2,158 research outputs found
Der "demokratische Frieden" und seine außenpolitischen Konsequenzen
Der „demokratische Frieden“ und seine außenpolitischen Konsequenzen Demokratien führen gegeneinander keine Kriege; oder jedenfalls „fast“ keine. Dieser statistische Befund ist ziemlich robust gegenüber Veränderungen in der Definition von „Demokratie“ und von „Krieg“. Demokratien erfreuen sich überdies im Durchschnitt größeren Wohlstands, vermeiden erfolgreich Hungersnöte, bieten ihren Bürgerinnen und Bürgern mehr Freiheit und lassen sich eher auf internationale Organisationen und auf die Rechtsbindung in internationalen Verträgen ein als Staaten mit anderen Regierungsformen; dies sind natürlich Durchschnittswerte, von denen es Abweichungen gibt. Aber die Nachricht ist ziemlich klar: Demokratien bieten eine vergleichsweise bessere Form von „Good Governance“ als andere Systeme
Parlamentarisierung der Weltpolitik : ein skeptischer Warnruf
In diesem Aufsatz konzentriere ich mich auf einen wichtigen und überaus kühnen, praktisch-politischen Vorschlag des Projekts der kosmopolitischen Demokratie (Archibugi/Held 1995; Archibugi et al. 1998; Beck 2004; Held 1998): auf die Parlamentarisierung der Weltpolitik (Übersicht bei Bienen et al. 1998). Das kosmopolitische Projekt unterstellt, dass die Vergemeinschaftung der Menschheit einen Grad erreicht hat, der es erlaubt oder gar erfordert, die Herstellung von Recht – einschließlich von Weltbürgerrecht (Brunkhorst et al. 1999) und die Kontrolle seiner richtigen exekutiven Anwendung in die Hände einer globalen Legislative zu geben
Zwischen Macht und Gerechtigkeit : Zustand und Perspektiven des nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregimes
Das nukleare Nichtverbreitungsregime weist eine erstaunliche Erfolgsstory auf. Die Zahl der Staaten, die kernwaffenorientierte Aktivitäten in verschiedenen Stadien des Fortschritts aufgegeben haben, ist weitaus größer als die der Kernwaffenstaaten. Auf dem Höhepunkt seines Erfolgs droht dem Regime jedoch Ungemach aus zwei Richtungen: Eine kleine Anzahl von „Ausbrechern“ und „Außenseitern“ unterminiert seine zentrale Zielsetzung, die Weiterverbreitung dieser Waffen aufzuhalten. Die Verweigerungshaltung der Kernwaffenstaaten gegenüber ihrer Abrüstungspflicht verstößt gegen den im Regime eingelassenen Gerechtigkeitsgrundsatz und zerstört damit seine Legitimität. Diese Erkenntnis ist mittlerweile aus dem „Ghetto“ der unverdrossenen Abrüstungsenthusiasten in den sicherheitspolitischen Mainstream vorgedrungen. Von ihrer Durchsetzungsfähigkeit wird letztlich die Zukunft des Regimes abhängen – mit weitreichenden Konsequenzen für die globale Sicherheit.The nuclear nonproliferation regime is an amazing success story: The number of countries which have stopped nuclear weapons activities in various stages of progress is much larger than the number of nuclear weapon states. At the apex of its success, however, the regime is threatened by erosion from two different directions: A small number of rule-breakers and outsiders undermines its central objective: to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The refusal of the official nuclear weapon states to fulfill their undertaking of nuclear disarmament violates the principle of justice enshrined in the treaty, and thereby destroys its legitimacy. This insight has meanwhile expanded beyond the group of stubborn disarmers into the mainstream security establishment. How successful this expansion will be will determine the future of the regime – with far-reaching consequences for global security
Nukleare Krisen und transatlantischer Dissens : amerikanische und europäische Antworten auf aktuelle Probleme der Weiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen
Nordkorea, Iran, Irak: alle drei Staaten schockierten in diesem Jahr die Weltöffentlichkeit durch die Nachricht von Nuklearprogrammen – auch wenn sich der Verdacht im Fall Irak nicht bestätigte. Doch gerade an diesem Fall wird deutlich, wie unterschiedlich die ordnungspolitischen Vorstellungen der Vereinigten Staaten gegenüber denen der europäischen Länder sind.
