Why do large shareholders adopt a short-term versus a long-term investment horizon in different firms?

I ask why the same large shareholders have different investment horizons. Using data for 1998–2013, I examine four fundamental firm policies for their potential influence on blockholders’ investments with different time horizons. The panel ordinary least squares, difference‐in‐difference (using the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act), logistic, and dynamic generalized method of moments regression analyses reveal that blockholders adopt a short‐term horizon in smaller firms with a less independent board, high leverage, and high dividends while the same blockholders keep their investments longer in firms with a more independent board and low dividends. Under various economic conditions, different firm characteristics gain importance in blockholders’ decision on short‐term versus long‐term investments

An examination of the relationship of governance structure and performance: Evidence from banking companies in Bangladesh

Corporate governance has become increasingly important in developed and developing countries just after a series of corporate scandals and failures in a number of countries. Corporate governance structure is often viewed as a means of corporate success despite prior studies reveal mixed, somewhere conflicting and ambiguous, and somewhere no relationship between governance structure and performance. This study empirically investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance of listed banking companies in Bangladesh by using two multiple regression models. The study reveals that a good number of companies do not comply with the regulatory requirements indicating remarkable shortfall in corporate governance practice. The companies are run by the professional managers having no duality and no ownership interest for which they are compensated by high remuneration to curb agency conflict. Apart from some inconsistent relationship between some corporate variables, the corporate governance mechanisms do not appear to have significant relationship with financial performances. The findings reveal an insignificant negative impact or somewhere no impact of independent directors and non-independent non-executive directors on the level of performance that strongly support the concept that the managers are essentially worthy of trust and earn returns for the owners as claimed by stewardship theory. The study provides support for the view that while much emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms is necessary to safeguard the interest of stakeholders; corporate governance on its own, as a set of codes or standards for corporate conformance, cannot make a company successful. Companies need to balance corporate governance mechanisms with performance by adopting strategic decision and risk management with the efficient utilization of the organization’s resources

Risk-shifting Through Issuer Liability and Corporate Monitoring

This article explores how issuer liability re-allocates fraud risk and how risk allocation may reduce the incidence of fraud. In the US, the apparent absence of individual liability of officeholders and insufficient monitoring by insurers under-mine the potential deterrent effect of securities litigation. The underlying reasons why both mechanisms remain ineffective are collective action problems under the prevailing dispersed ownership structure, which eliminates the incentives to moni-tor set by issuer liability. This article suggests that issuer liability could potentially have a stronger deterrent effect when it shifts risk to individuals or entities holding a larger financial stake. Thus, it would enlist large shareholders in monitoring in much of Europe. The same risk-shifting effect also has implications for the debate about the relationship between securities litigation and creditor interests. Credi-tors’ claims should not be given precedence over claims of defrauded investors (e.g., because of the capital maintenance principle), since bearing some of the fraud risk will more strongly incentivise large creditors, such as banks, to monitor the firm in jurisdictions where corporate debt is relatively concentrated

Hamlet and the fall of the Berlin wall : the myth of interventionist Shakespeare performance

The critical reception of Heiner Müller’s 1990 Hamlet/Maschine at the Deutsches Theater in East Berlin epitomizes a trend of crediting GDR Shakespeare performance with political influence. Drawing on rehearsal notes and reviews, Oliver challenges the interventionist Shakespeare myth, contrasting the Deutsches Theater’s political involvement with the impact of its Hamlet production on events surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall. Shakespeare’s capacity for political intervention at this point was limited by theater practitioners’ reliance on public funding, their close relationships with governmental authority, and an underlying distrust of the masses. Ultimately, GDR artists proved useful to the 1989 protest movement because they occupied a unique position at the interface of dissidence and power

Multiple agency perspective, family control, and private information abuse in an emerging economy

Using a comprehensive sample of listed companies in Hong Kong this paper investigates how family control affects private information abuses and firm performance in emerging economies. We combine research on stock market microstructure with more recent studies of multiple agency perspectives and argue that family ownership and control over the board increases the risk of private information abuse. This, in turn, has a negative impact on stock market performance. Family control is associated with an incentive to distort information disclosure to minority shareholders and obtain private benefits of control. However, the multiple agency roles of controlling families may have different governance properties in terms of investors’ perceptions of private information abuse. These findings contribute to our understanding of the conflicting evidence on the governance role of family control within a multiple agency perspectiv

