Humans vs. Hardware: The Unique World of the NASA Human System Risk Assessment

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Background

The process for managing NASA human system risks (health and performance) is owned by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB).




Each of these 32 HSRB risks is assessed for its likelihood and consequence (LxC) scores or risk ratings using HSRB scales.

23 of these risks define the HRP research portfolio.

HSRB Risk Matrix (with LxC scales)

Consequence score is from 1 to 4 (y-axis)

Likelihood score is from 1 to 3 (x-axis)




Consequence outcomes are evaluated for two categories:

1) In-flight health & performance

2) Post-flight health

Risk Ratings

HRP research work produces evidence for the HSRB risk assessment process that generates risk ratings.




LxC scores are helpful in determining direction of mitigation work to achieve acceptable risk levels.


Traditional Engineering Risk Assessment

A lot of NASA engineering systems use quantitative risk methods (e.g. ISS, Shuttle).


The approach is generally based on an aggregate of quantitative assessments at the subsystem level.



Traditional Engineering Risk Assessment



Example of a Traditional Engineering Risk Assessment



*ISS Program recently kicked off a more traditional Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU).


Aspects of Traditional Engineering Systems

- Can be evaluated on a subsystem, subassembly, or component level.
 - Interfaces are concretely defined.
- Can be replicated into identical units with same behavior and response.
 - Can (almost) eliminate element of chance or variance.
 - Allows for multiple forms of design verification.

Can be subjected to destructive testing.

In contrast...

Human systems and human system risks have unique issues that are difficult to address using methods nominally used for traditional hardware and software systems...



🔅 Human physiology is so complicated hundreds of complex feedback loops so connectivity between subsystems is difficult to fully understand or model.

- Hard to predict precise physiological impacts of spaceflight hazards and effectiveness of countermeasures because...
 - Human systems can't be designed identically like engineering systems can.



Source: theafrolounge.com

 Human systems have the exceptional ability to heal and repair themselves at differing rates.





VS.

Various factors impact individual responses.



2013 Astronaut Class

Human systems can't be tested to failure to generate useful data points –



Source: truthalerts.com

i.e. we remain uncertain about human threshold break points and susceptibility thresholds.

Other Constraints for Human System Risk Assessment


- Limited spaceflight data to support risks astronaut population is small within 55 years of spaceflight history.
- Data collection protocols different over time no consistency in spaceflight data.
 - Need epidemiological expertise to analyze data.
- We rely on broader body of evidence from terrestrial sources from which we can only make inferences about human spaceflight risks.
 - E.g., terrestrial population clinical data, analog data, ground experiments

Human System Risk Assessment

- For human system risks, NASA primarily uses qualitative risk methods.
 - Each risk represents only an aspect of a subsystem of the human body 'system' so parts do not necessarily sum up to the whole.

Each subsystem is too broad to cover only one health/performance risk.

Human System Risk Assessment



HSRB doesn't use any systematic approach but considers the complexity of the human system and integration of risks...

In describing risks to properly assess LxC...e.g,

- How do possible virulence changes in microorganisms (Microhost Risk) interact with potential changes in the immune system that would be manifested in clinical outcomes (Immune Risk)?
- How does fatigue (Sleep Risk) impact crew performance during critical tasks (Task Risk and Human-Robotics Risk)?

- …And in directing work to different entities to ultimately lower LxC...e.g.,
 - Could work for a risk create or exacerbate another risk?




Do fluid shift control devices (for Visual Impairment Risk) negatively impact neurovestibular issues (Sensorimotor Risk)?






Could work for a risk partially mitigate another risk?



- HSRB is flexible with risk assessment approaches to use on the best available evidence –
 - Quantitative models when available e.g. HRP medical system model, HRP radiation risk models



 Subject Matter Expert opinion – flight surgeons, scientists and engineers...



Source: kamaladevi.com

Combination of approaches - semi-quantitative

- Assumptions and rationale for judgments are documented.
 - For consistency, LxC analyses use only the applicable existing countermeasures and standards for exploration missions.
 - Guidelines for risk assessment and applicable rules-ofthumb are being developed.





Source: asset-tilburg.nl

Source: atleastihaveabrain.files.wordpress.com

What about HRP?


HRP tracks shared tasks and gaps in research plans among the risks and across Elements

HRP Human Research Roadmap

http://humanresearchroadmap.nasa.gov/




HRP uses a taxonomy framework to develop insights on potential integration points between risks.



Adapted from Mindock, J. and Klaus, D. "Contributing Factor Map: A Taxonomy of Influences on Human Performance and Health in Space." IEEE Transactions on Human-Machine Systems, Vol. 44, No. 5, October 2014

HRP is exploring genomics research to understand individual variation and potentially develop personalized countermeasures.



Conclusions

The general approach for quantitative risk assessments of engineering systems at NASA is difficult to apply to human system risks.

HSRB considers how the complexity of human systems and unique nature of these risks impact LxC assessment.

HRP incorporates these same considerations in the design of research plans and in its research management framework.

The HRP Risk Team supports the HSRB in improvements to and execution of the risk assessment process (and the risk management process in general).

THANK YOU!

HRP Risk Team

(and HSRB Support)

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