Combining System Safety and Reliability to Ensure NASA CoNNeCT's Success

Hazard Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), the Limited-Life Items List (LLIL), and the Single Point Failure (SPF) List were applied by System Safety and Reliability engineers on NASA's Communications, Navigation, and Networking reConfigurable Testbed (CoNNeCT) Project. The integrated approach involving cross reviews of these reports by System Safety, Reliability, and Design engineers resulted in the mitigation of all identified hazards. The outcome was that the system met all the safety requirements it was required to meet

International R&M/Safety Cooperation Lessons Learned Between NASA and JAXA

Presented are a number of important experiences gained and lessons learned from the collaboration of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) on the CoNNeCT (Communications, Navigation, and Networking re-Configurable Testbed) project. Both space agencies worked on the CoNNeCT Project to design, assemble, test, integrate, and launch a communications testbed facility mounted onto the International Space Station (ISS) truss. At the 2012 RAMS, two papers about CoNNeCT were presented: one on Ground Support Equipment Reliability & System Safety, and the other one on combined application of System Safety & Reliability for the flight system. In addition to the logistics challenges present when two organizations are on the opposite side of the world, there is also a language barrier. The language barrier encompasses not only the different alphabet, it encompasses the social interactions; these were addressed by techniques presented in the paper. The differences in interpretation and application of Spaceflight Requirements will be discussed in this paper. Although many, but definitely not all, of JAXA's Spaceflight Requirements were inspired by NASA, there were significant and critically important differences in how they were interpreted and applied. This paper intends to summarize which practices worked and which did not for an international collaborative effort so that future missions may benefit from our experiences. The CoNNeCT flight system has been successfully assembled, integrated, tested, shipped, launched and installed on the ISS without incident. This demonstrates that the steps taken to facilitate international understanding, communication, and coordination were successful and warrant discussion as lessons learned

Spaceflight Safety on the North Coast of America

Spaceflight Safety (SFS) engineers at NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) are responsible for evaluating the microgravity fluids and combustion experiments, payloads and facilities developed at NASA LeRC which are manifested for spaceflight on the Space Shuttle, the Russian space station Mir, and/or the International Space Station (ISS). An ongoing activity at NASA LeRC is the comprehensive training of its SFS engineers through the creation and use of safety tools and processes. Teams of SFS engineers worked on the development of an Internet website (containing a spaceflight safety knowledge database and electronic templates of safety products) and the establishment of a technical peer review process (known as the Safety Assurance for Lewis Spaceflight Activities (SALSA) review)

Humans vs. Hardware: The Unique World of the NASA Human System Risk Assessment

No abstract availabl

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Failure Tolerance, High Reliability and Correlated Failure History

In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has continuously refined agency safety and reliability requirements in response to mission demands, critical failures, and technology development. Early spacecraft, including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and demonstrated test margins. Later programs, such as the reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and International Space Station (ISS), introduced probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance to improve robustness at the expense of added complexity. More recently, the Orion Multi-Program Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) hardware. Failure tolerance variances are defined and managed in accordance with agency human-rating requirements, and require concurrence from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) representatives conducted accelerated research to compare unique safety and reliability criteria against ground and flight anomalies, based on information contained in post-mission reports and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. In some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety requirements. In others, empirical trends have highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety guidelines. Given the inability to achieve absolute compliance with evolving safety and reliability requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the framework of changing system design, inspection, materials and process developments to formulate conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, and net changes in safety risk. Based on the aggregate performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant systems, the authors have attempted to establish best practices and guidelines to inform future program decisions. On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not intended to direct a universal set of requirements for future missions based on prior lessons learned. Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee future success. However, this assessment offers a retrospective review of policy changes, implementation and effectiveness. In the future, NASA, European Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit from a more robust correlation between requirements and performance, as space-faring nations work toward more challenging, complex and long-duration commercial and deep-space ventures

Risk Interfaces to Support Integrated Systems Analysis and Development

Objectives for systems analysis capability: Develop integrated understanding of how a complex human physiological-socio-technical mission system behaves in spaceflight. Why? Support development of integrated solutions that prevent unwanted outcomes (Implementable approaches to minimize mission resources(mass, power, crew time, etc.)); Support development of tools for autonomy (need for exploration) (Assess and maintain resilience -individuals, teams, integrated system). Output of this exercise: -Representation of interfaces based on Human System Risk Board (HSRB) Risk Summary information and simple status based on Human Research Roadmap; Consolidated HSRB information applied to support communication; Point-of-Departure for HRP Element planning; Ability to track and communicate status of collaborations.

International R&M/Safety Cooperation Lessons Learned Between NASA and JAXA

No abstract availabl