Während die USA grundsätzlich Misstrauen gegenüber allen Nichtdemokratien hegen und daher ihre sicherheitspolitischen Ziele meist einen Regimewechsel einschließen, setzt Europa stärker auf Nichtverbreitungsregime und die Vereinten Nationen. Dabei können sich europäische Staaten die Koexistenz und Kooperation zwischen Demokratien und Nichtdemokratien vorstellen, solange alle gleichermaßen das Nichtverbreitungsregime tragen. Diese unterschiedlichen Ordnungsphilosophien führten schließlich zu den abweichenden Auffassungen in der Frage, ob nun gegen den Irak Krieg zu führen sei oder nicht.
Allzu lange können sich die USA und die Europäische Union diese Differenzen jedoch nicht leisten, denn das Nichtverbreitungsregime bedarf einer starken Führung und der Abstimmung der westlichen Demokratien untereinander, da sie die mächtigsten Mitglieder des Regimes darstellen. Ein weiterer notwendiger Schritt wäre ein gleichberechtigter globaler Diskurs über Sicherheit, da Nordkorea und auch der Iran Sicherheitsgründe für das Betreiben eigener Atomprogramme haben. Solange die westlichen Länder Sicherheitspolitik nur von der eigenen nationalen Warte aus betrachten und der transatlantische Dissens nicht überwunden wird, bleibt das Nichtverbreitungsregime beschädigt
Nuclear disarmament: with what end in view? : The international discourse about nuclear arms control and the vision of a nuclear weapon free world
The classic security framework from the time of the East–West conflict no longer exists. NATO no
longer faces any conventional threat. The relationship between Russia and the West, though not constituting
a security community, is certainly no longer characterized by hostility. As a result, the nuclear
arsenals of both sides are dwindling: more than one third of the strategic warheads existing in the
1980s have been done away with; according to the stated goals of the START II treaty, by the middle
of the next decade, stocks will stand at less than a quarter of their historic highs. Types of tactical
nuclear weapons have decreased dramatically in number; more than 90 per cent have been deactivated,
and a large number dismantled. Britain and France have also reduced their stocks of nuclear weapons,
albeit by a much more modest extent. Soon Britain will possess only one type of nuclear weapon, and
France only two. The flexibility of the various arsenals has markedly diminished as a result of this
reduction in variety.
These developments have cleared the view to a long-obscured goal of nuclear arms control: a nuclearweapon-
free world. Our subject here is the international discourse about nuclear disarmament. In
tackling it, we wish to distance ourselves from a view that sees politics merely as an exchange of
blows between \u27robust interests\u27 in the arena of power politics, with the accompanying rhetoric serving
merely to spread an ideological and legitimatory smoke-screen over this \u27hard core\u27.
Whether comprehensive nuclear disarmament has any chance of being achieved is, in our view, signalled
firstly—though not exclusively and entirely—by the way in which it is discussed in international
politics. It is this discussion that we shall examine here. We shall try, firstly, to establish how the
justification for, and military and political role of, nuclear weapons is dealt with in various international
forums, in the nuclear-weapon states themselves, and in Germany; secondly, we shall try to gauge
whether, within these debates, any changes can be identified which would permit some kind of diagnosis
and prognosis of trends.
The NPT Extension Conference constitutes a dividing-line in this regard. The contracting parties
themselves were at odds about the importance of nuclear disarmament from the outset. A brief account
of the course of this dispute is therefore given, before the NPT Review and Extension Conference of
spring 1995 is analysed in detail. This conference was of great importance in setting the agenda for the
global discussion about nuclear weapons.
The decision to extend the treaty also marks the start of a new era in the debate about nuclear disarmament.
The extent to which the disarmament obligations of the nuclear-weapon states, which are not
laid down anywhere else but in the NPT, were endorsed and concretized was striking. Whereas previously,
the rather ambiguous wording of Article VI could have given the impression that the NWS
were duty-bound to enter into negotiations but not to produce results, and that disarmament was a
process but not necessarily an end-point, the Principles and Objectives agreed during the Extension
Conference preclude this interpretation: they talk unequivocally of the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons.
