Consensus, Dissensus, and a Third Way, Learned Ignorance

The simplest statement of the relationship between consensus and dissensus is that arguments are supposed to begin in dissensus and end in consensus. This essay introduces a third state for argumentation, learned ignorance. Nicolas of Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia (1440) lays out both a case and a logic for argumentation that is not designed to end in a clear conclusion. Instead, the arguer pursues a matter up to an inconclusive point, and ends there, satisfied with the results. The underlying logic of this view is centered on the “coincidence of opposites,” which requires rejection of the usual logical principle that A and not-A cannot both be true

The Arguers

I wish to argue in favor of a particular orientation, one expressed in Brockriede\u27s remark that arguments are not in statements but in people. While much has been gained from textual analyses, even more will accrue by additional attention to the arguers. I consider that textual materials are really only the artifacts of arguments. The actual arguing is done exclusively by people, either the argument producers or receivers, and never by words on a page. In fact, most of our textual interpretations are quietly founded on the assumption that the artifact is fully informative about what people thin

Commentary on: A. F. Snoeck Henkeman\u27s The use of hyperbole in the argumentation stage

N/

Examples, Illustrations, Inductions, Anecdotes, Analogies, Precedents, Narratives, and Personal Testimonies: Are They Essentially Different?

This essay addresses the question of whether these argument schemes—example, illustration, induction, anecdote, analogy, precedent, narrative, and personal testimony—are distinct from one another. Each of them is essentially based on a single case (although the cases can be multiplied, perhaps converging into an informal induction). “Example” is the prototypical scheme. The critical questions for “example” apply to the other argument schemes as well

Convergent causal arguments in conversation

In theory, flawed arguments are not individually sufficient to justify a conclusion, but several may converge to do so. This is an empirical study of how arguers respond to a series of imperfect causal arguments during a serious conversation. People became less critical of the flawed arguments as more of the arguments appeared. The study gives empirical evidence that ordinary arguers permit sufficiency to accumulate during an extended discussion

A critical examination and development of Wellman’s theory of conductive argument

The paper aims to provide an analysis and critique of Carl Wellman’s account of conduction presented in Challenge and Response and Morals and Ethics. It considers several issues, including: reason-ing vs. argument, the definition vs. the three patterns of conduction, pro and con arguments as dialogues, their assessment, the concept of validity, applications beyond moral arguments, argument type vs. as crite-rion of evaluation

Appraisal models of intercultural communication apprehension among sojourners.

We used R. S. Lazarus’ (Emotion and Adaptation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) appraisal theory of emotions to propose a theoretical model of anxiety, upon which we built two empirical models centering on intercultural communication apprehension (ICA), distinguished by timing. We tested the models in three samples: Chinese in the US (N = 268), US Americans who studied abroad (N = 419), and US Americans in the US (N = 515). The models achieved good fit. The results showed that during an anticipated or actual intercultural interaction, people had multiple, potentially conflicting goals. The goal-related appraisals of the situation resulted in emotional reactions, such as ICA, as well as coping strategies. ICA and coping further influenced people’s immediacy behaviors and the intention to interact. Our empirical models supported the utility of the theoretical framework for all three samples, and provided advice for practitioners to improve sojourners’ time abroad