How Can Non-State Initiatives Help to Increase National Contributions under the UNFCCC?

The international governance landscape on climate change mitigation is increasingly complex across multiple governance levels. Climate change mitigation initiatives by non-state stakeholders can play an important role in governing global climate change and contribute to avoiding unmanageable climate change. It has been argued that the UNFCCC could and should play a stronger role in ‘orchestrating’ the efforts of these initiatives within the wider climate regime complex and thus inspire new and enhanced climate action. In fact, the Lima-Paris Action Agenda supporting cooperative climate action among state and non-state actors was supposed to be a major outcome of COP21. There is little doubt that successful mitigation initiatives can create a momentum for climate protection. What is missing, is a systematic analysis of how this momentum can feed back into the UNFCCC negotiation process, inspiring also enhanced and more ambitious climate mitigation by states in future iterations of the cycle of nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. This paper aims to close this gap: building on a structurational regime model, the article [1] develops a theory of change of how and through which structuration channels non-state initiatives can contribute to changing the politics of international climate policy; [2] traces existing UNFCCC processes and the Paris Agreement with a view to identifying entry points for a more direct feedback from non-state initiatives; and [3] derives recommendations on how and under which agenda items positive experiences can resonate within the UNFCCC negotiation process

Auf dem Weg zu einer gerechten globalen Energietransformation? : Die Gestaltungsmacht der SDGs und des Paris Agreement

Wie viel Gestaltungsmacht haben das Pariser Klimaabkommen und die in der Agenda 2030 für nachhaltige Entwicklung formulierten Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) als internationaler Bezugsrahmen für die globale Energietransformation? In der vorliegeneden Studie analysiert Lukas Hermwille die beiden Agenden und stellt deren Komplementaritäten heraus. Die Studie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein Fokus allein auf innovative Ansätze und den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien nicht ausreicht. Nimmt man die Ambition des Zwei-Grad-Limits oder gar des 1,5-Grad-Ziels ernst, reicht es nicht aus, darauf zu warten, bis Kohle, Öl und Gas von alleine obsolet werden, sondern es wird nötig werden, den Ausstieg aus fossilen Energieträgern aktiv politisch zu gestalten. In diesem Sinne empfiehlt die Studie mit Hilfe von "Exnovationsstrategien" auch die potenziellen Verlierer der Energietransformation in den Blick zu nehmen, so Widerstände abzubauen, um den Ausstieg aus der Nutzung fossiler Energieträger rechtzeitig und gleichzeitig sozial gerecht zu erreichen

Offsetting for international aviation : the state of play of market-based measures under ICAO

This JIKO Policy Brief summarizes the state of play of the negotiations on a global market-based mechanism (global MBM) under ICAO. It specifies the respective responsibilities and different approaches of ICAO and the UNFCCC. It traces the historic activities in regard of climate protection under ICAO and provides an overview of the current negotiation process that is to culminate at the upcoming ICAO General Assembly in autumn 2016. Furthermore, the Policy Brief reflects on the CDM experience and derives recommendations

Financing additional emission reductions : what can be learned from the CDM

Many have hoped that the CDM's Additionality, if applied to the wider climate finance domain, can contribute to standardizing the funding criteria. This JIKO Policy Brief therefore explore options of applying the CDM's to do just that. The authors highlight issues of environmental system integrity and efficient allocation of funding, and discuss potential limits of the CDM's Additionality concept in its current form, if applied to climate finance. The prospects are limited, because a clear attribution of emission reductions is almost impossible in a system that does not have as well-defined borders as the zero-sum-game of tradable emission reductions under a capped environment.The authors propose some inroutes to adapting the current approach to Additionality in this context, and pose a number of questions that can help to further discuss and refine the CDM's Additionality concept to make it better applicable for a future, globally inclusive climate regime

Late and expensive : the political economy of coal phase-out in Germany

This chapter reconstructs the main actors, objectives and the pertinent contextual factors that co-determined the German coal phase-out. The German decision to phase out coal no later than 2038 was prepared by intense negotiations under the German "coal commission". It was tasked with finding an end date for coal-fired electricity generation and proposing ways and means to support coal workers and the affected regions. This latter objective was the dominant one, supported by a coalition of trade unions, industry, state-level governments as well as major political parties fearing a surge of far-right populism. Meanwhile, meeting the German climate targets was a key condition in the mandate of the coal commission. Yet, the German targets date back to 2010 and are not aligned with the more ambitious objectives enshrined in the Paris Agreement. This explains why the German coal phase-out schedule is so late and so expensive

Caught in between : credibility and feasibility of the voluntary carbon market post-2020

On the one hand, a large number of companies have committed to achieve net zero emissions and many of them foresee to offset some remaining emissions with carbon credits, suggesting a surge of future demand. Yet, the supply side of the voluntary carbon market is struggling to align its business model with the new legal architecture of the Paris Agreement. This article juxtaposes these two perspectives. It provides an overview of the plans of 482 major companies with some form of neutrality/net zero pledge and traces the struggle on the supply side of the voluntary carbon market to come up with a viable business model that ensures environmental integrity and contributes to achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Our analysis finds that if carbon credits are used to offset remaining emissions against neutrality objectives, these credits need to be accounted against the host countries' Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to ensure environmental integrity. Yet, operationalizing this approach is challenging and will require innovative solutions and political support. Key policy insights: There is a growing mismatch between the faith placed in carbon credits by private sector companies and the continued quest for a common position of the main suppliers of the voluntary carbon market. The voluntary carbon market has not yet found a way to align itself with the new legal architecture of the Paris Agreement in a credible and legitimate way. Public policy support at the national and international level will be needed to operationalize a robust approach for the market’s future activities

