State power and armament of the two Koreas: A case study.

Most analyses of armament of the two Koreas have focused on the military balance, utilizing inconsistent or biased official data, without a proper analysis of armament dynamics. Approaches toward peace in Korea through disarmament and arms control should be based on a more systematic, objective understanding of the armament process that goes beyond the predominant arms race explanation. First, it is argued that defense expenditure is the best indicator of armament, superior to "bean counts" or "firepower scores." Externally, the 'stock' of military spending is used as the indicator of military capabilities; internally, 'defense burden' is used. Second, the Korean military balance assessment is reevaluated, utilizing more reliable estimates of defense expenditures of the two Koreas. It turns out that the alleged inferiority of the south and the arms race explanation is not warranted. Third, however, theories of domestic processes, i.e., bureaucratic-organizational incrementalism, military-industrial complex, or military Keynesianism, are partial or reductionist: armament is understood as the outcome of parochial corporative interests. Fourth, a holistic approach is proposed. Armament is explained by the conception of state power as the total capacity of domination, or the 'sum of coercion and consent,' exercised by the state apparatus and dominant classes. State power is operationalized by the overall extractive capacity, i.e., 'taxation plus private profit.' Armament as the means of coercion depends on resource potential, extraction, and allocation. Yet the relationship between armament and extraction is not linear but dialectic (or curvilinear). A high level of state power depends on consent mobilization, yet the rising cost of the expansion of state power constrains defense burden. The distribution of taxation vs. capital has a systemic effect on the allocation of resources. An additional factor in allocation, i.e., military aid, provides considerable autonomy in resource mobilization/allocation. To conclude, the internal factors, especially the regime capacity, has more effect on armament, as the two Koreas have increasingly become self-reliant in defense. Theoretically, the hypothesis of state power should be further tested in comparative case studies.Ph.D.Political ScienceUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/104952/1/9624625.pdfDescription of 9624625.pdf : Restricted to UM users only