Who is the accused? The interrogation of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal

ABSTRACT The miḥna (218-234 H.) was a defining event of Islamic spiritual authority. Its importance was evident to contemporaries, the inquisitors and their victims, and each side recorded the events. This study compares these accounts. It concentrates on three components that appear in both narratives: how each side told the story to the wide public; how they perceived the torture of Ibn Ḥanbal; how they described and understood the dialogue between Ibn Ḥanbal and his inquisitors. Interestingly, the depictions of these events bear a strong resemblance. The aim of this study is to trace how shared factual descriptions end up promoting opposing ideologies.La Miḥna (218-234 H) fue un acontecimiento definitorio de la autoridad espiritual islámica. Su importancia fue evidente para sus contemporáneos, tanto los inquisidores como sus víctimas, y ambos lados recogieron los acontecimientos producidos. Este artículo compara estas narraciones. Se concentra en tres elementos que aparecen en ambos relatos: cómo cada lado contó la historia a un público amplio; cómo percibieron la tortura de Ibn Ḥanbal; cómo describieron y comprendieron el diálogo entre Ibn Ḥanbal y sus inquisidores. Es interesante señalar que los relatos de ambos lados de estos acontecimientos tienen un gran parecido. El objeto de este estudio es detectar de qué modo las descripciones de hechos comunes acaban apoyando ideologías opuestas

The formation of Ḥanbalism : piety into power /

Originally published: Richmond: Curzon, 2001

Sunni Islamists: From Syria to the Umma, and Back

International audienceContrary to a widespread belief, Arab nationalism did not emerge in Syria as a purely secular ideology, considering that proto-Islamists played a key role in popularizing it from the late Ottoman era onward. This emphasis on Syria’s Arabness was perpetuated after independence by the Muslim Brotherhood: first, out of a quest for relevance in the country’s parliamentary system, notably after Nasser’s popularity grew among the conservative opinion; second, because after it was banned by the Baathist regime in 1963, the Brotherhood considered that returning to Syrian politics required to remain in tune with Arab nationalist ideas, despite the fact that the latter were increasingly vilified by conservative ulama and Islamist militants in the name of Pan-Islamic unity. The 2011 revolution and ensuing conflict had ambivalent consequences in that respect: On the one hand, alignment with the popular uprising encouraged a focus on Syrianhood as opposed to transnational identities, not only on the part of the Brotherhood, but also among hardliners like Ahrar al-Sham and, more ambiguously, the formerly al-Qaeda affiliated Hay’aTahrir al-Sham; on the other hand, the Islamic State’s unrepentant Pan-Islamists seized the new opportunity structure to proclaim the restoration of the Caliphate