Motivation, reconsideration and exclusionary reasons

What do exclusionary reasons exclude? This is the main issue I address in this article. Raz appears to endorse what I label the ‘motivational' model of exclusionary reasons. He stresses that within the context of his theory of practical reasoning exclusionary reasons are reasons not to be motivated by certain first-order reasons (namely, the first-order reasons which conflict with the first-order reasons the exclusionary reasons protect). Some of his critics take him to be also committed to another model of exclusionary reasons which I label the ‘consideration' model. According to it exclusionary reasons are reasons not to consider or think of the conflicting first-order reasons. I argue that Raz's account of the exclusionary function of decisions suggests a third model of exclusionary reasons which I label the ‘reconsideration' model. On the reconsideration model exclusionary reasons are reasons not to reconsider the balance of first-order reasons. In this article I show how the reconsideration model differs from both the motivational and the consideration model and how it can account for the exclusionary function of not only decisions but also personal rules and authoritative directives

The authority of law in Plato's Crito

In this article I analyze the speech of the Laws in Plato’s Crito from a jurisprudential perspective. More specifically I explore the Laws’ views about the authority of law. I offer new interpretations of their famous ‘persuade or obey’ alternative and of their arguments about their superior moral status and the agreements of the citizens with them. I also explore the rather neglected topic of the mental attitude towards their authority that they demand from the citizens and conclude with a discussion of their understanding of the relation between law and morality. I approach the speech of the Laws as a historian of legal thought and try to locate their arguments firmly within both the context of the ancient Athenian legal system and the context of Platonic philosophy

The deliberative and epistemic dimension of legitimate authoritative directives

What reasons do legitimate authoritative directives generate in their subjects? Raz identifies two relevant reasons: (a) a first-order reason to do as directed; and (b) a second-order, exclusionary reason not to be motivated by at least some of the first-order reasons which conflict with the corresponding legitimate directive. In this chapter, I put forward two claims. The first claim, which I develop in the first section of the chapter, introduces a revision to the Razian framework: I argue that legitimate authoritative directives also exclude a particular type of reasoning about the balance of first-order reasons which is similar to the type of reasoning involved in the reconsideration of decisions. This captures the deliberative dimension of legitimate authoritative directives. The second claim, which I develop in the second section, is that the reasoning-excluding reasons legitimate authoritative directives generate have important epistemic value. This captures their epistemic dimension. My revisionism does not affect Raz's account of legitimate authority, and more specifically his normal justification thesis. Rather I presuppose it in developing my arguments. Reconsideration and reasoning-excluding reasons. What exclusionary reasons exclude has been a matter of debate. We can take them to exclude motivation by, consideration of, or reasoning about a certain range of first-order reasons

Plato's legal postivism in the Laws

In this paper, the author reassesses the place of Plato’s Laws in the history of legal thought. In virtue of the account of law that he presents in the Laws, Plato has been traditionally credited with a natural law theory of law. The author challenges that ‘orthodox’ interpretation and argues that in the Laws Plato presents an account of the nature of law that belongs to the tradition of legal positivism

Crito's failure to deliberate socratically

In comparison to the speech of the Laws the dialectic between Crito and Socrates at the beginning of the Crito has received little attention. In this paper I argue that it contains an important philosophical message. It illustrates that the many's failure to follow Socrates' principles, like his principle of non-retaliation, is due to the intrinsic fragility of true beliefs. Though the many can understand Socrates' values and may accept his principles if he argues with them long enough, they may fail to hold onto his principles when confronted with the difficulties of life. Crito's failure to deliberate socratically at the beginning of the Crito exemplifies the many's predicament

Albumin and mammalian cell culture: implications for biotechnology applications

Albumin has a long historical involvement in design of media for the successful culture of mammalian cells, in both the research and commercial fields. The potential application of albumins, bovine or human serum albumin, for cell culture is a by-product of the physico-chemical, biochemical and cell-specific properties of the molecule. In this review an analysis of these features of albumin leads to a consideration of the extracellular and intracellular actions of the molecule, and importantly the role of its interactions with numerous ligands or bioactive factors that influence the growth of cells in culture: these include hormones, growth factors, lipids, amino acids, metal ions, reactive oxygen and nitrogen species to name a few. The interaction of albumin with the cell in relation to these co-factors has a potential impact on metabolic and biosynthetic activity, cell proliferation and survival. Application of this knowledge to improve the performance in manufacturing biotechnology and in the emerging uses of cell culture for tissue engineering and stem cell derived therapies is an important prospect

Human haematopoietic stem cell development: From the embryo to the dish:From the embryo to the dish

Publisher Copyright: © 2017. Published by The Company of Biologists Ltd.Haematopoietic stem cells (HSCs) emerge during embryogenesis and give rise to the adult haematopoietic system. Understanding how early haematopoietic development occurs is of fundamental importance for basic biology and medical sciences, but our knowledge is still limited compared with what we know of adult HSCs and their microenvironment. This is particularly true for human haematopoiesis, and is reflected in our current inability to recapitulate the development of HSCs from pluripotent stem cells in vitro. In this Review, we discuss what is known of human haematopoietic development: the anatomical sites at which it occurs, the different temporal waves of haematopoiesis, the emergence of the first HSCs and the signalling landscape of the haematopoietic niche. We also discuss the extent to which in vitro differentiation of human pluripotent stem cells recapitulates bona fide human developmental haematopoiesis, and outline some future directions in the field.publishersversionPeer reviewe

Faction

In the fifth book of the Politics Aristotle discusses the issue of change in political constitutions. He focuses primarily (though not exclusively) on constitutional changes which are brought about by faction (stasis). In this chapter I examine Aristotle's account of faction. I support two main theses: Aristotle distinguishes different types of faction based on the diverse motives of agents of faction. Those who start faction may be motivated by a wide variety of considerations ranging from ideological concerns to personal vengeance. Aristotle studies the phenomenon of faction from two related but distinct perspectives. On the one hand, he tries to explain the phenomenon of faction by reference to factors which influence the psychology of those who start faction. On the other, he offers a sociological account of the origins of faction in terms of ideological conflict and the injustice of the constitution. The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I try to substantiate the first thesis. In particular I argue that Aristotle distinguishes two different types of faction: politically motivated faction and faction due to personal rivalry. I draw a further distinction within the first type of faction. On the one hand, those who desire greater political power may believe that their current constitution deprives them of their fair share of political power. I call this subtype of politically motivated faction “injustice-induced faction.” On the other, the desire for greater political power may be triggered by an unjust desire to have more. I call the second subtype of politically motivated faction “greed-induced faction.” These diversely motivated factions have common political consequences. The generated political dissent threatens the existence of the constitution

Aristotle on the Authority of the Many: Politics III 11, 1281a40-b21

In this article I propose a new interpretation of Aristotle's arguments about the authority of the many at Politics III 11, 1281a40-b21. It consists of the following main tenets. First, the multitude that Aristotle refers to in his arguments should be understood on the model of the multitude which rules in polities and the members of which are accomplished in only a part of political excellence, namely, military excellence. Second, the best citizens with whom he compares that multitude in his arguments do not possess complete political excellence but rather the highest degree of military excellence among their fellow citizens in a polity. Third, the members of that multitude are collectively superior to the best citizens in making decisions about political particulars, for example, decisions about specific policies. Fourth, their superiority can be explained by reference to the fact that they collectively possess superior experience than the best citizens, though they have individually and collectively inferior political understanding. Finally, their collective superiority in making political decisions is the outcome of the aggregation of their individual political judgements that are based on experience rather than the outcome of some form of public deliberation that enables them to grasp the political reasons which support their decisions