Regenerative block empirical likelihood for Markov chains

Empirical likelihood is a powerful semi-parametric method increasingly investigated in the literature. However, most authors essentially focus on an i.i.d. setting. In the case of dependent data, the classical empirical likelihood method cannot be directly applied on the data but rather on blocks of consecutive data catching the dependence structure. Generalization of empirical likelihood based on the construction of blocks of increasing nonrandom length have been proposed for time series satisfying mixing conditions. Following some recent developments in the bootstrap literature, we propose a generalization for a large class of Markov chains, based on small blocks of various lengths. Our approach makes use of the regenerative structure of Markov chains, which allows us to construct blocks which are almost independent (independent in the atomic case). We obtain the asymptotic validity of the method for positive recurrent Markov chains and present some simulation results

Tuition fees, self-esteem and social heterogeneity

International audienceModelling students' behaviour in relation to tuition fees is a complex task since students' "talent" is not common knowledge. Students observe a private noisy signal of their abilities, while university receives noisy information based on the quantitative and qualitative data provided by university applicants. In this article, we add the heterogeneity of the population to this model: we assume that this heterogeneity means that the perception of skills among a part of the population is biased and underestimates the capabilities of its members to succeed in the higher education system. Our conclusions differ from those derived in the literature and show in particular that the optimal tuition fees for a given number of students are lower than those obtained for a homogeneous population

Modeling tuition fees in presence of social heterogeneity

International audienceTuition fees have been spreading through developed countries in the last decade. Beyond the obvious interest of funding universities, it is advocated that they could serve as a tool to select students. According to some recent models, in presence of asymmetric and imperfect information on the candidates' capacities, tuition should be the only selection device, at the expense of tests. Following Bourdieu's seminal work on higher education, we consider that powerful sociologic mechanisms induce social reproduction. These effects must be taken into account to understand the behaviour of potential students. In particular, candidates from lower social groups may underestimate their capacities. Therefore, we introduce heterogeneity in potential students' private evaluation of their own capacities. As a result, we obtain that tuition fees do not lead to social optimum, because talented member discard themselves. This effect gets only stronger as entrance tests are abandoned. Nevertheless, we do not recommend strong selecting tests, since the same sociologic mechanisms negatively biased the results of applicants from lower social groups

Efficient tuition fees and examinations : A reply

Dans un récent article, Gary-Bobo et Trannoy (2008) avancent l'idée que, sous certaines conditions, les frais d'inscription à l'université peuvent être un élément socialement utile pour sélectionner les étudiants à l'entrée de l'université. Les conditions définies dans leur article sont essentiellement l'existence d'informations imparfaites et asymétriques (informations “bruitées” des étudiants sur leur talent et des universités sur le talent des étudiants) et l'absence de contraintes sur le marché financier (afin de “garantir” aux bons étudiants issus de milieux modestes d'être en mesure d'emprunter la somme nécessaire à leurs études, somme qu'ils rembourseront une fois entrés dans la vie active). L'imperfection et l'asymétrie d'information conduiraient à un phénomène d'opportunisme ex ante (anti-sélection) que des frais de scolarité suffisamment élevés permettraient de combattre (en décourageant les étudiants “ trop mauvais ” d'intégrer l'enseignement supérieur). Leur article repose néanmoins sur une hypothèse consistant à modéliser une population indépendamment du milieu social d'origine. En appuyant notre recherche sur des travaux sociologiques et économiques, nous soulignons, au contraire, qu'une sous-estimation, par les individus issus de classes sociales défavorisées, de leurs capacités, apparaît plus réaliste. La prise en compte de cette hypothèse nous permet alors de montrer que les frais de scolarité doivent être relativement faibles, même en l'absence de contraintes de crédit (afin de ne pas exclure ces populations du système universitaire). Nous proposons enfin une discussion critique des autres raisons généralement avancées en faveur d'un accroissement des frais de scolarité et dégageons des perspectives de recherche.

Régime par répartition dans l'enseignement supérieur : fondements théoriques et estimations empiriques

Après avoir rappelé qu'un régime par capitalisation ne garantissait ni équité, ni efficience, ni même le financement de l'enseignement supérieur, nous définissons ce que pourrait être un régime d'éducation par répartition et discuté de ses atouts et limites, pour construire une approche théorique du concept. Une éducation par répartition conjugue la gratuité de l'accès, une allocation universelle d'autonomie et un accroissement des dépenses publiques destinés à l'université (jusqu'à un niveau jugé raisonnable pour que celle-ci puisse mener à bien ses missions). Nous montrons qu'un tel régime peut se révéler équitable et efficace pour financer le système éducatif et discutons des conditions permettant à un tel système d'être efficient. Nous montrons également qu'il permet de limiter les mécanismes de polarisation au sein de l'enseignement supérieur. Nous chiffrons alors le coût du régime par répartition (en année pleine: 5 milliards d'euros pour accroître les besoins de financement des universités et 19 milliards d'euros pour l'allocation d'autonomie), proposons des modalités de financement et analysons l'impact de ce régime sur les revenus de foyers types. Nous concluons en présentant les limites et perspectives de recherche

