A Brief History of Mobile Telecommunication in Europe

Since the introduction of mobile telephony in the early fifties in Europe, US and Japan the demand for this service exploded. It seems that the latent demand for mobile telecommunication services for decade's continued to be very strong. Since the introduction of cellular technology the capacity of the services increasingly became able to meet the massive demand. Next and future generations of mobile telecommunication technologies bring increased transmission speed and more versatile services. This forces network operators to organise multi- sourced information flows supplied by service providers to increase the network effect of the system instead of providing the network infrastructure and leave the content to the users as in pure voice telephony. The drivers and inhibitors behind the emergence and recent developments of mobile telecommunications systems in Europe are highlighted in this paper. Liberalisation of the telecom markets in Europe drove new entrants to the market and curbed excessive pricing. However, in recent years the lack of challenging service is the main cause for the wavering development of newer generations of mobile telecommunication services.Telecommunications, Market Structure, Production, Pricing, Technological Change, Economic History, Europe

Opening up the Pandora Box of Deregulation - the Deregulation Process of the Swedish Railway System

Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

Competitive tenders in passenger railway services: Looking into the theory and practice of different approaches in Europe

During the past 15 years competitive tenders have become a common procedure to procure and organise passenger railway services in European Union member countries. Different models have been developed in different countries, spanning from the British radical privatisation and franchising of the railway services to the more incremental processes in countries like Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. The variety of tendering models has occurred for a number of reasons. For example, EU legislation permits different models of organising tenders, member countries have had different goals with the introduction of tenders and other reforms, and within countries we find trial-and-error processes aiming at reducing earlier flaws. In this article we will describe the dominating tendering procedures, look into their theoretical rationale and discuss their possible pitfalls and advantages, drawing from the experiences of several countries. It is evident that the different tendering regimes suffer from different types of problems. In the Swedish tenders there have often been very few competing firms, in Britain the long time span of the first round of franchised contracts resulted in difficulties in making correct estimates of future developments etc. The article concludes with an overall appraisal of the different models and explores the possibilities for learning across the tendering regimes

Competitive Tendering of Railway Services in Sweden Extent and Effects 1989-1999

In 1988 the vertical separation of the Swedish State Railways into one train operator (SJ) and one infrastructure holder (Banverket) was implemented. Together with the transfer of responsibility for the regional non-profitable passenger railway services to regional transport authorities, this reform paved the way for the introduction of competitive tendering for these services. Initially, only one new firm entered, but through subsequent tenders this figure has increased to four. Since 1992 it has also been possible for the state’s negotiator to procure the non-profitable interregional services by means of tendering. For several years no actual entry occurred on this part of the market, partly due to more demanding conditions compared to other tenders. However, following the outcome of the latest tenders, new entry is set to take place in January 2000. Consequently, what started as a very slow walk towards more competition in the railway sector has taken us to a point where SJ is facing actual competition on almost all parts of the market. In addition to discussing the new entrants, the different types of tenders are compared in some detail in the paper. Some empirical data on the number of bidders, cost reductions, innovations and travelling changes related to tenders is presented and interpreted. The development of the behaviour of SJ and its competitors is also discussed, as well as the further impact upon transport policy.Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

Prospects And Pitfalls Of Public-Private Partnerships In The Transportation Sector – Theoretical Issues And Empirical Experience

