Externalizing the EU's Justice and Home Affairs to Southeast Asia: Prospects and Limitations

Introduction: The transnational dimension ascribed to may phenomena traditionally associated with domestic, or internal, security such as terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemics, or people smuggling has led to increased pressures to increase cooperation across national borders to ‘fight’ or ‘manage’ many of the new, transnational security threats. The ESS describes the post-Cold War environment as ‘one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked’ (European Union 2003b, 3). The perceived diffusion between internal and external security has not only accelerated demands for a greater cooperation between the EU and third states and international organizations, but also provided the EU with greater policy-making competencies. Subsequently the EU has over the last decade or so established policies in a number of different policy fields which seek to guide the behavior of its member states within the EU, as well as the EU’s external cooperation.

Myanmar, the Rohingya crisis, and further EU sanctions

The violence against the Rohingya, which has led hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to seek refuge in Bangladesh, has severely damaged Myanmar’s international image. In response to the deterioration of the human rights situation in Myanmar in Octo­ber 2018, the European Union (EU) threatened to withdraw the trade preferences that ensure the country has duty-free access to the EU common market. It seems highly plausible, however, that such measures would fail to alter the political calculations of the Burmese government or of the military. Instead, a withdrawal of the trade preferences would primarily hit the mostly female workers in the country’s textile industry. The EU and its Member States should therefore consider a combination of specific sanctions against military enterprises as well as tightened entry bans and account freezes that are directed at leading military personnel. These targeted sanc­tions against Myanmar’s armed forces should be flanked by an increase in the level of diplo­matic engagement with civilian actors in the country. (author's abstract

Indonesia in ASEAN: regional leadership between ambition and ambiguity

Supporting regional integration processes within the context of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an integral component of Brussels' strategic interest in South-East Asia. Hereby, Indonesia - regional primus inter pares and self-proclaimed driver of regional integration - is perceived as a key partner for Europe. There are indications, however, that Indonesia seems to be turning away from ASEAN under the administration of the current president, Joko Widodo ("Jokowi"). A new narrative has recently emerged in Jakarta that seeks to prioritise Indonesia's national interests in all aspects of the country's international affairs over long-standing hallmarks of Indonesia's international politics - most notably of ASEAN being the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. In order to be able to gauge changes in Indonesian foreign policy towards ASEAN under Jokowi, this research paper traces the role that ASEAN has played in Indonesian foreign policy - from the fall of Suharto up to the present day. The study finds that Indonesia's role in ASEAN differs distinctly from one policy field to the other. Although Indonesia has contributed extensively towards regional integration in the field of security policy, it has predominantly displayed inert - or outright negative - attitudes towards regional economic integration. There are a number of indicators that Jakarta's foot-dragging - with regard to economic integration - might further increase under the Jokowi administration. This, however, is not tantamount to a complete neglect of ASEAN in the foreseeable future. After all, ASEAN is still viewed by policy-makers in Jakarta as being the centre of the regional security architecture and the main instrument for maintaining regional security and stability. (author's abstract

An arms race in Southeast Asia? Changing arms dynamics, regional security and the role of European arms export

Southeast Asia is arming massively. In the past decade, military spending by the region’s states has risen by 57 percent on average. China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in the Pacific is frequently cited as the trigger for this leap in arms purchases. However, as this study will show, domestic and foreign-policy factors other than the ‘China factor’ have also been decisive for the increase: lasting territorial conflicts, domestic militant revolutionary movements and the powerful political influence of the military. Even if no direct link can be shown to exist between an arms race and an increasing likelihood of violent conflict breaking out, this does not mean that Southeast Asia is gaining in stability through the current arms build-up. On the contrary, the quantitative and qualitative expansion of military capacities has increased both threat perceptions and distrust in the region. In this context, Germany and many of its European neighbours would be well-advised to rethink their role as central arms suppliers to Southeast Asia more strategically and critically. Germany and the EU currently view the arms trade with Southeast Asian customers primarily from an economic perspective. What is needed, however, is a political and strategic discourse on the impact of their arms exports. (author's abstract

