"Ehe und Familie stehen unter dem besonderen Schutz der staatlichen Ordnung" (Art. 6 Grundgesetz): Verfassungsnorm und Lebenswirklichkeit

"Ehe und Familie stehen gemäß Art. 6 Abs. 1 GG unter dem besonderen Schutz der staatlichen Ordnung. Der verfassungsrechtliche Schutz verhindert störende Eingriffe von Seiten des Staates. Außerdem stellt Art. 6 Abs. 1 GG eine sogenannte Institutsgarantie von Ehe und Familie dar. Diese Rechtsinstitute dürfen nicht nur nicht abgeschafft werden, sondern genießen auch gegenüber anderen Lebensformen eine privilegierte Stellung. Schließlich wird der verfassungsrechtliche Rang von Ehe und Familie auch als wertentscheidende Grundsatznorm verstanden, die von den staatlichen Gewalten bei allen Entscheidungen mitzuberücksichtigen ist. Sowohl der Ehe- als auch der Familienbegriff haben keinen festen Inhalt, sondern unterliegen dem Wandel der Zeit und werden von unterschiedlichen Vorstellungen und Werten wie auch den konkreten sozialen und ökonomischen Bedingungen geprägt. Trotzdem schützt Art. 6 Abs. 1 GG einen unantastbaren Kernbereich. Dazu gehört das Prinzip der Einehe, die Geschlechtsverschiedenheit der Partner und die grundsätzliche Unauflöslichkeit der Ehe." (Autorenreferat)"According to Art 6 par. 1 GG, marriage and family are granted a particular legal protection. First of all, the constitutional protection on the one hand prohibits offensive state interventions. Besides, Art 6 par. 1 GG constitutes a so-called ‘guarantee of the legal institute' of marriage and family. That does not only mean that these legal institutes may not be abolished but also that they are granted a privileged status with regards to other forms of living. Finally, the constitutional priority of marriage and family is understood as a principal value which has to be taken into account by all public authorities in their decisions. Both the concept of marriage and the concept of family do not have a fixed content but are subject to changes and are therefore influenced by different ideals and values as well as by the concrete social and economic conditions. Nevertheless, Art 6 par. 1 GG protects an intangible essence of the concept of marriage, i.e. the principle of monogamy, the diversity of sex of the partners, and the principal indissolvability of marriage." (author's abstract

O Eu de Fichte

ResumoNo presente texto (“O Eu de Fichte”), no qual identifica duas épocas distintas na história da filosofia concernente ao desenvolvimento da teoria da consciência, D. Henrich volta-se, após caracterizar os componentes de cada período, à teoria da consciência do primeiro Fichte, o da Doutrina da Ciência de 1794, pondo ênfase sobre algumas aporiaspresentes nessa sua primeira formulação, na medida em que Fichte foi o primeiro a encarar o problema da consciência em sua perspectiva, no fundo, mais agônica, deixado sem tratamento pela tradição da filosofia pré-kantiana e kantiana. AbstractIn the present text (Fichte’s Self), in which he identifies two distinct epochs in the history of philosophy concerning the development of the theory of consciousness, D. Henrich turns, after characterizing the components of each period, to the theory of consciousness of the first Fichte, that of the Doctrine of Science of 1794, placing emphasis on some of the aporias present in his first formulation, insofar as Fichte was the first to face the problem of consciousness in its essentially more agonistic perspective, left untreated by the tradition of pre-Kantian and Kantianphilosophy

Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s Reappraisal

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Egosplitting. My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking