The Indexical 'I' the First Person in Thought and Language

The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in cognition. The first part of the book constitutes a critique of different solutions to the problem of how 'I' refers, while the second part advances a positive account of 'I'. It is argued that 'I' refers indirectly through a de re sense that is based on non-conceptual content. 'I' expresses an individual concept with two components: the de re sense and a context-independent, fundamental self-concept. By interacting with the environment the subject forms belifs about herself that are essentially first-personal. To have a full-blown self-consciousness and be a competent speaker of 'I', the subject must be able to connect these indexical beliefs with general ones and thus conceive of herself as part of the objective order. The use of 'I' moreover presupposes unity of consciousness and identity over time on the part of the speake

Empathy, engagement, entrainment: the interaction dynamics of aesthetic experience

A recent version of the view that aesthetic experience is based in empathy as inner imitation explains aesthetic experience as the automatic simulation of actions, emotions, and bodily sensations depicted in an artwork by motor neurons in the brain. Criticizing the simulation theory for committing to an erroneous concept of empathy and failing to distinguish regular from aesthetic experiences of art, I advance an alternative, dynamic approach and claim that aesthetic experience is enacted and skillful, based in the recognition of others’ experiences as distinct from one’s own. In combining insights from mainly psychology, phenomenology, and cognitive science, the dynamic approach aims to explain the emergence of aesthetic experience in terms of the reciprocal interaction between viewer and artwork. I argue that aesthetic experience emerges by participatory sense-making and revolves around movement as a means for creating meaning. While entrainment merely plays a preparatory part in this, aesthetic engagement constitutes the phenomenological side of coupling to an artwork and provides the context for exploration, and eventually for moving, seeing, and feeling with art. I submit that aesthetic experience emerges from bodily and emotional engagement with works of art via the complementary processes of the perception–action and motion–emotion loops. The former involves the embodied visual exploration of an artwork in physical space, and progressively structures and organizes visual experience by way of perceptual feedback from body movements made in response to the artwork. The latter concerns the movement qualities and shapes of implicit and explicit bodily responses to an artwork that cue emotion and thereby modulate over-all affect and attitude. The two processes cause the viewer to bodily and emotionally move with and be moved by individual works of art, and consequently to recognize another psychological orientation than her own, which explains how art can cause feelings of insight or awe and disclose aspects of life that are unfamiliar or novel to the viewer

Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality

Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoretical puzzles have been defended by Regan 1980, Bacharach (Research in Economics 53: 117–147, 1999), Hurley (Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 264–265, 2003), Sugden (Philosophical Explorations 6(3):165–181, 2003), and Tuomela 2013, among others. While collectivistic game theorists like Michael Bacharach provide formal frameworks designed to avert some of the standard dilemmas, philosophers of collective action like Raimo Tuomela aim at substantive accounts of collective action that may explain how agents overcoming such social dilemmas would be motivated. This paper focuses on the conditions on collective action and intention that need to be fulfilled for Bacharach’s “team reasoning” to occur. Two influential approaches to collective action are related to the idea of team reasoning: Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intention and Raimo Tuomela’s theory of a we-mode of intending. I argue that neither captures the “agency transformation” that team reasoning requires. That might be an acceptable conclusion for Bratman but more problematic for Tuomela, who claims that Bacharach’s results support his theory. I sketch an alternative framework in which the perspectival element that is required for team reasoning - the ‘we-perspective’ - can be understood and functionally characterized in relation to the traditional distinction between mode and content of intentional states. I claim that the latter understanding of a collective perspective provides the right kind of philosophical background for team reasoning, and I discuss some implications in relation to Tuomela’s assumption that switching between individual and collective perspectives can be a matter of rational choice

Nordic Walking and chronic low back pain: design of a randomized clinical trial

BACKGROUND: Low Back Pain is a major public health problem all over the western world. Active approaches including exercise in the treatment of low back pain results in better outcomes for patients, but it is not known exactly which types of back exercises are most beneficial or whether general physical activity provide similar benefits. Nordic Walking is a popular and fast growing type of exercise in Northern Europe. Initial studies have demonstrated that persons performing Nordic Walking are able to exercise longer and harder compared to normal walking thereby increasing their cardiovascular metabolism. Until now no studies have been performed to investigate whether Nordic Walking has beneficial effects in relation to low back pain. The primary aim of this study is to investigate whether supervised Nordic Walking can reduce pain and improve function in a population of chronic low back pain patients when compared to unsupervised Nordic Walking and advice to stay active. In addition we investigate whether there is an increase in the cardiovascular metabolism in persons performing supervised Nordic Walking compared to persons who are advised to stay active. Finally, we investigate whether there is a difference in compliance between persons receiving supervised Nordic Walking and persons doing unsupervised Nordic Walking. METHODS: One hundred and fifty patients with low back pain for at least eight weeks and referred to a specialized secondary sector outpatient back pain clinic are included in the study. After completion of the standard back centre treatment patients are randomized into one of three groups: A) Nordic Walking twice a week for eight weeks under supervision of a specially trained instructor; B) Unsupervised Nordic Walking for eight weeks after one training session with an instructor; C) A one hour motivational talk including advice to stay active. Outcome measures are pain, function, overall health, cardiovascular ability and activity level. RESULTS: No results available at this point. DISCUSSION: This study will investigate the effect of Nordic Walking on pain and function in a population of people with chronic LBP. TRIAL REGISTRATION: registration # NCT0020982