Right-wing and populist support for climate mitigation policies: Evidence from Poland and its carbon-intensive Silesia region

Research on environmental behaviour is often overlooked in literature on regime destabilization in energy transitions. This study addresses that gap by focusing on socio-political and demographic factors shaping support for carbon regime destabilization policies in one of the most carbon-intensive regions of Europe. Carbon-intensive industries, especially coal mining and coal-based power generation, are often concentrated in a few carbon-intensive regions. Therefore, decarbonization actions will affect those regions particularly strongly. Correspondingly, carbon-intensive regions often exert significant political influence on the two climate mitigation policies at the national level. Focusing on Poland, we investigate socio-political and demographic factors that correlate with the approval or rejection of the two climate mitigation policies: increasing taxes on fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal and using public money to subsidize renewable energy such as wind and solar power in Poland and its carbon-intensive Silesia region. Using logistic regression with individual-level data derived from the 2016 European Social Survey (ESS) and the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), we find party-political ideology to be an important predictor at the national level but much less so at the regional level. Specifically, voting for right-wing party is not a divisive factor for individual support of the two climate mitigation policies either nationally or regionally. More interestingly, populism is a strong factor in support of increasing taxes on fossil fuel in the carbon-intensive Silesia region but is less important concerning in support of using public money to subsidize renewable energy in Poland overall. These results show the heterogeneity of right-wing party and populism within the support for the two climate mitigation policies. Socio-demographic factors, especially age, gender, education level, employment status, and employment sector, have even more complex and heterogeneous components in support of the two climate mitigation policies at the national and regional levels. Identifying the complex socio-political and demographic factors of climate mitigation policies across different national versus carbon-intensive regional contexts is an essential step for generating in situ decarbonization strategies.publishedVersio

Right-wing and populist support for climate mitigation policies : evidence from Poland and its carbon-intensive Silesia region

Research on environmental behaviour is often overlooked in literature on regime destabilization in energy transitions. This study addresses that gap by focusing on socio-political and demographic factors shaping support for carbon regime destabilization policies in one of the most carbon-intensive regions of Europe. Carbon-intensive industries, especially coal mining and coal-based power generation, are often concentrated in a few carbon-intensive regions. Therefore, decarbonization actions will affect those regions particularly strongly. Correspondingly, carbon-intensive regions often exert significant political influence on the two climate mitigation policies at the national level. Focusing on Poland, we investigate socio-political and demographic factors that correlate with the approval or rejection of the two climate mitigation policies: increasing taxes on fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal and using public money to subsidize renewable energy such as wind and solar power in Poland and its carbon-intensive Silesia region. Using logistic regression with individual-level data derived from the 2016 European Social Survey (ESS) and the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), we find party-political ideology to be an important predictor at the national level but much less so at the regional level. Specifically, voting for right-wing party is not a divisive factor for individual support of the two climate mitigation policies either nationally or regionally. More interestingly, populism is a strong factor in support of increasing taxes on fossil fuel in the carbon-intensive Silesia region but is less important concerning in support of using public money to subsidize renewable energy in Poland overall. These results show the heterogeneity of right-wing party and populism within the support for the two climate mitigation policies. Socio-demographic factors, especially age, gender, education level, employment status, and employment sector, have even more complex and heterogeneous components in support of the two climate mitigation policies at the national and regional levels. Identifying the complex socio-political and demographic factors of climate mitigation policies across different national versus carbon-intensive regional contexts is an essential step for generating in situ decarbonization strategies

Towards net zero: making baselines for international carbon markets dynamic by applying ‘ambition coefficients’

This paper discusses options to increase mitigation ambition in crediting mechanisms that serve the Paris Agreement (PA), such as the Article 6.4 mechanism. Under the Clean Development Mechanism and other crediting mechanisms, baselines have been specified in the form of greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity factors and linked to business-as-usual developments. This means that with increasing production of goods and services through carbon market activities, absolute emissions may increase or fall only slowly. At a global level, such an approach widens the ‘emissions gap’. To enable continued use of emissions intensity baselines in crediting mechanisms while being in line with the PA’s goal to pursue efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5°C, we propose to apply an ‘ambition coefficient’ to emissions intensities of technologies when establishing the baseline. This coefficient would decrease to reflect increasing ambition over time, and reach zero when a country needs to reach net zero emissions. Due to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, the coefficient would fall more quickly for developed than for developing countries. The latter would be able to generate emission reduction credits well beyond 2050, while for the former, crediting would stop around 2035 or before. An ambition coefficient approach would generate certainty for carbon market investors and preserve trust in international carbon markets that operate in line with the agreed, long-term ambition of the international climate regime

Out of the comfort zone! : Governing the exnovation of unsustainable technologies and practices

Innovations are important for sustainability transformations, yet often prove insufficient for replacing established unsustainable structures. The promotion of renewable energy, for example, has been insufficient for pushing coal out of the energy market. The prevalent "innovation bias" should be overcome by complementing innovation politics and research with a stronger occupation with the purposive termination of unsustainable technologies, products and practices. This article therefore introduces the concept of "exnovation" and discusses the need of, as well as different approaches for, the governance of exnovation processes