3,170 research outputs found

    Boltzmann's H-theorem, its limitations, and the birth of (fully) statistical mechanics

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    A comparison is made of the traditional Loschmidt (reversibility) and Zermelo (recurrence) objections to Boltzmann's H-theorem, and its simplified variant in the Ehrenfests' 1912 wind-tree model. The little-cited 1896 (pre-recurrence) objection of Zermelo (similar to an 1889 argument due to Poincare) is also analysed. Significant differences between the objections are highlighted, and several old and modern misconceptions concerning both them and the H-theorem are clarified. We give particular emphasis to the radical nature of Poincare's and Zermelo's attack, and the importance of the shift in Boltzmann's thinking in response to the objections as a whole.Comment: 40 page

    An Exploratory Investigation of the Fundamental Determinants of National Equity Market Returns

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    This paper studies average and conditional expected returns in national equity markets, and their relation to a number of fundamental country attributes. The attributes are organized into three groups. The first is relative valuation ratios, such as price-to-book-value, cash-flow, earnings and dividends. The second group measures relative economic performance and the third measures industry structure. We find that average returns across countries are related to the volatility of their price-to-book ratios. Predictable variation in returns is also related to relative gross domestic product, interest rate levels and dividend-price ratios. We explore the hypothesis that cross-sectional variation in the country attributes proxy for variation in the sensitivity of national markets to global measures of economic risks. We test single-factor and two-factor models in which countries' conditional betas are assumed to be functions of the more important fundamental attributes.

    Conditioning Variables and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

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    Previous studies have identified predetermined variables that have some power to explain the time series of stock and bond returns. This paper shows that loadings on the same variables also provide significant cross-sectional explanatory power for stock portfolio returns. These loadings are important, over and the above the variables advocated by Fama and French (1993) in their three factor model,' and also the four factors of Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995). The explanatory power of the loadings on lagged variables is robust to various portfolio grouping procedures and other considerations. The lagged variables reveal information about the cross-section of expected returns that is not captured by popular asset pricing factors. These results carry implications for risk analysis, performance measurement, cost-of-capital calculations and other applications.

    Sources of Risk and Expected Returns in Global Equity Markets

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    This paper empirically examines multifactor asset pricing models for the returns and expected returns on eighteen national equity markets. The factors are chosen to measure global economic risks. Although previous studies do not reject the unconditional mean- variance efficiency of a world market portfolio, our evidence indicates that the tests are low in power, and the world market betas do not provide a good explanation of cross-sectional differences in average returns. Multiple beta models provide an improved explanation of the equity returns.