In addition, fixing 1996 as the deadline for the halting of tests marked the nuclear-weapon states\u27 firstever
acceptance of a fixed date for an arms-control measure; and the demand for the immediate commencement
of negotiations on a \u27cut-off\u27 is tantamount to another deadline. Lastly, there was a call for
the \u27determined pursuit …of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally\u27;
this is more precise than the vague call to pursue negotiations \u27in good faith\u27 contained in Article VI of
the NPT. In his final statement to the conference, the American representative acknowledged this fact:
the ultimate goal, he said, was a nuclear-weapon-free world.
Following the end of the Extension Conference, there was no more disputing the fact that the ultimate
objective was comprehensive nuclear disarmament. However, at the debates conducted within the
framework of the United Nations and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the various parties
now got stuck into deciding \u27how\u27, \u27how fast\u27, and \u27in which forum\u27. In this matter, the nuclear-weapon
states and the threshold countries that were not party to the NPT occupied the extreme ends of the
spectrum, whilst the non-nuclear-weapon industrialized countries and non-aligned states, with their
various political variants, occupied the space in between.
An overview of all the multilateral forums that deal with nuclear disarmament produces a strangely
ambivalent impression. On the one hand, the nuclear-weapon states do not reject the aim of comprehensive
disarmament; on the other hand, they fight shy of any concession, even verbal, that might
propel them into unforeseen, undesired measures. In so doing, however, they also signal that they have
clearly become sensitive to this kind of pressure—whether it emanates from diplomatic sources or
from world opinion. Their ostentatiously intransigent attitude is therefore as much an expression of
political uncertainty and vulnerability as of strength resulting from de facto power. Where this pressure
becomes extremely strong, and extends unequivocally to their own allies—as in the case of the test
ban—opportunities arise for concessions that were initially held to be impossible, as in the \u27zero threshold\u27
modalities of the ban. The non-aligned countries still display the weakness of frequently going
for a traditional disarmament purism that preserves the cohesiveness of their otherwise disparate movement,
rather than for practical political demands that would do more to advance nuclear disarmament
than does 1950s- or 1960s-style rhetorical self-gratification. However, there is a new median
position (e.g. that of South Africa) which may in the long run present more of a threat to the hardliners
amongst the NWS than do unrealistic New-Delhi-style conjurations.
The effects stemming from the increase in nuclear-weapon-free zones merit considerable attention.
This increase entails a restriction in the scope of the NWS to move freely over the world\u27s oceans, and
to deploy nuclear weapons outside their own territories. This could eventually further undermine the
legitimacy of nuclear-weapons ownership. The signature of the relevant protocols by the NWS has, in
the last two years, led to an ever greater number of states coming to enjoy binding security assurances
from them. The geographical area within which the threat to use, and the use of, nuclear weapons
would even be legally permissible has thus considerably diminished in size.
Two major international institutions—the Canberra Commission for Nuclear Disarmament, created by
a Western-oriented government, namely Australia, and the International Court of Justice in The Hague,
which is addressing the question of the legality of nuclear weapons—constitute new forums for
discussion of the issue. They will undoubtedly help advance the discussion about the future of nuclear
weapons. But how far they can make a practical contribution on the path to a nuclear-weapon-free
world remains to be seen. That contribution will stand or fall according to how the International Court
of Justice\u27s ruling and the recommendations of the Canberra Commission are received, and the extent
to which account is taken of them in future disarmament discourse.
We end our study with a short overview of the national policies and discourses of some of the major
players. The aim of this is not to provide a full, in-depth analysis of the various national debates, but to
highlight the main positions and—where appropriate—identify changes in relation to the status quo
ante.
The positions of the nuclear-weapon states and of the most important of the non-nuclear-weapon states,
Germany, betray a remarkable ambivalence. In the nuclear-weapon states, the desire to preserve
national status clearly predominates. However, this desire is being overlaid by the growing realization
that nuclear weapons can no longer be decreed a purely national affair, and therefore a taboo subject,
and that disarmament is part and parcel of the transitional legitimation for continued nuclear status.
This paradoxical state of affairs leads to a situation in which the nuclear-weapon states, albeit reluctantly,
are subordinating themselves to requirements which, although not a sufficient condition for
nuclear disarmament, are none the less a necessary one—namely, transparency and a restricted scope
for action. But the ambivalence remains: the process is fragile and could easily be reversed; on the
other hand, the fact that it is now acceptable to raise certain topics in the internal American debate
suggests that a nuclear-weapon state may consider that its long-term interests are better safeguarded in
a nuclear-weapon-free world.
