Sub‐Saharan Africa: A Theater for Middle East Power Struggles

Africa has experienced an unprecedented level of involvement in its regional affairs by Middle Eastern states in the past few years. This is a remarkable development, indeed, given that transregional relations have been characterized by reciprocal ignorance for most of the post‐World War II period. The scope of these current transregional entanglements can be best observed along the African coast bordering the Red Sea. Middle Eastern states have facilitated peace talks in, for instance, Sudan (Qatar, 2008–2011), and Somalia (Saudi Arabia, 2007; Turkey, since 2011), as well as between Djibouti and Eritrea (Qatar, 2010–2017). More recently, concerted mediation efforts by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have led to an agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia - ending, finally, their 20-year war in September 2018 - and stimulated fresh negotiations between Djibouti and Eritrea. New talks have also been facilitated regarding the three-way conflict among Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over sharing the Nile waters. However, recent Middle Eastern spats have also left the Horn of Africa facing security-related repercussions. The intra-Gulf crisis pitting Saudi Arabia and the UAE against Qatar and Turkey has reverberated to such an extent that the African Union discussed the spillover in January 2018. And while the recent diplomatic breakthrough between Eritrea and Ethiopia has been widely praised as an important step toward regional stabilization, observers also caution that Middle Eastern geopolitical rivalries could "provoke destabilizing reactions across the Horn of Africa." This is even more true as the Red Sea has experienced notable militarization of late. Besides the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which have already established military bases in the region or are planning to do so, Middle Eastern states are also emerging as regional military players. Egypt, Iran, Israel and Qatar obviously have a stake in these developments, while Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE, which seem bent on becoming key actors in the Greater Horn, are constructing a series of military bases from Sudan to Somalia. The debates about the militarization of the Red Sea obscure, however, the fact that Africa as a whole has become a region of vital interest to these and other Middle Eastern states, each of them with its own history of relations there. While prospective economic benefits and international prestige have long dominated the agenda, present-day dynamics are heavily driven by the struggle for hegemony in the Middle East. This article focuses on the policies of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the dominant regional powers at the center of the hegemonic competition. On the one hand, their turn to Africa indicates that their foreign policies have become more assertive on the international stage, especially regarding South-South relations. On the other, their current strategic approaches and their politics of alliance building follow very closely the logic of conflict dynamics in their home region

The Future of South Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council

The crafting of South Yemen's political future is a core issue in Yemen's multilevel conflict. A central role in that process is played by the Southern Transitional Council (al-Majlis al-Intiqali al-Janubi; hereafter, STC), an entity that is increasingly perceived internationally as the representative of South Yemeni interests. While this role is in keeping with the STC's own mandate, it is not approved of by all of the many rival actors involved. The STC was founded in 2017 with the aim of leading the territories of the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to independence. Such calls for secession have long been popular with large parts of the population, but have gained new momentum since the onset of civil war in 2014. Reshaping the relationship between North and South has been central to a comprehensive conflict settlement in Yemen, and not just since the STC was founded. The STC claims to represent the interests of the South and to provide its political leadership. It sees itself at the forefront of the heterogeneous Southern Movement, which has endured numerous internal conflicts since its emergence in 2007 and has not yet been able to agree on a common leadership structure. Thus, the STC is neither the only political interest group of the South nor is its claim to leadership acknowledged and approved of by all organisations of the Southern Movement. The fact that the STC is currently the dominant organisation in the Southern Movement is largely due to the support of the United Arab Emirates. As a result, the future leadership position of the STC, as well as its agency, are highly dependent on the interests of Abu Dhabi. Given the importance of the Southern issue in future peace negotiations in Yemen, it is necessary to take into account the range of key actors in South Yemen and to understand their relationship with each other. The European Union should continue to press for an understanding among these actors and support them in developing a common bargaining position