    The Disability Tax Credit: Why it Fails and How to Fix It

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    When the government establishes a social program whose primary purpose is to help provide support to low-income people with disabilities, its success should be measured on how well it achieves that purpose. Unfortunately, there are reasons to seriously question the usefulness of Canada’s disability tax credit since it is helping so very few of the people it is intended to support. In fact, the credit is helping only a small number of Canadians with disability who qualify for it, and least of all those in the poorest families who receive an average of only 29annually.Thereasonisnothardtosee:DesigningthesupportasataxcreditmeansthatonlythoseCanadianswithdisabilitywhoearnenoughincometohavethemowingtaxescantakeadvantageofit.Yetitisanunfortunaterealitythatpeoplewithdisabilityareoftenatlowincomespreciselybecausetheirdisabilityleavesthemunabletoworkinfull−time,wellpaidjobs.Thus,theverypeoplewhoneedthissupportmostaretheonesleastabletotakeadvantageofit.Inotherwords,theneediestdisabledCanadiansarereceivingtheleastbenefit.Farfrombeingasuccessfulpolicy,theresultsofthedisabilitytaxcreditcanonlybedescribedasdisappointing.Thereisanuncomplicatedwaytobeginrectifyingthis:Bymakingthedisabilitytaxcreditrefundable.Alongthesamelinesasaguaranteedminimumincome,ornegativeincometax,thoselow−incomeCanadianswithdisabilitieswhoqualifyforthecreditbutlacksufficientincometobenefitfromthecreditcouldsimplybemadeeligibleforarefundoftheamounttheycannotclaim.Simplydoingthat,turningthisnon−refundablecreditintoarefundablecredit,wouldincreasetheaveragebenefitforCanada’spoorestfamilieswithadisabledpersonfrom29 annually. The reason is not hard to see: Designing the support as a tax credit means that only those Canadians with disability who earn enough income to have them owing taxes can take advantage of it. Yet it is an unfortunate reality that people with disability are often at low incomes precisely because their disability leaves them unable to work in full-time, wellpaid jobs. Thus, the very people who need this support most are the ones least able to take advantage of it. In other words, the neediest disabled Canadians are receiving the least benefit. Far from being a successful policy, the results of the disability tax credit can only be described as disappointing. There is an uncomplicated way to begin rectifying this: By making the disability tax credit refundable. Along the same lines as a guaranteed minimum income, or negative income tax, those low-income Canadians with disabilities who qualify for the credit but lack sufficient income to benefit from the credit could simply be made eligible for a refund of the amount they cannot claim. Simply doing that, turning this non-refundable credit into a refundable credit, would increase the average benefit for Canada’s poorest families with a disabled person from 29 to 511,increasingtheirtotalincomebyameaningful4.1percent.Justasimportantly,whereameagre0.2percentofthesefamiliesnowgetanybenefitatallfromthecredit,arefundablecreditwouldnowseeamajority,56.4percent,receivingbenefits. Weestimatethatthiswouldmeanaddedcoststothefederalprogramofamodest511, increasing their total income by a meaningful 4.1 per cent. Just as importantly, where a meagre 0.2 per cent of these families now get any benefit at all from the credit, a refundable credit would now see a majority, 56.4 per cent, receiving benefits. We estimate that this would mean added costs to the federal program of a modest 72 million, or a 17 per cent increase. A similar reform at the provincial level would cost an additional 31million.Anevenmoreeffectiveoptionforensuringbetteroutcomesforthispolicy,however,wouldbetobothmakethetaxcreditrefundableandenhanceittotripleitsvalue.Thiswouldensurethatvirtuallyeveryfamilywithadisabledpersonbelowthelowincomecut−off,wouldbenefitfromthecreditandthisenhancementwouldraisetheirincomesafarmoreconsequential27percent.Thecostsofthisenhancedrefundabledisabilitytaxcreditwouldbe,ofcourse,notablyhigher,estimatedat31 million. An even more effective option for ensuring better outcomes for this policy, however, would be to both make the tax credit refundable and enhance it to triple its value. This would ensure that virtually every family with a disabled person below the low income cut-off, would benefit from the credit and this enhancement would raise their incomes a far more consequential 27 per cent. The costs of this enhanced refundable disability tax credit would be, of course, notably higher, estimated at 516 million federally and $240 million provincially, but it would actually achieve the outcomes that this policy ostensibly intends. The current program may be cheaper, but the value it delivers is trifling and the money, therefore, is arguably heavily wasted. For years there have been calls to make this tax credit work better through refundability. We now have evidence that an enhanced refundable disability tax credit would make the significant difference in the lives of lowincome Canadians with disabilities that the policy was designed to do, but has so far largely failed to do

    The Impact of Converting Federal Non-Refundable Tax Credits Into Refundable Credits

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    With economic inequality on the rise in Canada, the federal government needs to consider innovative solutions. One possibility for improving the tax-transfer system involves refundable tax credits (RTCs). Making all tax credits refundable wouldn’t require Ottawa to introduce new tax measures; the Canadian tax system already contains a mix of RTCs and NRTCs, so the government could simply continue its practice of designing tax credit programs to be refundable. Using Statistics Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database and Model, this paper examines the impacts and cost of converting NRTCs to RTCs, with and without an income exemption equal to 25 percent of the before-tax lowincome standard for a census family, the Census Family Low-Income Line. Under the Option Without Exemption (OW/OE), RTC recipients are taxed at a single rate of 15 percent, regardless of family size, right up to the Line. Under the Option With Exemption (OWE), RTC recipients are taxed at zero percent up to 25 percent of the Line and at a single rate of 20 percent, regardless of family size, up to 100 percent of the Line. The incremental cost of switching NRTCs to RTCs under the OW/OE is 6.6billion,asadditionalbenefitsareprovidedto6.4millionfamilies—slightlylessthan37percentofallfamilies.ThecostoftheOWEis6.6 billion, as additional benefits are provided to 6.4 million families — slightly less than 37 percent of all families. The cost of the OWE is 7.2 billion, as benefits flow to slightly more families — 6.45 million. However, the percentage of benefits reaching low-income families is much higher under the OWE (69 percent vs. 49 percent). Additionally, the OWE provides an average of nine percent more RTC benefits to low-income tax filers, making it clearly the superior option for poverty reduction. Moreover, the paper shows that alternative conversion schemes that set benefit reduction rates to differ by family size can further increase the benefits to low-income families at a lower overall cost. Such changes would elicit a labour-supply response in terms of a reduction in hours worked, and while the effect is smaller under the less expensive OW/OE, the difference between the two options is slight. This paper simulates the conversion of NRTCs to RTCs in comprehensive detail, besides providing practical advice on how such a shift would be funded. It offers valuable food for thought on an issue that is increasingly critical to Canadian society

