become unemployed from automation. Benefit conditionality policies, which are increasingly prevalent, apply stringent obligations like accepting available albeit worse jobs, and sanctions like unemployment benefit cuts to pressure unemployed workers into reemployment. Automation-vulnerable workers may reject benefit conditionality because its stringent obligations and sanctions may exacerbate their economic vulnerabilities. However, they may yet support benefit conditionality if they consider their worries about status decline and welfare competition to be more salient than their worries about the economic costs of benefit conditionality. These worries may have electoral implications. If automation-vulnerable workers worry about status decline and welfare competition and support benefit conditionality, they may prefer parties that support such policies, like radical right parties whose appeals speak to these concerns. This study investigates these political implications of automation risk in West European countries by exploiting cross-national individual-level surveys from the European Social Survey. I find that automation-vulnerable workers support benefit conditionality policies that obligate unemployed workers to accept worse jobs, namely lower wage or educationally mismatched jobs. This finding may indicate that these workers find welfare competition and status decline worries more salient than potential economic costs which they may suffer from benefit conditionality. These worries may also explain their preference for radical right parties over other party families. These findings show that risk is an important determinant of support for benefit conditionality policies, and its impact should be disentangled from that of current employment status. However, and through the case of automation, I demonstrate that risk may manifest different worries and threats, even non-economic ones, which may likewise affect benefit conditionality support. I also echo recent studies which show that automation-vulnerable workers’ support for radical right parties may be traced to their status worries, but I add that their concerns about welfare competition and support for benefit conditionality may also be relevant explanations.How do individual workers respond to the threat of workplace automation in Western Europe today? This dissertation explores this issue in terms of workers’ support for welfare policies and voting behaviour. With regards to welfare policies, the dissertation looks at whether workers whose jobs are threatened by automation support stringent obligations and conditions being attached to receiving unemployment benefits. These conditions may include accepting jobs which pay lower wages or require lower education. At the same time, the dissertation also examines whether such workers prefer specific parties. Overall, this dissertation argues that the political responses of automation-threatened workers may depend on whether they feel more insecure about their economic or status prospects. It provides descriptive evidence showing that when workers whose jobs are threatened by automation fear a decline in their social status, they support stringent obligations being attached to unemployment benefit recipiency and prefer radical right parties

Moral Economy Theory

Peer reviewe

The “losers of automation” : A reservoir of votes for the radical right?

This paper studies the association between the risk of automation and vote choice in 11 West European countries. We extend upon labour economics literature on the effects of automation on the labour market by focusing on the political consequences of automation. We also build on existing work relating labour market risks to support for radical right parties. We argue that automation threat is most likely to increase support for radical right parties. We demonstrate that those more inclined to vote for the radical right rather than the average voters are those who are both threatened by automation and are still “just about managing” economically. They are more receptive to the narrative of the radical right, which simultaneously highlights the risk, and proposes protection. Using cross-sectional individual level data drawn from the European Social Survey (rounds 6, 7 and 8), we find that individuals who perceive themselves as “coping on present income” are significantly more likely to vote for radical right parties as risk of automation increases. They are also less likely to vote for major right parties.Peer reviewe

The “losers of automation” : A reservoir of votes for the radical right?

This paper studies the association between the risk of automation and vote choice in 11 West European countries. We extend upon labour economics literature on the effects of automation on the labour market by focusing on the political consequences of automation. We also build on existing work relating labour market risks to support for radical right parties. We argue that automation threat is most likely to increase support for radical right parties. We demonstrate that those more inclined to vote for the radical right rather than the average voters are those who are both threatened by automation and are still “just about managing” economically. They are more receptive to the narrative of the radical right, which simultaneously highlights the risk, and proposes protection. Using cross-sectional individual level data drawn from the European Social Survey (rounds 6, 7 and 8), we find that individuals who perceive themselves as “coping on present income” are significantly more likely to vote for radical right parties as risk of automation increases. They are also less likely to vote for major right parties.Peer reviewe

A green but also just transition? Variations in social and industrial policy responses to industrial decarbonisation in EU member states

The EU aims for net carbon neutrality by 2050. Since industry contributes substantially to carbon emissions, reforms to decarbonise industry are necessary to achieve this goal. However, these reforms may entail labour market costs in the form of unemployment, which may necessitate social policies to mitigate them. Our article provides a novel contribution to the existing literature by developing a framework to classify how these policy responses may vary across EU Member States and it also suggests sources for these variations. We analyse the planned social policy responses of four countries – Denmark, Germany, Spain and Poland – by comparing the emphasis on social investment relative to compensation; the emphasis on social relative to industrial policy; and the extent to which social policy is targeted. Our findings suggest that Danish plans will rely primarily on social investment, whereas Poland will rely on compensation. In Germany, there is a greater emphasis on industrial policy, and Spain’s planned responses differ between policies targeted at coal miners and policies for other workers

European social dialogues : shaping EU social policy through parental leave rights

