Inside Lawyers: Friends or Gatekeepers?

Part I of this Article sets the stage by contrasting two alternative proposals to reform the inside lawyer\u27s role—my reform and Hamermesh\u27s counterreform. Part II discusses the primary empirical disagreements between the two approaches. Part III interrogates the propriety and the utility of invoking the “lawyer as friend” analogy as a model to guide inside counsel\u27s relationships with managers

Economic Inequality, Access to Law, and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements: A Comment on the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role

This Article contends that these autonomy-based defenses of the standard conception cannot withstand the “economic inequality” objection. According to this objection, the moral worthiness of lawyering under the standard conception cannot be reconciled with a legal system that is so marred by gross economic inequality such that only the wealthy have access to lawyers. It can also not be reconciled with the fact that the wealthy routinely use lawyers to undermine the public interest and exploit others who cannot afford lawyers. After examining responses to the economic inequality objection, this Article concludes that these responses do not take seriously how economic inequality can interact with the principle of neutrality to exacerbate inequality. Specifically, they fail to consider the possibility that lawyers, acting according to the principle of neutrality, will foreclose others’ access to lawyers (and thereby the law) and undermine their autonomy—the very value that underwrites these defenses

Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping

This Article asks and answers the following question: why does the legal profession resist gatekeeping? Or, put another way, why do lawyers resist duties that require them to act to avert harm to their corporate client, its own shareholders, and-possibly-the capital markets? While acknowledging that the economic self-interest of the profession is an undeniable force fueling the bar’s opposition to gatekeeping, this Article argues that the characterization of naked rent-seeking behavior is too simplistic. It argues that economic self-interest exerts a more subtle influence than the conventional story would suggest. In addition, the legal profession’s resistance to gatekeeping is grounded in lawyers’ internalization of attitudes held by the corporate managers serving as the clients’ representatives and lawyers’ lack of empathy for potential shareholder-victims. In short, under-examined psychological forces other than economic self-interest loom large in the profession’s resistance to gatekeeping

Legal Ethics After #MeToo: Autonomy, Domination, and Nondisclosure Agreements

The legal profession has long embraced what is called the “standard conception” of legal ethics, the prevailing model guiding the social and professional norms of American lawyers since at least the 1970s. The standard conception requires lawyers to promote their clients’ interests vigorously within the bounds of law and urges lawyers to be morally neutral toward lawful client ends, regardless of even the predictable consequences of their representations, including any harms inflicted on third parties or the public at large. Central to the most prominent defenses of the standard conception is the value of individual autonomy, specifically the client’s. According to these defenses, when lawyers help to preserve and express the autonomy of clients vis-à-vis the legal system, lawyers provide a moral good. This article challenges the standard conception—specifically, the critical role that “autonomy” plays in its justification. It calls for an alternative model of legal ethics that draws from the republican intellectual tradition. Part I reviews some of the leading defenses of the standard conception and shows how they have identified autonomy as a core value underlying the standard conception. Part II interrogates the notoriously nebulous notion of autonomy and teases out its various entailments, including the distinction between negative liberty and positive liberty—concepts which have been integral to all major modern political philosophical traditions, including the classical and contemporary liberal traditions, which have provided the intellectual grounding for the standard conception. With these distinctions in hand, Part III explains how the standard conception exacts an “autonomy appropriation” from lawyers to their clients in disproportionate and regressive ways. It argues that the standard conception violates the very value used to justify its existence. Part IV looks outward from the bilateral relationship between lawyer and client to think about the impact on third parties and raises the “autonomy externality” problem. It argues that, even if we stay laser-focused on the value of autonomy alone, clients’ exercise of their autonomy can undermine the autonomy of others. Hence, lawyers’ enhancement of their clients’ autonomy can simultaneously undermine the autonomy of third persons. To explore the autonomy externality problem in stark, real-world terms, Part IV conducts a case study of pre-filing nondisclosure agreements (“NDAs”) used by lawyers to settle sexual abuse claims made against powerful clients. It shows how lawyers who recommend, negotiate, and draft NDAs on behalf of their clients undermine the autonomy of third persons by enabling repeat sexual abuse. What is more, the justifications for the standard conception are paralyzed by a commitment to value neutrality, making the standard conception ill-equipped to assess autonomy tradeoffs between the client and third parties, such as with NDAs. Part V introduces an alternative conception of autonomy, based on the republican notion of liberty. Whereas liberal understandings of autonomy emphasize negative and certain forms of positive liberty, the republican conception of autonomy is the absence of domination. Returning to the case study of NDAs, it argues that an alternative model of legal ethics based on republican liberty is better able to assess autonomy tradeoffs and to provide moral guidance that better comports with our sense that some incursions on autonomy are more serious than others. It then offers suggestions on how we might rekindle the civic virtue of the legal profession around the value of republican liberty. Part VI answers objections that a republican conception of legal ethics would perversely lead to lawyers dominating clients or be inferior to the direct regulation of autonomy externalities

Understanding the differentiation, expansion, recruitment and suppressive activities of myeloid-derived suppressor cells in cancers

There has been a great interest in myeloid-derived suppressor cells (MDSCs) due to their biological functions in tumor-mediated immune escape by suppressing antitumor immune responses. These cells arise from altered myelopoiesis in response to the tumor-derived factors. The most recognized function of MDSCs is suppressing anti-tumor immune responses by impairing T cell functions, and these cells are the most important players in cancer dissemination and metastasis. Therefore, understanding the factors and the mechanism of MDSC differentiation, expansion, and recruitment into the tumor microenvironment can lead to its control. However, most of the studies only defined MDSCs with no further characterization of granulocytic and monocytic subsets. In this review, we discuss the mechanisms by which specific MDSC subsets contribute to cancers. A better understanding of MDSC subset development and the specific molecular mechanism is needed to identify treatment targets. The understanding of the specific molecular mechanisms responsible for MDSC accumulation would enable more precise therapeutic targeting of these cells