    An Alberta Guaranteed Basic Income: Issues and Options

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    Poverty remains a persistent problem even in advanced economies, and Alberta is no exception despite robust long-term economic growth.  Serious discussion of poverty reduction through a basic or guaranteed income has reemerged at the federal level and among the provinces, including Québec and Ontario, coinciding with renewed efforts to address child poverty through the Canada Child Benefit and the Alberta Child Benefit.  These relatively new income support programs provide federal and provincial tax credits that are refundable; that is, unlike many current nonrefundable tax credits, they provide a benefit to families that is larger the further their income lies below the level of the credit.  This paper analyzes the prospects for Alberta poverty reduction today through a basic guaranteed income achieved by tax reform that would make most of the current existing nonrefundable tax credits refundable. Our paper demonstrates that a guaranteed basic income achieved by transforming most existing nonrefundable tax credits into a single refundable credit can have substantial impact on poverty in Alberta because it more effectively transfers the income support provided by these credits to lower-income families.  Using version 26.0 of the Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M) from Statistics Canada, we are able to simulate the impact of various options for an Alberta Guaranteed Basic Income (AGBI) that might emerge from this tax change.  Our analysis sets a budget for the AGBI based on current expenditures for the Basic credit and five other nonrefundable tax credits that have a total value of 5.36billioninAlberta. Forthisbudget,awidevarietyofprogramoptionsareavailablebasedondifferentcombinationsofanincomeguaranteethatwouldbethemaximumamountavailabletoafamilywithnootherincomeandabenefitreductionratethatreducestheincomebenefitasfamilyincomefromothersourcesrises. Weconsidertheimpactofavarietyoftheseprogramoptionsalongmultipledimensions,includingthepovertyratebasedonStatisticsCanada’sLowIncomeCutoffspovertyline,thedepthofpovertycalculatedastheamountbywhichfamilyincomesfallbelowthepovertyline,incomeinequalitymeasuredbytheGinicoefficient,earningsfromthelabourmarket,andthedistributionofbeneficiaries.  WeillustrateourapproachbychoosinganAGBIwitharelativelylowbenefitreductionrateof105.36 billion in Alberta.  For this budget, a wide variety of program options are available based on different combinations of an income guarantee that would be the maximum amount available to a family with no other income and a benefit reduction rate that reduces the income benefit as family income from other sources rises.  We consider the impact of a variety of these program options along multiple dimensions, including the poverty rate based on Statistics Canada’s Low Income Cutoffs poverty line, the depth of poverty calculated as the amount by which family incomes fall below the poverty line, income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, earnings from the labour market, and the distribution of beneficiaries.   We illustrate our approach by choosing an AGBI with a relatively low benefit reduction rate of 10% that yields income guarantees of 6,389 and 9,305forfamilieswithoneandtwoadults,respectively. Whileourplanisillustrative,wearguethatitissensibleinlightoftheinevitabletrade−offsbetweenchangesinthedegreeofpovertyreduction,labourearningsandtheproportionoffamiliesthatbenefitfromaprogramofthisnature. Theplanprovidesbenefitsto37.39,305 for families with one and two adults, respectively.  While our plan is illustrative, we argue that it is sensible in light of the inevitable trade-offs between changes in the degree of poverty reduction, labour earnings and the proportion of families that benefit from a program of this nature.  The plan provides benefits to 37.3% of families, effectively delivers benefits to the families with the lowest incomes, and reduces the rate of poverty and its depth by more than 20%.  Single parent families and non-elderly and elderly single persons benefit overall from the AGBI, and poverty is completely eliminated for single parent families.            We also consider an AGBI linked to a comparable federal plan, since the federal and provincial tax systems are integrated and the federal Liberal government has expressed interest in poverty reduction through a basic income.  The federal plan we consider transforms the same set of nonrefundable tax credits as the provincial AGBI option and also eliminates the federal GST credit for a combined guaranteed basic income program budget of 11.36 billion for Alberta.  We opt for a federal plan with a modest benefit reduction rate of 15% that provides income guarantees of 7,285and7,285 and 10,302 for families with one and two parents, respectively.  The combined federal and provincial guaranteed basic income plans provide income guarantees of 13,674and13,674 and 19,338 for single and two-parent families with no other income and reduce the income support benefits at a moderate rate.  Disposable income increases by 50.4% for the poorest 10% of families and by 6% for the next poorest 10% of families, and one-third of Albertans received benefits under the combined plan.  As was the case for the provincial AGBI, single parent families and non-elderly and elderly single adults experience an overall increase in their disposable income but the poorest families receive significant benefits on average for all family types.  The rate of poverty among all Albertans drops by 44% and is completely eliminated for single parents and non-elderly and elderly couples.  While poverty remains for two-parent families and the non-elderly single person, its rate declines substantially and its depth is cut by more than half.  The non-elderly single person, the family group that exhibits by far the most poverty, receives the most benefit from the combined plan, as the families with bottom 40% of incomes show gains on average in this group.  Overall inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, falls by 2.2% compared to 1.6% for the provincial AGBI alone.            Our plan relies on the filing of an income tax return to obtain benefits.  In this regard, it is worth noting that the rate of tax filing in Canada is very high, as about 95 per cent of persons 15 and over file a return.  Those who don’t file a return and those whose incomes fluctuate can rely on social assistance as a source of income, as our plan would supplement that existing basic support program.  In this regard, the provincial social assistance program could be used in concert with the AGBI to reach those who don’t file a tax return and those who require emergency funding within the taxation year because of a sharp decline in income.              Our analysis has attempted to illustrate the impact that a straightforward tax policy change toward refundable tax credits can have on poverty in Alberta, particularly with federal participation in a comparable plan.  As concerns about technological displacement of workers and rising inequality grow, discussion of the need for a guaranteed basic income is unlikely to abate, and we believe that tax reform to make existing tax credits refundable can be effective in delivering what amounts to a guaranteed basic income for families without serious economic disruption.  Most Canadians now file taxes, making such a guaranteed basic income plan a sensible consideration for the future

