Das Tribunal der Vernunft : Rainer Forst über das »Recht auf Rechtfertigung«

Rezension zu: Rainer Forst: Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung. Elemente einer konstruktivistischen Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt 2007. ISBN 978-3-518-29362-1, 413 Seiten, 14 Euro

Weltraum zwischen den Zeilen : Niels Werbers Beitrag zur »reflexiven Globalisierung«

Rezension zu: Niels Werber : Die Geopolitik der Literatur. Vermessungen einer medialen Weltraumordnung ; Hanser Verlag, München, 2007 ; ISBN 978-3-446-20947-3 ; 334 Seiten, 24,90 Euro

The mark of the moral:Beyond the sentimentalist turn

In light of recent empirical data, many psychologists and philosophers have turned away from rationalism about moral judgment and embraced sentimentalism. In the process, they have rejected the classical “moral signature” as a way of distinguishing moral from conventional norms in favor of a sentimentalist approach to carving out the moral domain. In this paper, we argue that this sentimentalist turn has been made prematurely. Although we agree that the experiments reveal that the classical approach is flawed, we propose to replace it with an alternative, according to which a norm is moral precisely if it is justifiable to all. This does not hold for most norms based on disgust or loyalty to a particular community. We accommodate the fact that such norms are not merely conventional by introducing a third domain, the domain of ethics. Our proposal reveals that (psychological) rationalism is still a viable option, as a lot of the experimental evidence that features emotions concerns the domain of ethics rather than morality

Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive Control

We propose a fundamental challenge to the feasibility of moral progress: most extant theories of progress, we will argue, assume an unrealistic level of cognitive control people must have over their moral judgments for moral progress to occur. Moral progress depends at least in part on the possibility of individual people improving their moral cognition to eliminate the pernicious influence of various epistemically defective biases and other distorting factors. Since the degree of control people can exert over their moral cognition tends to be significantly overestimated, the prospects of moral progress face a formidable problem, the force of which has thus far been underappreciated. In the paper, we will provide both conceptual and empirical arguments for this thesis, and explain its most important implications.Values Technology and InnovationEthics & Philosophy of Technolog

Metamorality without Moral Truth

Recently, Joshua Greene has argued that we need a metamorality to solve moral problems for which evolution has not prepared us. The metamorality that he proposes is a utilitarian account that he calls deep pragmatism. Deep pragmatism is supposed to arbitrate when the values espoused by different groups clash. To date, no systematic appraisal of this argument for a metamorality exists. We reconstruct Greene’s case for deep pragmatism as a metamorality and consider three lines of objection to it. We argue that, in the end, only one of these objections seriously threatens Greene’s position. Greene has to commit to the nonexistence of moral truth in order for his argument for the need of a metamorality to get off the ground. This, however, leads to a tension in his overall argument for deep pragmatism: ultimately, it casts his rejection of antiutilitarian moral intuitions into doubt.</p

Pruritus Ani

Pruritus ani is an unpleasant cutaneous sensation that induces the desire to scratch the skin around the anal orifice. It may start insidiously and appears in 1% to 5% of the population. It is classified as primary (idiopathic) pruritus ani when no cause can be found. However, as 25% to 75% of cases have co-existing pathology, a detailed history and examination are necessary. The goal of treatment is asymptomatic, intact, dry, clean perianal skin with reversal of morphological changes. The management of pruritus ani is directed towards the underlying cause. If the diagnosis is idiopathic pruritus ani, the patients can still be managed with great success by eliminating of irritants and scratching, by giving general advice regarding hygiene and lifestyle modification and by using active treatment measures

Can’t we all disagree more constructively? Moral foundations, moral reasoning, and political disagreement

Can’t we all disagree more constructively? Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in political partisanship: the 2013 shutdown of the US government as well as an ever more divided political landscape in Europe illustrate that citizens and representatives of developed nations fundamentally disagree over virtually every significant issue of public policy, from immigration to health care, from the regulation of financial markets to climate change, from drug policies to medical procedures (Koleva et al. Journal of Research in Personality 46:184–194, 2012). The emerging field of political psychology brings the tools of moral psychology to bear on this issue. It suggests that the main conflict shaping politics today can be explained in terms of people’s moral foundations (Graham et al. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96(5):1029–1046, 2009; Haidt 2012; Graham et al. PLOS One 7(12):1–13, (2012); cf. also Rai and Fiske Psychological Review 118:57–75, 2011): progressive liberals, it is argued, view society as consisting of separate individuals with differing values and life plans, whereas conservatives rely on a thicker notion of political morality that includes traditions, communities, and values of purity (Haidt and Graham Social Justice Research 20:98–116, 2007). In this paper, I explore the normative implications of this theory. In particular, I will argue that its proponents take it to support an asymmetry of understanding: if deep political disagreements reflect differences in people’s moral foundations, and these disagreements cannot be rationally resolved, then overcoming them makes it necessary to acknowledge the moral foundations of the other side’s political outlook. But conservatives, the theory suggests, already do acknowledge all of the liberal moral foundations, and not vice versa. To overcome partisanship and the resulting political deadlock, then, it seems to be up to liberals to move closer towards the conservative side, and not vice versa. I wish to analyze what the argument for this asymmetry is and whether it holds up. In the end, I shall argue that the available evidence does support an asymmetry, but that it is the opposite of what Moral Foundations theorists think it is. There is such an asymmetry - but its burden falls on the conservative side