As far as Germany is concerned, the question it faces is to decide where it stands in this debate, given
its status as a major non-nuclear-weapon state. No clear line is at present discernible, and the debate is
extremely rudimentary. Between Nibelungen-like loyalty to the Western alliance\u27s first-use option and
a spirited attempt to secure greater transparency in the nuclear powers\u27 nuclear-weapon complex, there
is a palette of opinions and attitudes for which no clear common denominator is yet discernible. This is
all the more regrettable in that, in this debate more than any other, Germany\u27s voice carries great
weight, and its absence is constantly being used by advocates of nuclear weapons in its partner countries
to prove the necessity of their existing arsenals, because otherwise—so they claim—Germany,
feeling itself insecure, could institute its own nuclear option.
The opening-up of a discussion on German security-needs, and the contribution which nuclear weapons
make, or do not make, to it, is unavoidable. It has essentially already been rendered inevitable by
the French offer of \u27extended deterrence\u27. It should not be sidestepped
Justice in international diplomacy
Gerechtigkeitsbelange treten in den internationalen Beziehungen häufig auf. Sie sind in allen Verhandlungen präsent und daher ein Kernbestandteil internationaler Diplomatie. Einen Gegenstand mit dem Etikett 'Gerechtigkeit' zu versehen, kann in derselben Weise als Sprechakt analysiert werden, wie der Vorgang der 'Versicherheitlichung' ('securitization'). 'Justization' definiert eine Sachfrage als moralisch relevant, emotional belastet und nur bedingt kompromissfähig. Der Sprechakt signalisiert internationalen Partnern eine harte Verhandlungsposition und dient der Mobilisierung der einheimischen Öffentlichkeit. Ist es zur 'Justization' gekommen, so haben Diplomaten und politische Führungen später Probleme, Verhandlungskompromisse an die Öffentlichkeit zu verkaufen, die zuvor mit Gerechtigkeitsansprüchen mobilisiert wurde. Öffentliche Diplomatie, in der Gerechtigkeitsbelange auftreten, macht daher Einigungen schwieriger. Da Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen in kulturellen Traditionen verankert sind, die sich erheblich unterscheiden können, ist für Verständigung, Kompromiss und Lösungen die Brückenbildung über die Kulturgrenzen hinweg nötig. Das ist zwar nicht unmöglich, ist aber zugleich eine gewaltige Aufgabe. Der Autor beschäftigt sich in seinem HSFK-Arbeitspapier mit der Analyse von 'Justization' und ihren Folgen, die einen Wissenszuwachs über das Wesen von Verhandlungen verspricht, indem sie den herkömmlichen Interessenanalysen eine wichtige moralische Dimension hinzu fügt
Regional convergence in the European Union (1985-1999). A spatial dynamic panel analysis
We estimate the speed of income convergence for a sample of 196 European NUTS 2 regions over the period 1985-1999. So far there is no direct estimator available for dynamic panels with strong spatial dependencies. We propose a two-step procedure, which involves first spatial filtering of the variables to remove the spatial correlation, and application of standard GMM estimators for dynamic panels in a second step. Our results show that ignorance of the spatial correlation leads to potentially misleading results. Applying a system GMM estimator on the filtered variables, we obtain a speed of convergence of seven per cent.
Justice in interdisciplinary perspective: findings from other disciplines and their impact on international relations
"Peace and justice has been a preferred couple in theoretical writings - but what do we know about their empirical relationship? Will it pay off to deepen research into this relationship at all? Insights from other disciplines should serve as a mighty incentive in a field like international relations which has always looked intensely at other faculties for stimulus: Neuroscientists have located the parts of the brain responsible for averse reactions against violation of claims for justice. Evolutionary biologists have identified rules of distribution and retribution not only in early human societies but among other socially living species as well. Psychologists have watched the emergence of a sense of justice in very early childhood, while behavioral economists have identified behavior of average persons in experiments that deviated significantly from the model of 'economic man' and could only be explained by a sense of justice. The paper discusses these findings and what we should take from them for our own work on interstate and intrastate war and peace." (author's abstract
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