    North Kingstown in the Revolution

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    Documents the patriotic efforts of North Kingstown, Rhode Island during the American Revolution, with notable acknowledgements to George Babcock and Samuel Phillips

    Household change, residential mobility and the changing role of social housing : a multi-method study of the sector's role in the life course of exiting tenants

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    In recent years there have been great changes in the demographic and socio-economic profiles of the sector's tenant stock. Associated with these trends are changes in attitudes, aspirations and demands. Moreover, in today's climate of social housing reduction, stigmatisation, residualisation and rise in low cost home ownership, there are questions as to what role social housing is and should be playing in people's lives. This thesis tackles this increasingly important issue within British society. Hitherto, the debate has been informed very largely by research on households entering and living in social housing. Therefore, the study reported in this thesis gives particular attention to the role that social housing has played in the lives of those who have left the sector. It places the answer within the wider context of demographic and social change and the resultant transforming nature of, and changing demands on, the social housing sector. By adopting a multi-method approach the wider macro-level effects are elucidated as catalysts for change in the way people view social housing's role during their life course. In this manner, the study works towards an understanding of the exit 'process' and not just the exit 'event'. The results indicate that, in general, households exiting social housing have seen their time within the sector as a transitional period not just within their housing career but within their lives, a chance to consolidate household finances and set the foundations for future plans. The work Rifther reveals the difficulties faced by social housing providers in adapting to changes in demand and in tenant profiles in a society where, for the vast majority, the ultimate aspiration is of home ownership.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo
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