The consensus paradox: does deliberative agreement impede rational discourse?

This paper explores a tension in deliberative democratic theory. The tension consists in that deliberative opinion-formation ideally aims to reach consensus, while a consensus, once established, will likely impede the conditions for further rational public discourse. Hence, over time, deliberative democracy might risk undermining itself. While the tension is demonstrable in theory, we also suggest three cognitive and socio-psychological mechanisms by which consensus might hamper the rationality of public discourse: after an agreement, participants cease to develop new arguments, they tend to forget existing arguments, and their fear of deviating from the social norm promotes conformism. Existing research has largely neglected to study how consensus in decision-making affects future public deliberation. Our paper thus serves three purposes: To elaborate the consensus paradox in deliberative democratic theory, to open up a research agenda for examining the paradox empirically, and to assess the theoretical implications of the paradox. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12103. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving

The limits of the principle of charity : Why Haesebrouck is wrong after all

In our article entitled ‘The Responsibility to Protect – An incoherent Doctrine?’ we claimed that R2P in the version proposed by the ICISS is incoherent. We argued that the ICISS-report used the criteria of right intention, proportionality and legitimate authority to determine when a humanitarian intervention is obligatory and we continued by arguing that this cannot be done in a coherent manner. In his reply to our article Tim Haesebrouck refutes our argument by claiming that the ICISS differentiates between criteria governing when a humanitarian intervention is obligatory from criteria governing what is permitted in an obligatory intervention and thereby avoid being incoherent. In this closing reply we show through an analysis of the report that ICISS does indeed differentiate between the criteria, but not in order to determine what is obligatory or permitted. Hence, our conclusion regarding the incoherence is not refuted by Haesebrouck

Assessing the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making in terms of adequate support for conclusions

How can we assess the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making? Sceptics doubt such assessments are possible, as they must rely on controversial substantive standards of truth and rightness. Challenging that scepticism, this paper suggests a procedure-independent standard for assessing the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making by evaluating whether it is adequately supported by reasons. Adequate support for conclusion is a necessary (but insufficient on its own) aspect of epistemic quality for any epistemic justification of democracy, though particularly relevant to theories that emphasize public deliberation. Finding existing methods for measuring the quality of public discourse to fall short, we draw on an epistemological theory of argumentation to provide a more sophisticated approach to evaluating the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making, illustrate how the approach can be used, and demonstrate its relevance for the epistemic turn in democratic theory. The final version of this research has been published in Social Epistemology. © 2017 Taylor & Franci

Deliberation after consensus

This editorial introduction presents an overview of the themes explored in the symposium on Deliberation after Consensus. For all the talk of its obsolescence and irrelevance, the concept of consensus still remains centrally contested through generations of deliberative democracy scholarship. In face of criticism for being neither empirically feasible nor normatively desirable, some deliberative theorists have moved away from consensus-oriented teleology and argued in favor of other legitimate outcomes of deliberations. Other theorists have resisted this move, claiming that the aim of deliberation implies that consensus should remain as a regulative ideal for deliberative outcomes. Engaging with these debates about the role of consensus in theories of deliberative democracy, this symposium brings together a selection of innovative, original research articles that raise novel questions about the role consensus could and should play in democratic deliberation and in a deliberative democracy. This introduction offers an overview of the debate over consensus drawing on the notion of successive generations of deliberative democracy research. Our aim is to demonstrate that the view of consensus has changed during generations of deliberative scholarships, but also that some scholars still defend the normative importance of the meaning of consensus once developed by the first generation. Consequently, there are tendencies of both change and continuity in the debate over consensus in deliberative theory. We conclude this introduction by providing a brief synopsis of each paper

Deliberation after Consensus: Introduction to the Symposium

This editorial introduction presents an overview of the themes explored in the symposium on Deliberation after Consensus. For all the talk of its obsolescence and irrelevance, the concept of consensus still remains centrally contested through generations of deliberative democracy scholarship. In face of criticism for being neither empirically feasible nor normatively desirable, some deliberative theorists have moved away from consensus-oriented teleology and argued in favor of other legitimate outcomes of deliberations. Other theorists have resisted this move, claiming that the aim of deliberation implies that consensus should remain as a regulative ideal for deliberative outcomes. Engaging with these debates about the role of consensus in theories of deliberative democracy, this symposium brings together a selection of innovative, original research articles that raise novel questions about the role consensus could and should play in democratic deliberation and in a deliberative democracy. This introduction offers an overview of the debate over consensus drawing on the notion of successive generations of deliberative democracy research. Our aim is to demonstrate that the view of consensus has changed during generations of deliberative scholarships, but also that some scholars still defend the normative importance of the meaning of consensus once developed by the first generation. Consequently, there are tendencies of both change and continuity in the debate over consensus in deliberative theory. We conclude this introduction by providing a brief synopsis of each paper