Yet Another Scramble: Why Middle Eastern Powers Are Reaching Out to Africa

The recent endeavours of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in the Horn of Africa have raised fears that the Middle Eastern struggle for hegemony will be repeated in a region of vast geostrategic importance. Yet these countries' interest in Africa is neither new nor limited to the Horn. To anticipate the impact of their contest for influence in Africa, it is key to understand the preferences underlying their efforts. The upgrading of relations between Middle Eastern powers and African states dates back several decades. Iran intensified relations with African states as a result of the sanctions imposed on the regime following the Islamic Revolution. Turkey's Africa policy gained momentum with the Justice and Development Party's rise to power. Saudi Arabia established initial contacts with African states in the wake of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War but only recently rediscovered its strategic interest in the continent. While their Africa policies have also been driven by particular interests, Ankara, Riyadh, and Tehran have long been primarily interested in prospective economic gains on the one hand and the continent's potential as a source of international allies on the other. Unlike the case in past periods of recurring strategic neglect, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey today view Africa as a region of considerable importance for the achievement of their political objectives in and beyond the Middle East. Their competition for influence in the Horn of Africa and the increasing militarisation of the Red Sea are just two of the most visible indications of this. The policies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will have significant effects on events in Africa and contradict the aims of the EU's foreign policies in many respects, particularly in terms of security and migration. The EU should also be aware that these states are presenting themselves as a viable alternative to it and should thus seek to further mend its strained relationships with African partners

Saudi-Arabiens Krieg im Jemen: keine Ausstiegsstrategie

Ende März 2017 ging der von Saudi-Arabien und einer Militärkoalition geführte Krieg im Jemen in sein drittes Jahr. Dieser Krieg ist militärisch kaum mehr zu gewinnen und hat im Jemen eine humanitäre Katastrophe ausgelöst. Dabei läuft der Krieg saudischen Interessen zuwider und droht, die Stabilität des Königreichs zu gefährden. Entgegen der landläufigen Darstellung in der deutschen und internationalen Presse handelt es sich beim Krieg im Jemen nicht um einen Stellvertreterkrieg. Die von Riad zu Beginn des Krieges erhobene Behauptung, die Huthis würden maßgeblich von Iran unterstützt und kontrolliert, ist irreführend und nicht belegbar. Statt die Huthis zu schwächen, hat der Militäreinsatz zu einer Konsolidierung ihrer Position geführt; statt den vermeintlichen iranischen Einfluss zurückzudrängen, verleiht er Teheran zusehends die Möglichkeit zu tatsächlicher Einflussnahme. Derweil hat der Krieg den Jemen in eine humanitäre Katastrophe geführt und das Scheitern des jemenitischen Staates wahrscheinlicher gemacht. Ein gescheiterter Nachbarstaat jedoch steht den saudischen -und europäischen- Sicherheitsinteressen diametral entgegen. Der Krieg untergräbt nicht nur mittel- und langfristig die saudischen Inte­ressen im Jemen und auf der Arabischen Halbinsel, sondern bedroht im Falle einer weiteren Eskalation auch direkt die Stellung des Königshauses und somit die Stabilität des Königreichs. Da eine militärische Lösung des Konflikts weder wünschenswert noch realistisch ist, sollte die Bundesregierung -auch gegenüber den USA- auf Friedensverhandlungen unter dem Dach der UNO hinwirken. Der von der Bundeskanzlerin in Aussicht gestellte deutsche Beitrag zur Konfliktregelung muss neben verhandlungsunterstützenden Maßnahmen auch den Stopp von Rüstungsexporten unter anderem an Riad beinhalten

Muhammad ʿAbd al-Malik al-Mutawakkil: A Political Biography

Muhammad ʿAbd al-Malik al-Mutawakkil (1942-2014), professor of political science at Sanaa University, deputy secretary-general of the Union of Popular Forces, and pioneer of the human rights movement in South Arabia, was one of the few home de lettres in Yemen whose intellectual clout extended far into the Arab world. As an outstanding figure of political and scholarly life in the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, his vita exemplifies the ups and downs of Yemeni politics in the post-imamic, republican era up to the fall of ʿAli ʿAbdallah Salih, just as his writings are an enlightening guide to the understanding of the latter and the Yemeni social fabric as a whole. This article seeks to provide a political biography of a man whose calm and sensible voice many will find missing in these times of turmoil