A Low-Mass Planet with a Possible Sub-Stellar-Mass Host in Microlensing Event MOA-2007-BLG-192

We report the detection of an extrasolar planet of mass ratio q ~ 2 x 10^(-4) in microlensing event MOA-2007-BLG-192. The best fit microlensing model shows both the microlensing parallax and finite source effects, and these can be combined to obtain the lens masses of M = 0.060 (+0.028 -0.021) M_sun for the primary and m = 3.3 (+4.9 -1.6) M_earth for the planet. However, the observational coverage of the planetary deviation is sparse and incomplete, and the radius of the source was estimated without the benefit of a source star color measurement. As a result, the 2-sigma limits on the mass ratio and finite source measurements are weak. Nevertheless, the microlensing parallax signal clearly favors a sub-stellar mass planetary host, and the measurement of finite source effects in the light curve supports this conclusion. Adaptive optics images taken with the Very Large Telescope (VLT) NACO instrument are consistent with a lens star that is either a brown dwarf or a star at the bottom of the main sequence. Follow-up VLT and/or Hubble Space Telescope (HST) observations will either confirm that the primary is a brown dwarf or detect the low-mass lens star and enable a precise determination of its mass. In either case, the lens star, MOA-2007-BLG-192L, is the lowest mass primary known to have a companion with a planetary mass ratio, and the planet, MOA-2007-BLG-192Lb, is probably the lowest mass exoplanet found to date, aside from the lowest mass pulsar planet.Comment: Accepted for publication in the Astrophysical Journal. Scheduled for the Sept. 1, 2008 issu

Murine and Bovine γδ T Cells Enhance Innate Immunity against Brucella abortus Infections

γδ T cells have been postulated to act as a first line of defense against infectious agents, particularly intracellular pathogens, representing an important link between the innate and adaptive immune responses. Human γδ T cells expand in the blood of brucellosis patients and are active against Brucella in vitro. However, the role of γδ T cells in vivo during experimental brucellosis has not been studied. Here we report TCRδ−/− mice are more susceptible to B. abortus infection than C57BL/6 mice at one week post-infection as measured by splenic colonization and splenomegaly. An increase in TCRγδ cells was observed in the spleens of B. abortus-infected C57BL/6 mice, which peaked at two weeks post-infection and occurred concomitantly with diminished brucellae. γδ T cells were the major source of IL-17 following infection and also produced IFN-γ. Depletion of γδ T cells from C57BL/6, IL-17Rα−/−, and GMCSF−/− mice enhanced susceptibility to B. abortus infection although this susceptibility was unaltered in the mutant mice; however, when γδ T cells were depleted from IFN-γ−/− mice, enhanced susceptibility was observed. Neutralization of γδ T cells in the absence of TNF-α did not further impair immunity. In the absence of TNF-α or γδ T cells, B. abortus-infected mice showed enhanced IFN-γ, suggesting that they augmented production to compensate for the loss of γδ T cells and/or TNF-α. While the protective role of γδ T cells was TNF-α-dependent, γδ T cells were not the major source of TNF-α and activation of γδ T cells following B. abortus infection was TNF-α-independent. Additionally, bovine TCRγδ cells were found to respond rapidly to B. abortus infection upon co-culture with autologous macrophages and could impair the intramacrophage replication of B. abortus via IFN-γ. Collectively, these results demonstrate γδ T cells are important for early protection to B. abortus infections

Institutional investors and corporate governance

We provide a comprehensive overview of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance with three main components. First, we establish new stylized facts documenting the evolution and importance of institutional ownership. Second, we provide a detailed characterization of key aspects of the legal and regulatory setting within which institutional investors govern portfolio firms. Third, we synthesize the evolving response of the recent theoretical and empirical academic literature in finance to the emergence of institutional investors in corporate governance. We highlight how the defining aspect of institutional investors – the fact that they are financial intermediaries – differentiates them in their governance role from standard principal blockholders. Further, not all institutional investors are identical, and we pay close attention to heterogeneity amongst institutional investors as blockholders