Reformasi reloaded? Implications of Indonesia's 2014 elections

For the third time since the end of the authoritarian Suharto regime the Indonesian people have directly elected their president. The victory of Joko Widodo ('Jokowi'), a self-made businessman from modest upbringings, has spurred hopes for a renewal of Indonesia’s reform (reformasi) process, which had for the most part lain dormant during the second term of his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ('SBY'). While the new government has raised high expectations for swift reforms amongst its supporters, it faces a range of imminent challenges. An ailing state budget, bureaucratic red tape, dated infrastructure, as well as reforms in the fields of health care and education are but some of the policy fields that warrant quick action. The first reality check for Jokowi's reform policies will be in parliament, where his coalition currently holds a mere 38 percent of the seats. With regard to Jokowi's strong focus on domestic affairs and his lack of experience in foreign affairs, it is also to be expected that Indonesia will play a less active role in the region in the next couple of years. (author's abstract

Risking another Rohingya refugee crisis in the Andaman Sea

Kutupalong -which, located near Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh, is the biggest refugee camp in the world with an estimated 700,000 inhabitants- has just witnessed its first coronavirus death. The 71-year-old victim was among at least 29 Rohingya refugees in the camp who had recently tested positive for the virus. The death of the refugee has increased concerns that the deadly virus could spread rapidly through refugee camps in Bangladesh, which are home to an estimated 1 million refugees. Observers also fear that the coronavirus outbreak could create panic in the camps and induce more Rohingya to seek refuge in Indonesia and Malaysia by crossing the Andaman Sea in boats. Malaysia and Indonesia are refusing to allow the passengers of any such boats to disembark over fears that they could be carrying the virus. According to official statements, Malaysia has turned back 22 boats since May 2020. In the second week of June, 269 Rohingya were detained in Malaysia after their vessel had reportedly been intentionally damaged, thus thwarting efforts to push it back to sea. These recent events have exacerbated fears that the current situation could turn into another Andaman Sea refugee crisis. (Autorenreferat

Blickpunkt Weltkonsum. Leben und Lernen im Netzwerk globalisierter Märkte

Weltweit ist Konsum ein ebenso omnipräsenter wie omnipotenter Bestandteil unseres Alltags. Die vielfältigen Auswirkungen unseres Konsumhandelns werden hingegen selten umfassend, d. h. insbesondere mit Perspektive auf die Wertschöpfung auf Seiten der Produzenten, reflektiert. Der Beitrag zielt auf die Notwendigkeit einer multiperspektivisch angelegten Auseinandersetzung mit Konsumthemen in schulischen Kontexten - insbesondere im Rahmen des sozialwissenschaftlichen Unterrichts. Dabei werden aktuelle Überlegungen zur Konsumentenverantwortung in der Welt(-konsum)gesellschaft zum Ausgangspunkt für die Auseinandersetzung mit Konsum in den vernetzten und mitunter nur unzureichend fassbaren Strukturen globalisierter Märkte gemacht. (DIPF/Orig.)Consumerism is an omnipresent and omnipotent part of people\u27s everyday life around the world. Nevertheless, the multiple effects of consumer behavior on the individual and the world society, i. e. especially the perspective on the producer\u27s added value, are rarely reflected comprehensively. This article shows the need for a global and multiperspectival confrontation with consumer issues in school contexts - particularly in the context of social science teaching. For this purpose, recent thoughts regarding the consumer responsibility in the world (consumer) society will be taken up and represent the starting point for an exploration of the opportunities and risks of consumption in the networked and sometimes occasional elusive structures of global markets. (DIPF/Orig.

Aung San Suu Kyi at the International Court of Justice: the Gambia's genocide case against Myanmar and its domestic ramifications

The recent decision by The Gambia to file a genocide case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has directed international attention again towards Rakhine State in western Myanmar, where the Rohingya people have faced discrimi­nation and persecution for decades. What took many observers by surprise was the announcement by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi that she would be travelling to The Hague to personally "defend the national interest" and thus, by extension, the actions of her former nemesis. After all, she had enjoyed broad international support precisely for her role as leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and her democratic, non-violent opposition against the military dictatorship. These develop­ments, we argue, must be understood against a wider rollback of the democratisation process. The rollback is at least partly being orchestrated by Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, and it could bode ill especially for the ethnic minorities in the country. (author's abstract