Highly efficient separation of actinides from lanthanides by a phenanthroline-derived bis-triazine ligand

The synthesis, lanthanide complexation, and solvent ex- traction of actinide(III) and lanthanide(III) radiotracers from nitric acid solutions by a phenanthroline-derived quadridentate bis-triazine ligand are described. The ligand separates Am(III) and Cm(III) from the lanthanides with remarkably high efficiency, high selectivity, and fast extraction kinetics compared to its 2,2'-bipyridine counterpart. Structures of the 1:2 bis-complexes of the ligand with Eu(III) and Yb(III) were elucidated by X-ray crystallography and force field calculations, respec-tively. The Eu(III) bis-complex is the first 1:2 bis-complex of a quadridentate bis-triazine ligand to be characterized by crystallography. The faster rates of extraction were verified by kinetics measurements using the rotating membrane cell technique in several diluents. The improved kinetics of metal ion extraction are related to the higher surface activity of the ligand at the phase interface. The improvement in the ligand's properties on replacing the bipyridine unit with a phenanthroline unit far exceeds what was anticipated based on ligand design alone

S-ketamine in patient-controlled analgesia reduces opioid consumption in a dose-dependent manner after major lumbar fusion surgery: A randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trial

Background Spinal fusion surgery causes severe pain. Strong opioids, commonly used as postoperative analgesics, may have unwanted side effects. S-ketamine may be an effective analgesic adjuvant in opioid patient-controlled analgesia (PCA). However, the optimal adjunct S-ketamine dose to reduce postoperative opioid consumption is still unknown.Methods We randomized 107 patients at two tertiary hospitals in a double-blinded, placebo-controlled clinical trial of adults undergoing major lumbar spinal fusion surgery. Patients were randomly allocated to four groups in order to compare the effects of three different doses of adjunct S-ketamine (0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 mg ml-1) or placebo on postoperative analgesia in oxycodone PCA. Study drugs were administered for 24 hours postoperative after which oxycodone-PCA was continued for further 48 hours. Our primary outcome was cumulative oxycodone consumption at 24 hours after surgery.Results Of the 100 patients analyzed, patients receiving 0.75 mg ml(-1) S-ketamine in oxycodone PCA needed 25% less oxycodone at 24 h postoperatively (61.2 mg) compared with patients receiving 0.5 mg ml(-1) (74.7 mg) or 0.25 mg ml(-1) (74.1 mg) S-ketamine in oxycodone or oxycodone alone (81.9 mg) (mean difference: -20.6 mg; 95% confidence interval [CI]: -41 to -0.20; P = 0.048). A beneficial effect in mean change of pain intensity at rest was seen in the group receiving 0.75 mg ml(-1) S-ketamine in oxycodone PCA compared with patients receiving lower ketamine doses or oxycodone alone (standardized effect size: 0.17, 95% CI: 0.013-0.32, P = 0.033). The occurrence of adverse events was similar among the groups.Conclusions Oxycodone PCA containing S-ketamine as an adjunct at a ratio of 1: 0.75 decreased cumulative oxycodone consumption at 24 h after major lumbar spinal fusion surgery without additional adverse effects

Semantics, conceptual spaces, and the meeting of minds

We present an account of semantics that is not construed as a mapping of language to theworld but rather as amapping between individual meaning spaces. The meanings of linguistic entities are established via a “meeting of minds.” The concepts in the minds of communicating individuals are modeled as convex regions in conceptual spaces. We outline a mathematical framework, based on fixpoints in continuous mappings between conceptual spaces, that can be used to model such a semantics. If concepts are convex, it will in general be possible for interactors to agree on joint meaning even if they start out from different representational spaces. Language is discrete, while mental representations tend to be continuous—posing a seeming paradox. We show that the convexity assumption allows us to address this problem. Using examples, we further show that our approach helps explain the semantic processes involved in the composition of expressions

The mismeasure of ape social cognition

In his classic analysis, The Mismeasure of Man, Gould (1981) demolished the idea that intelligence was an inherent, genetic trait of different human groups by emphasizing, among other things, (a) its sensitivity to environmental input, (b) the incommensurate pre-test preparation of different human groups, and (c) the inadequacy of the testing contexts, in many cases. According to Gould, the root cause of these oversights was confirmation bias by psychometricians, an unwarranted commitment to the idea that intelligence was a fixed, immutable quality of people. By virtue of a similar, systemic interpretive bias, in the last two decades, numerous contemporary researchers in comparative psychology have claimed human superiority over apes in social intelligence, based on two-group comparisons between postindustrial, Western Europeans and captive apes, where the apes have been isolated from European styles of social interaction, and tested with radically different procedures. Moreover, direct comparisons of humans with apes suffer from pervasive lapses in argumentation: Research designs in wide contemporary use are inherently mute about the underlying psychological causes of overt behavior. Here we analyze these problems and offer a more fruitful approach to the comparative study of social intelligence, which focuses on specific individual learning histories in specific ecological circumstances