At Last! An Explicit Solution for the Ramsey Saddle Path

I derive an explicit solution for the saddle path in a Ramsey growth model. The existence of a closed form expression greatly simplifies the analysis of how the parameters of the utility function affects investments and growth.Ramsey growth model

Battlefields and Marketplaces

Divided societies in the developing world experience wasteful struggles for power. We study the relationship between political stability and resources wasted in the struggle within a model of competitive power contests. The model of power contests is similar in structure to models describing oligopolistic market competition. This analogy helps us in deriving results that are new to the conflict literature. We show, for example, that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index can be interpreted as a measure of power concentration and that a peace treaty between fighting groups have a parallel in tacit collusion between firms in a market.Violent conflicts, Rent-seeking games, Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Oligopolistic competition.

At last!: An explicit solution for the Ramsey saddle path

I derive an explicit solution for the saddle path in a Ramsey growth model. The existence of a closed form expression greatly simpliÞes the analysis of how the parameters of the utility function affects investments and growth

King of the Hill Positional Dynamics in Contests

In a contest with positional dynamics between an incumbent and a challenger i) inequality of power may magnify conflicts, ii) more severe conflicts can go together with lower turnover of incumbents, and iii) power can be self defeating as cost advantages can reduce pay-offs. These three propositions of our paper are contrary to the implications of static conflict models. They follow from incorporating positional dynamics into the standard static approach. Such positional dynamics are relevant for competition in battlefields, politics, and market places.Contests;political stability;war;incumbency advantage

With or Without U? - The appropriate test for a U shaped relationship.

Non-linear relationships are common in economic theory, and such relationships are also frequently tested empirically. We argue that the usual test of non-linear relationships is flawed, and derive the appropriate test for a U shaped relationship. Our test gives the exact necessary and sufficient conditions for the test of a U shape in both finite samples and for a large class of models.U shape; hypothesis test; Kuznets curve; Fieller interval

A finer point in forensic identification

In this note I bring a new aspect into the so called Island Problem. Given that only cases where there is a suspect reaches the court, what is the consequence for the probability of guilt? I find that it indeed matters for the results that court cases are selected in this way. The analysis illustrates the general point that the exact protocol by which data are generated is an essential part of the information that should be used when analyzing data

Exact small sample properties of the instrumental variable estimator: A view from a different angle

I derive the exact small sample properties of the instrumental variables estimator using a trigonometric approach. The distribution for the estimation error is decomposed into a product of three components - each with an intuitive interpretation. This approach helps the discussion on what underlies the exact shape of the estimator’s distribution and in particular the possibility of a bimodal distribution

Institutions and the Resource Curse

Countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners. We claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions. More natural resources push aggregate income down, when institutions are grabber friendly, while more resources raise income, when institutions are producer friendly. We test this theory building on Sachs and Warner's influential works on the resource curse. Our main hypothesis: that institutions are decisive for the resource curse, is confirmed. Our results are in sharp contrast to the claim by Sachs and Warner that institutions do not play a role.Natural resources, Institutional quality, Growth, Rent-seeking

Institutions and the resource curse

Countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners. We claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions. More natural resources push aggregate income down, when institutions are grabber friendly, while more resources raise income, when institutions are producer friendly. We test this theory building on Sachs and Warner's influential works on the resource curse. Our main hypothesis: that institutions are decisive for the resource curse, is confirmed. Our results are in sharp contrast to the claim by Sachs and Warner that institutions do not play a role.Natural resources, Institutional quality, Growth, Rent-seeking

The political economy of migration politics in oil-rich Gulf countries

We study the political economy of migration policies in oil-rich Gulf countries focusing on two policy dimensions: a) the number of migrants allowed into the country and b) the assimilation of migrants, where less assimilated migrants on short-term contracts remit more. We develop a two goods macro model with traded and non-traded goods. The migration of guest workers leads to a wage drop hurting citizen workers, while capitalists and oil rent earners benefit. When foreign exchange is remitted out of the economy, the real exchange rate depreciates. The remittance outflow benefits oil rent earners while capitalists and workers lose. Hence the three classes of domestic agents have diverging interests with regard to their preferred policy mix. The results are important for understanding the changes in migration policy in the Gulf, in particular in relation to the sharing of oil rents and on the political influence of the working class and the capitalists