One effect of the regulatory reforms in the transportation sector is that private companies increasingly participate in the investments in new transportation systems. These investments may amount to very large sums in the coming 10-year-period. There are several different ways to categorise these projects, but with a common name they may all be viewed as Public- Private Partnerships (PPPs). Some PPP projects may be very long-term, including new infrastructure investments as in concessions and Build-Operate-Transfer projects, while others may be more short-term, concerning reinvestments only – and sometimes even limited to the task of operating a finished construction. The overall goal of PPP projects is to find solutions to problems in which the advantages of the private sector (such as financial assets, efficient management, propensity to innovative and entrepreneurship) are combined with the advantages of the public sector (such as social and environmental concern). When carried out successfully, PPP projects can be very powerful tools to quickly construct new infrastructure facilities and operate them efficiently. However, experience has also shown that they may sometimes go wrong, creating transportation systems that are inefficient, under-used and lossmaking. Although PPPs are still considered to be interesting solutions for urgent projects when budget constraints limit the possibilities for public-only investments, the discouraging experience of some high-profile projects have had a negative impact on the reputation of the PPP model. In this paper, we discuss the prospects and pitfalls of PPPs in the transportation sector, focussing on long-term projects involving investments in new infrastructure for roads and railways. Of particular interest are the various problems related to the sharing of risks between different partners in a PPP project. This includes both the risk sharing between the private and the public sector and the distribution of risk among the involved private firms, such as the members of a consortium but also their relations to banks and similar institutions. The risks of a PPP project are typically related to estimations and forecasts of market development and other factors. We discuss these issues by using the theoretical concepts of lock-in and hold-up problems, and what can be done to avoid them in terms of PPP and contract design. The theoretical discussion and the conclusions of the paper also draw from the gathered empirical experience of previous projects, primarily from European countries.Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

The complexity of market structure – prospects for on-the-track competition in Sweden 1

During 2009, the Swedish Government is proposing to the Parliament that the last remaining monopoly of the national operator SJ – the commercial parts of rail passenger traffic – is removed in a step-wise process 2009-2010. This would introduce the possibility of on-the track competition for rail passenger services on all parts of the network. If so, it will mark the finalisation of a process that started in 1988 with the vertical separation of railway infrastructure from operations. The critical issue is how to legislate and regulate the new railway market that will emerge in 2010-2012. In this paper, we discuss the conditions for such a reform, looking at some critical issues such as the interface between subsidised (tendered) services and commercial services, the markets for rolling stock and vehicle maintenance, and the distribution of infrastructure capacity. The first aim of the paper is to recapitulate and analyze the increasing commitment to deregulation in the Swedish railway market. The second aim is to analyze the possible options that are at hand in dismantling SJ AB’s remaining monopoly rights to profitable railway lines in the inter-regional railway market and other potential sources of monopoly power. The third aim is to describe and analyze the transition from the multitude of market structures that exist today to an envisioned unified market structure after the reform. In addition, the sustainability of SJ’s financial performance in a changing market environment is reviewed, finding that the influence from general business cycles may be an important factor. The paper also includes an overview of the experience from the previous regulatory reforms and recent changes in the competitive environment and supporting industries.Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

The complexity of market structure – prospects for on-the-track competition in Sweden 1

During 2009, the Swedish Government is proposing to the Parliament that the last remaining monopoly of the national operator SJ – the commercial parts of rail passenger traffic – is removed in a step-wise process 2009-2010. This would introduce the possibility of on-the track competition for rail passenger services on all parts of the network. If so, it will mark the finalisation of a process that started in 1988 with the vertical separation of railway infrastructure from operations. The critical issue is how to legislate and regulate the new railway market that will emerge in 2010-2012. In this paper, we discuss the conditions for such a reform, looking at some critical issues such as the interface between subsidised (tendered) services and commercial services, the markets for rolling stock and vehicle maintenance, and the distribution of infrastructure capacity. The first aim of the paper is to recapitulate and analyze the increasing commitment to deregulation in the Swedish railway market. The second aim is to analyze the possible options that are at hand in dismantling SJ AB’s remaining monopoly rights to profitable railway lines in the inter-regional railway market and other potential sources of monopoly power. The third aim is to describe and analyze the transition from the multitude of market structures that exist today to an envisioned unified market structure after the reform. In addition, the sustainability of SJ’s financial performance in a changing market environment is reviewed, finding that the influence from general business cycles may be an important factor. The paper also includes an overview of the experience from the previous regulatory reforms and recent changes in the competitive environment and supporting industries.Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

Strategic Pricing by Oligopolists in Public Tenders of Passenger Railway Services

