Does banning discards in an otter trawler fishery create incentives for more selective fishing?

Reforms of the European Union Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) will implement an EU wide ban on discarding phased in from 2015, requiring the landing of unwanted small and unmarketable fish. The Commission argues that this will create strong incentives for more selective fishing practices; however, there is little information to allow us to predict likely changes in fishing behaviour. Using detailed historic observer and logbook data from English North Sea otter trawlers and information on fish prices and landing costs, we examine the potential impact of a discard ban combined with either effort controls or catch quotas on the landings of an average trip. We calculate fishing incomes based on the assumption that existing fishing behaviour and catch compositions are maintained and compare this with incomes calculated on the assumption that all unwanted catch can be avoided. The difference provides an estimate of the maximum possible financial incentive for fishers to adopt more selective fishing practices. The calculations suggest that a discard ban in isolation will generate little economic incentive to operate more selectively. When combined with effort controls, a reduction in fishing effort may result in a proportional reduction in unwanted catches, but an incentive to actively avoid this catch is unlikely to be generated. Catch quotas would generate much stronger economic incentives, but only for the avoidance of the five quota species. So, contrary to the aims of the reformed CFP, a discard ban may not result in a dramatic reduction in unmarketable catches of all species

The short-term impacts of implementing catch quotas and a discard ban on English North Sea otter trawlers

A key objective of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy reforms is the elimination of discards and a reduction in unwanted catches. Combining a discard ban with catch quotas, where all fish, independent of size, count towards quotas could create economic incentives for more selective fishing, reducing unwanted catches. We use fishing activities data from English North Sea otter trawlers to examine the impact of these measures on this fleet. Initial impacts depend on the scale of increase and distribution of quotas and are unevenly distributed, depending on catch and discard characteristics of vessels. Selective fishing will be rewarded as vessels that currently have low discards could increase catches and profits. Fishing by less selective vessels will be curtailed, reducing profits by 1–14%. This could be partially mitigated through reducing regulated catches but will require changes to fishing patterns as using currently available selective fishing gears may impact on profitability. So, catch quotas and a discard ban create strong incentives for more selective fishing practices, but also for non-compliance with full documentation of catches. A high level of monitoring and enforcement will be required to ensure that fishers improve profitability through more selective fishing practices rather than illegal discarding