Software verification plan for GCS

This verification plan is written as part of an experiment designed to study the fundamental characteristics of the software failure process. The experiment will be conducted using several implementations of software that were produced according to industry-standard guidelines, namely the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics RTCA/DO-178A guidelines, Software Consideration in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, for the development of flight software. This plan fulfills the DO-178A requirements for providing instructions on the testing of each implementation of software. The plan details the verification activities to be performed at each phase in the development process, contains a step by step description of the testing procedures, and discusses all of the tools used throughout the verification process

GCS programmer's manual

A variety of instructions to be used in the development of implementations of software for the Guidance and Control Software (GCS) project is described. This document fulfills the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics RTCA/DO-178A guidelines, 'Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification' requirements for document No. 4, which specifies the information necessary for understanding and programming the host computer, and document No. 12, which specifies the software design and implementation standards that are applicable to the software development and testing process. Information on the following subjects is contained: activity recording, communication protocol, coding standards, change management, error handling, design standards, problem reporting, module testing logs, documentation formats, accuracy requirements, and programmer responsibilities

Considerations of Unmanned Aircraft Classification for Civil Airworthiness Standards

The use of unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS) has been characterized as the next great step forward in the evolution of civil aviation. Although use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in military and public service operations is proliferating, civil use of UAS remains limited in the United States today. This report focuses on one particular regulatory challenge: classifying UAS to assign airworthiness standards. Classification is useful for ensuring that meaningful differences in design are accommodated by certification to different standards, and that aircraft with similar risk profiles are held to similar standards. This paper provides observations related to how the current regulations for classifying manned aircraft, based on dimensions of aircraft class and operational aircraft categories, could apply to UAS. This report finds that existing aircraft classes are well aligned with the types of UAS that currently exist; however, the operational categories are more difficult to align to proposed UAS use in the NAS. Specifically, the factors used to group manned aircraft into similar risk profiles do not necessarily capture all relevant UAS risks. UAS classification is investigated through gathering approaches to classification from a broad spectrum of organizations, and then identifying and evaluating the classification factors from these approaches. This initial investigation concludes that factors in addition to those currently used today to group manned aircraft for the purpose of assigning airworthiness standards will be needed to adequately capture risks associated with UAS and their operations

Modelling the Risks Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pose to People on the Ground

Worldwide there is much e ort being directed towards the development of a framework of air- worthiness regulations for remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS). It is now broadly accepted that regulations should have a strong foundation in, and traceability to, the management of the safety risks. Existing risk models for RPAS operations do not provide a simple means for incorporating the wide range of technical and operational controls into the risk analysis and evaluation processes. This paper describes a new approach for modelling and evaluating the risks associated with RPAS operations near populous areas based on the barrier bow tie (BBT) model. A BBT model is used to structure the underlying risk management problem. The model focuses risk analysis, evaluation, and decision making activities on the devices, people, and processes that can be employed to reduce risk. The BBT model and a comprehensive set of example risk controls are presented. The general model can be applied to any RPAS operation. The foundations for quantitative and qualitative assessments using a BBT model are also presented. The modelling and evaluation framework is illustrated through its application to a case-study rotary wing RPAS for two operational scenarios. The model can be used as a basis for determining airworthiness certification requirements for RPAS

Fabrication of functionally graded 3A/5A zeolites by electrophoretic deposition

Functionally graded zeolites of molecular sieve type 3A and 5A are deposited by electrophoretic deposition (EPD) from acetone suspension with 8% volume concentration of n-butylamine as particle charging agent. The EPD characteristics of both 3A and 5A suspensions are studied. Functionally graded zeolite 3A/5A deposits are obtained at 200 V DC. Energy dispersive X-ray dispersion (EDX) analysis results confirm the graded structure. The deposited zeolites are also analysed by scanning electron microscopy (SEM). The factors influencing the deposition process are discussed