The European Social Dialogue (ESD) has served as the platform for European social partners to negotiate parental leave policies at the European Union (EU) level since 1995. The partners’ efforts to revise the regulations in 2015, in response to the European Commission’s broader approach toward European work–life balance policies, failed, however, and the reasons for and implications of this failure remain insufficiently explored. Drawing on existing ESD literature and leveraging the regulator-intermediary-target (RIT) model, the authors develop a typology of policymaking outcomes based on the analysis of three parental leave directives from 1996 to 2019. The findings demonstrate that divergent preferences among European social partners, particularly when juxtaposed against the Commission’s policy objectives and interests, reduced the probability of a successful ESD through which European social partners could generate a framework agreement. Instead of being rule-makers, these conditions relegated European social partners to the role of rule-takers. If this trend continues, it poses a significant challenge to the role and influence of European social partners in EU policymaking

Wnt/β-Catenin Signaling Induces the Aging of Mesenchymal Stem Cells through the DNA Damage Response and the p53/p21 Pathway

Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of cellular extrinsic factors in the aging of adult stem cells. However, the effects of an aged cell–extrinsic environment on mesenchymal stem cell (MSC) aging and the factors involved remain unclear. In the current study, we examine the effects of old rat serum (ORS) on the aging of MSCs, and explore the effects and mechanisms of Wnt/β-catenin signaling on MSC aging induced by ORS treatment. Senescence-associated changes in the cells are examined with SA-β-galactosidase staining and ROS staining. The proliferation ability is detected by MTT assay. The surviving and apoptotic cells are determined using AO/EB staining. The results suggest that ORS promotes MSC senescence and reduces the proliferation and survival of cells. The immunofluorescence staining shows that the expression of β-catenin increases in MSCs of old rats. To identify the effects of Wnt/β-catenin signaling on MSC aging induced with ORS, the expression of β-catenin, GSK-3β, and c-myc are detected. The results show that the Wnt/β-catenin signaling in the cells is activated after ORS treatment. Then we examine the aging, proliferation, and survival of MSCs after modulating Wnt/β-catenin signaling. The results indicate that the senescence and dysfunction of MSCs in the medium containing ORS is reversed by the Wnt/β-catenin signaling inhibitor DKK1 or by β-catenin siRNA. Moreover, the expression of γ-H2A.X, a molecular marker of DNA damage response, p16INK4a, p53, and p21 is increased in senescent MSCs induced with ORS, and is also reversed by DKK1 or by β-catenin siRNA. In summary, our study indicates the Wnt/β-catenin signaling may play a critical role in MSC aging induced by the serum of aged animals and suggests that the DNA damage response and p53/p21 pathway may be the main mediators of MSC aging induced by excessive activation of Wnt/β-catenin signaling

Unpredictable and non-transparent working conditions? : riders in the food-delivery sector in six EU countries

This report focuses on the social rights of the most flexible non-standard workers. It does so with reference to the stipulations in the new EU Directive 2019/1152 on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions (TPWC). The Directive – which at the time of writing is not yet fully implemented in all countries – aims to ensure that workers receive information about their working conditions in writing at an early stage and benefit from minimum rights to prevent precariousness. We focus, in particular, on one of the most flexible group of non-standard workers – platform-based food delivery workers (riders). Platform work was one of the explicit targets of the Directive. While the Directive will not apply to genuinely self-employed workers, it is applicable to those in bogus self-employment – therefore including riders who hold no employee status despite the platform’s employee-like control over them It is an interesting case to scrutinise the potential benefits and limits of the TPWC Directive as working hours are highly variable and platform work is carried out on the basis of a variety of employment statuses (including solo self-employment) and contract types (employment by third-party agencies, civil law contracts, mini-jobs etc.). This report draws on country case studies and uses variation across sectors. The cases – Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland and Spain – are justified by their coverage of a range of industrial relations models and welfare regimes; features that are likely to impact the situation of the sector in the specific countries. These differences mean that the Directive may have differential impact on riders’ working conditions in the near future once fully implemented. To account for firm-level variation in the organization of food delivery platforms, we identified the two companies with the highest market share at the time of writing for each of our country cases (Just Eat and Wolt for Denmark, Lieferando and Gorillas for Germany, Just Eat and Glovo for Spain, Uber Eats and Deliveroo for France, Pyszne.pl (Just Eat) and Uber Eats for Poland and Thuisbezorgd.nl (Just Eat) and Uber Eats for the Netherlands). The country case studies are based on desk research which included information provided to riders during the application process and where possible scrutiny of contracts, service agreements, collective agreements and relevant legislation. The information provided during application formed an essential aspect for our analysis as information discrepancies between platforms’ online FAQs, job advertisements and what is then contractually agreed upon illustrates the state of predictability and transparency of working conditions well. For some countries expert interviews with trade union representatives have been conducted to verify or expand information. Analytically, the paper draws on the power resource framework of Vandenbroucke et al (2021) which distinguishes between normative, instrumental and enforcement resources. This allows us to systematically analyse the situation of riders across countries and platforms in relation to the Directive’s aims. Our findings show that riders often have poor work-related rights (normative resources) and inadequate information about these rights (instrumental resources) – and these problems are particularly salient for those in solo self-employment. The TPWC Directive might thus eventually – when fully implemented - improve parts of the working conditions on food delivery platforms