The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents supply more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contracts; thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.Incentives, non-monotone contracts, single-crossing property.

The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents supply more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contracts; thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively relatedIncentives, non-monotone contracts, single-crossing property.

Land taxes in a Latin American context

Since Henry George (1839-1897) economists have been arguing that a tax on unim- proved land is an ideal tax on e¢ ciency grounds. Output taxes, on the other hand, have distortional e¤ects on the economy. This paper shows that under asymmetric information output tax might be used along with land tax in order to implement the optimal taxation scheme in a Latin-American context, i.e., in an economy with imperfect land-rental market, non-agricultural land use and non-revenue objectives of land taxation. Also, we show that: (i) schemes based on land taxes alone might not be implementable; and (ii) tax evasion is more acute among large landholders.Optimal taxation, tax evasion, land use.

Interest Rates in Trade Credit Markets

There is evidence that suppliers have private information about their customers' credit risk. Yet, interest rates in trade credit markets are usually industry-not-firm specific. Why? If the demand for intermediate products is inelastic, suppliers should raise interest rates until they reach their customers' outside option, which, by definition, cannot reflect information that is privy to suppliers. In contrast, a highly elastic demand induces suppliers with monopoly power to waive interest, making private information once more irrelevant to the trade-credit rate. By characterizing these two equilibria, we obtain implications on when trade-credit rates shouldn't vary with private information held by suppliers.Trade Credit; Invariance of Interest Rates

Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule

Discontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined tie-breaking rules and communication of private information. We show that an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is sufficient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a class of auctions. The rule is explicitly defined and does not require communication of private information. We also characterize when special tie-breaking rules are really needed