891 research outputs found

    Co-evolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking

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    Here we introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. We provide analytic results for the limiting cases where linking dynamics is much faster than evolutionary dynamics and vice-versa, and show how the individual capacity of forming new links or severing inconvenient ones maps into the problem of strategy evolution in a well-mixed population under a different game. For intermediate ranges, we investigate numerically the detailed interplay determined by these two time-scales and show that the scope of validity of the analytical results extends to a much wider ratio of time scales than expected

    Similarity based cooperation and spatial segregation

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    We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial extension to a two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts with eight players in a Moore neighborhood. The system shows a strong segregation independent on parameters. The introduction of a local conversion mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of spiral waves in the spatial game. In the case of asymmetric costs of cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending on both cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed point of a forecast rule in the symmetric game, which corresponds to cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes unstable for high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure

    Equilibrium states for potentials with \sup\phi - \inf\phi < \htop(f)

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    In the context of smooth interval maps, we study an inducing scheme approach to prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium states for potentials ϕ\phi with he `bounded range' condition \sup \phi - \inf \phi < \htop, first used by Hofbauer and Keller. We compare our results to Hofbauer and Keller's use of Perron-Frobenius operators. We demonstrate that this `bounded range' condition on the potential is important even if the potential is H\"older continuous. We also prove analyticity of the pressure in this context.Comment: Added Lemma 6 to deal with the disparity between leading eigenvalues and operator norms. Added extra references and corrected some typo

    Stochasticity and evolutionary stability

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    In stochastic dynamical systems, different concepts of stability can be obtained in different limits. A particularly interesting example is evolutionary game theory, which is traditionally based on infinite populations, where strict Nash equilibria correspond to stable fixed points that are always evolutionarily stable. However, in finite populations stochastic effects can drive the system away from strict Nash equilibria, which gives rise to a new concept for evolutionary stability. The conventional and the new stability concepts may apparently contradict each other leading to conflicting predictions in large yet finite populations. We show that the two concepts can be derived from the frequency dependent Moran process in different limits. Our results help to determine the appropriate stability concept in large finite populations. The general validity of our findings is demonstrated showing that the same results are valid employing vastly different co-evolutionary processes

    Replicators in Fine-grained Environment: Adaptation and Polymorphism

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    Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the two-player replicator dynamics. For sufficiently fast environmental changes, this is reduced to a multi-player replicator dynamics in a constant environment. The two-player terms correspond to the time-averaged payoffs, while the three and four-player terms arise from the adaptation of the morphs to their varying environment. Such multi-player (adaptive) terms can induce a stable polymorphism. The establishment of the polymorphism in partnership games [genetic selection] is accompanied by decreasing mean fitness of the population.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figure

    Stochastic gain in population dynamics

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    We introduce an extension of the usual replicator dynamics to adaptive learning rates. We show that a population with a dynamic learning rate can gain an increased average payoff in transient phases and can also exploit external noise, leading the system away from the Nash equilibrium, in a reasonance-like fashion. The payoff versus noise curve resembles the signal to noise ratio curve in stochastic resonance. Seen in this broad context, we introduce another mechanism that exploits fluctuations in order to improve properties of the system. Such a mechanism could be of particular interest in economic systems.Comment: accepted for publication in Phys. Rev. Let

    Hawks and Doves on Small-World Networks

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    We explore the Hawk-Dove game on networks with topologies ranging from regular lattices to random graphs with small-world networks in between. This is done by means of computer simulations using several update rules for the population evolutionary dynamics. We find the overall result that cooperation is sometimes inhibited and sometimes enhanced in those network structures, with respect to the mixing population case. The differences are due to different update rules and depend on the gain-to-cost ratio. We analyse and qualitatively explain this behavior by using local topological arguments.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure

    Nongaussian fluctuations arising from finite populations: Exact results for the evolutionary Moran process

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    The appropriate description of fluctuations within the framework of evolutionary game theory is a fundamental unsolved problem in the case of finite populations. The Moran process recently introduced into this context [Nowak et al., Nature (London) 428, 646 (2004)] defines a promising standard model of evolutionary game theory in finite populations for which analytical results are accessible. In this paper, we derive the stationary distribution of the Moran process population dynamics for arbitrary 2×22\times{}2 games for the finite size case. We show that a nonvanishing background fitness can be transformed to the vanishing case by rescaling the payoff matrix. In contrast to the common approach to mimic finite-size fluctuations by Gaussian distributed noise, the finite size fluctuations can deviate significantly from a Gaussian distribution.Comment: 4 pages (2 figs). Published in Physical Review E (Rapid Communications

    Coexistence and Survival in Conservative Lotka-Volterra Networks

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    Analyzing coexistence and survival scenarios of Lotka-Volterra (LV) networks in which the total biomass is conserved is of vital importance for the characterization of long-term dynamics of ecological communities. Here, we introduce a classification scheme for coexistence scenarios in these conservative LV models and quantify the extinction process by employing the Pfaffian of the network's interaction matrix. We illustrate our findings on global stability properties for general systems of four and five species and find a generalized scaling law for the extinction time
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