The informativeness of the technical conversion factor for the price ratio of processing livestock

The technical conversion factor (TCF) is a survey-based estimate of the percentage of carcass weight obtained per unit of live weight. Practitioners and researchers have used it to predict the corresponding price ratio (PR). We use both in-sample regressions and out-of-sample forecasting analysis to test the validity of this approach in case of predicting the price effects of processing livestock in Europe. By regressing the PR on the inverse value of the corresponding TCF for a large panel of European countries and animal types, we find a significant positive relation between these variables, which also has economic value in terms of improving out-of-sample forecasting precision. This result is shown to be robust to animal type, year, and country fixed effects. The TCF therefore has predictive value about the corresponding PR.(3

On the expected number of equilibria in a multi-player multi-strategy evolutionary game

In this paper, we analyze the mean number $E(n,d)$ of internal equilibria in a general $d$-player $n$-strategy evolutionary game where the agents' payoffs are normally distributed. First, we give a computationally implementable formula for the general case. Next we characterize the asymptotic behavior of $E(2,d)$, estimating its lower and upper bounds as $d$ increases. Two important consequences are obtained from this analysis. On the one hand, we show that in both cases the probability of seeing the maximal possible number of equilibria tends to zero when $d$ or $n$ respectively goes to infinity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that the expected number of stable equilibria is bounded within a certain interval. Finally, for larger $n$ and $d$, numerical results are provided and discussed.Comment: 26 pages, 1 figure, 1 table. revised versio

Was the Higgs boson discovered?

The standard model has postulated the existence of a scalar boson, named the Higgs boson. This boson plays a central role in a symmetry breaking scheme called the Brout-Englert-Higgs mechanism (or the Brout-Englert-Higgs-Guralnik-Hagen-Kibble mechanism, for completeness) making the standard model realistic. However, until recently at least, the 50-year-long-sought Higgs boson had remained the only particle in the standard model not yet discovered experimentally. It is the last but very important missing ingredient of the standard model. Therefore, searching for the Higgs boson is a crucial task and an important mission of particle physics. For this purpose, many theoretical works have been done and different experiments have been organized. It may be said in particular that to search for the Higgs boson has been one of the ultimate goals of building and running the LHC, the world's largest and most powerful particle accelerator, at CERN, which is a great combination of science and technology. Recently, in the summer of 2012, ATLAS and CMS, the two biggest and general-purpose LHC collaborations, announced the discovery of a new boson with a mass around 125 GeV. Since then, for over two years, ATLAS, CMS and other collaborations have carried out intensive investigations on the newly discovered boson to confirm that this new boson is really the Higgs boson (of the standard model). It is a triumph of science and technology and international cooperation. Here, we will review the main results of these investigations following a brief introduction to the Higgs boson within the theoretical framework of the standard model and Brout-Englert-Higgs mechanism as well as a theoretical and experimental background of its search. This paper may attract interest of not only particle physicists but also a broader audience.Comment: LateX, 23 pages, 01 table, 9 figures. To appear in Commun. Phys. Version 2: Minor changes, two references adde

Essays on Asymmetric Information

This dissertation consists of three essays on the role of asymmetric information in economics. The central theme is on how asymmetric information, which can arise either exogenously or endogenously, have important implications on welfare and market design. Chapter 1 is entitled Within-Household Selection in the Health Insurance Market. This chapter studies the existence of adverse selection in Vietnam's Social Health Insurance program and how household decision making affects individual enrollment into insurance. I find that while there is a strong evidence of adverse selection at the individual level, selection into insurance happens both \emph{across} and \emph{within} households. I then explore different household factors that affect the selection of health insurance within the household such as the household's ability to share risk and within-household bargaining power. These findings have important policy implications for two reasons. First, in the presence of household decision making, price discrimination policy to reduce adverse selection at the individual level such as age-based pricing might not always be welfare improving. Second, any policy that attempts to generate pooling beyond the level sustained by the private market can distort the household's incentive to buy health insurance and worsen adverse selection for the rest of the market. Chapter 2 is entitled Household Bundling to Reduce Adverse Selection: Application to Social Health Insurance. This chapter explores the use of bundling to reduce adverse selection in insurance markets and its application to social health insurance programs. When the choice to buy health insurance is made at the household level, bundling the insurance policies of household members eliminates the effect of adverse selection \emph{within} a household since the household can no longer select only sick members to enroll. However, this can exacerbate adverse selection \emph{across} households, as healthier households might choose to drop out of the insurance market. The net effect of this trade-off depends on the characteristics of the household demand for medical care and risk preferences. I explore this issue using individual survey data on insurance enrollment and medical spending in Vietnam that contain detailed information about the structure of the household. I develop and estimate a model of household insurance bundle choice and medical utilization that accounts for these features. The results suggest that much of the adverse selection is concentrated within the household. Counterfactual analysis reveals that under optimal pricing, household bundling yields significantly higher consumer surplus and insurance enrollment than individual purchase. Furthermore, the insurance market is less susceptible to complete unraveling under household bundling. Chapter 3 is entitled Information Control in the Hold-up Problem, and it is a joint work with Teck Yong Tan. In this chapter, we study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. Our main result identifies a separation between information that creates ex-ante investment incentive and information that causes ex-post inefficiency, which then allows ex-post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex-ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the investment levels and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold-up risks