An important component in the deregulation of the public sector in the European Union is public procurement of services and products. This paper studies the bidding behavior of firms participating in public tenders of passenger railway services in Sweden. At a later stage in this research, the intention is to broaden the analysis to include the similar markets of Great Britain and Germany. A general assumption in the paper is that firms sometimes place very low bids and sometimes very high bids in tenders. In a theoretical part of the paper we discuss both these forms of strategic pricing, linked to a discussion on continuous and discontinuous economies of scale regarding costs of production. Detailed data on bids and bidders in Swedish tenders of railway services are then analyzed. About 30 tenders taking place between 1992 and 2003 are included, checking for cases of very low and high bids and other types of deviation within the data material. Among the early results, based upon this rather limited data set, we find that big firms like SJ and Connex tend to place either the lowest or the highest bid when participating in tenders. Connex’ bids generally deviate more from the average bid level than the bids from other firms. More data from Sweden and other countries is needed to make further analyses and hypothesis testing applicable. The scarcity of data is in itself an interesting result of the study, since it is caused by efforts of the procuring authorities to protect the “secrets” of the bidders. We argue that this is against the competition policy of the European Union and may harm the tendering process and industry development.Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

Prospects And Pitfalls Of Public-Private Partnerships In The Transportation Sector – Theoretical Issues And Empirical Experience

One effect of the regulatory reforms in the transportation sector is that private companies increasingly participate in the investments in new transportation systems. These investments may amount to very large sums in the coming 10-year-period. There are several different ways to categorise these projects, but with a common name they may all be viewed as Public- Private Partnerships (PPPs). Some PPP projects may be very long-term, including new infrastructure investments as in concessions and Build-Operate-Transfer projects, while others may be more short-term, concerning reinvestments only – and sometimes even limited to the task of operating a finished construction. The overall goal of PPP projects is to find solutions to problems in which the advantages of the private sector (such as financial assets, efficient management, propensity to innovative and entrepreneurship) are combined with the advantages of the public sector (such as social and environmental concern). When carried out successfully, PPP projects can be very powerful tools to quickly construct new infrastructure facilities and operate them efficiently. However, experience has also shown that they may sometimes go wrong, creating transportation systems that are inefficient, under-used and lossmaking. Although PPPs are still considered to be interesting solutions for urgent projects when budget constraints limit the possibilities for public-only investments, the discouraging experience of some high-profile projects have had a negative impact on the reputation of the PPP model. In this paper, we discuss the prospects and pitfalls of PPPs in the transportation sector, focussing on long-term projects involving investments in new infrastructure for roads and railways. Of particular interest are the various problems related to the sharing of risks between different partners in a PPP project. This includes both the risk sharing between the private and the public sector and the distribution of risk among the involved private firms, such as the members of a consortium but also their relations to banks and similar institutions. The risks of a PPP project are typically related to estimations and forecasts of market development and other factors. We discuss these issues by using the theoretical concepts of lock-in and hold-up problems, and what can be done to avoid them in terms of PPP and contract design. The theoretical discussion and the conclusions of the paper also draw from the gathered empirical experience of previous projects, primarily from European countries.Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

A mutation in POLE predisposing to a multi-tumour phenotype

Somatic mutations in the POLE gene encoding the catalytic subunit of DNA polymerase epsilon have been found in sporadic colorectal cancers (CRCs) and are most likely of importance in tumour development and/or progression. Recently, families with dominantly inherited colorectal adenomas and colorectal cancer were shown to have a causative heterozygous germline mutation in the proofreading exonuclease domain of POLE. The highly penetrant mutation was associated with predisposition to CRC only and no extra-colonic tumours were observed. We have identified a mutation in a large family in which the carriers not only developed CRC, they also demonstrate a highly penetrant predisposition to extra-intestinal tumours such as ovarian, endometrial and brain tumours. The mutation, NM_006231.2:c.1089C>A, p.Asn363Lys, also located in the proofreading exonuclease domain is directly involved in DNA binding. Theoretical prediction of the amino acid substitution suggests a profound effect of the substrate binding capability and a more severe impairment of the catalytic activity compared to the previously reported germline mutation. A possible genotype to phenotype correlation for deleterious mutations in POLE might exist that needs to be considered in the follow-up of mutation carriers