Contributory education scheme : theoretical basis and application

International audienceAfter a short criticism of the "self-funded education scheme" which is widely implemented in the world and often based on tuition fees, this article develops theoretical basis for a "contributory education scheme". This model is characterised 1) by a universal access for students to grants allowing them to take charge of themselves during their higher education curriculum; and 2) by a funding regime relying in particular on the population that has benefited from grants, once studies are finished. The article first points out the limits of the self-funded education scheme. Then, it discusses the analogies and differences with pension systems implemented in countries like France. We derive theoretical motivations in favour of a contributory education scheme: The equity of access to higher education, the incentives for students and university to be efficient, as well as the contributory equity are discussed. The article proposes finally to assess, for France, the cost and the options concerning the transformation of the tax system that would be needed for funding such a reform. Beyond the individual income, variables like the degree obtained by the student are taken into account in our assessment. The conclusion draws research perspectives concerning the theoretical dimensions and the transition such a reform concretely implies

Financing higher education: a contributory scheme

In this paper, we study the higher education financing based on the classical contributory versus self-funded pension funding scheme. We provide a brief discussion of how a system based on student debt can be seen ’funded’ and why it fails to ensure equity and efficiency and funding for the longer term. We also define a contributory financing scheme for higher education based on income tax and social security contributions, and study its strengths and weaknesses. By contributory, we mean a scheme that ensures free access to university, providing for students’ expenses and the costs of research and teaching. We show that such a system would be efficient and equitable, and we discuss under what conditions it would be efficient. We show also that it would prevent polarization in the higher education system. We conclude with an implementation of our contributory financing scheme in the case of France (it increases university funding by €5bn and provides €19bn for students’ expenditure) and illustrate the effect of such a scheme on some typical households

Financing Higher Education: a contributory education scheme

In this paper, we study the higher education financing based on the classical contributory versus self-funded pension funding scheme. We provide a brief discussion of how a system based on student debt can be seen 'funded' and why it fails to ensure equity and efficiency and funding for the longer term. We also define a contributory financing scheme for higher education based on income tax and social security contributions, and study its strengths and weaknesses. By contributory, we mean a scheme that ensures free access to university, providing for students' expenses and the costs of research and teaching. We show that such a system would be efficient and equitable, and we discuss under what conditions it would be efficient. We show also that it would prevent polarization in the higher education system. We conclude with an implementation of our contributory financing scheme in the case of France (it increases university funding by €5bn and provides €19bn for students' expenditure) and illustrate the effect of such a scheme on some typical households

Le rôle de la quantification dans le processus de marchandisation de l'université. Étude de cas d'une université anglaise

Dans le processus de marchandisation du secteur universitaire, à l’œuvre en Europe depuis le début des années 1980, la quantification joue un rôle central, en établissant des équivalences et des hiérarchies (classements) : elle permet de traiter des universités, des formations ou encore des chercheurs (euses) comme des éléments interchangeables dont la valeur n'est pas intrinsèque mais est déterminée par le rapport de l'offre et de la demande. En nous appuyant sur l'étude de cas d'une université anglaise, nous voulons montrer ici comment marchandisation et quantification vont de pair. Nous montrerons comment les chiffres sont mobilisés par l’État et par la direction de l'université étudiée pour transformer l'enseignement et la recherche en éléments interchangeables, réductibles à un seul ou un très petit nombre de critères pertinents ; et pour donner corps à cette réduction en orientant les pratiques des universitaires. Le caractère performatif de la quantification est ainsi utilisé comme un outil de transformation de la réalité sociale, avec pour finalité la mise en marché du secteur universitaire.In the higher education marketisation process that has been taking place since the early 1980s, quantification plays a central part by establishing equivalences and hierarchies (rankings: quantification makes it possible to consider that HEIs, courses and even academics are interchangeable and have no intrinsic value but a only a relative value determined by supply and demand. Drawing on the case study of an English university we argue that quantification goes along with marketisation. We show that the State and the university management use numbers in order to transform education and research into substitutable elements that are reducible to a single or a small number of relevant criteria. This transformation is implemented through the steering of academics' practices. The performative character of quantification is used as a tool for transforming social reality and for marketising the Higher Education sector