Monitoring Wind-Borne Particle Matter Entering Poultry Farms via the Air-Inlet: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus and Other Pathogens Risk

Wind-supported transport of particle matter (PM) contaminated with excreta from highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIv)-infected wild birds may be a HPAIv-introduction pathway, which may explain infections in indoor-housed poultry. The primary objective of our study was therefore to measure the nature and quantity of PM entering poultry houses via air-inlets. The air-inlets of two recently HPAIv-infected poultry farms (a broiler farm and a layer farm) were equipped with mosquito-net collection bags. PM was harvested every 5 days for 25 days. Video-camera monitoring registered wild bird visits. PM was tested for avian influenza viruses (AIV), Campylobacter and Salmonella with PCR. Insects, predominantly mosquitoes, were tested for AIV, West Nile, Usutu and Schmallenberg virus. A considerable number of mosquitoes and small PM amounts entered the air-inlets, mostly cobweb and plant material, but no wild bird feathers. Substantial variation in PM entering between air-inlets existed. In stormy periods, significantly larger PM amounts may enter wind-directed air-inlets. PM samples were AIV and Salmonella negative and insect samples were negative for all viruses and bacteria, but several broiler and layer farm PM samples tested Campylobacter positive. Regular wild (water) bird visits were observed near to the poultry houses. Air-borne PM and insects-potentially contaminated with HPAIv or other pathogens-can enter poultry air-inlets. Implementation of measures limiting this potential introduction route are recommended

Clinical and Pathological Findings in SARS-CoV-2 Disease Outbreaks in Farmed Mink (Neovison vison)

SARS-CoV-2, the causative agent of COVID-19, caused respiratory disease outbreaks with increased mortality in 4 mink farms in the Netherlands. The most striking postmortem finding was an acute interstitial pneumonia, which was found in nearly all examined mink that died at the peak of the outbreaks. Acute alveolar damage was a consistent histopathological finding in mink that died with pneumonia. SARS-CoV-2 infections were confirmed by detection of viral RNA in throat swabs and by immunohistochemical detection of viral antigen in nasal conchae, trachea, and lung. Clinically, the outbreaks lasted for about 4 weeks but some animals were still polymerase chain reaction–positive for SARS-CoV-2 in throat swabs after clinical signs had disappeared. This is the first report of the clinical and pathological characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in mink farms

T(r)icky Environments: Higher Prevalence of Tick-Borne Zoonotic Pathogens in Rodents from Natural Areas Compared with Urban Areas.

Background: Urban areas are unique ecosystems with stark differences in species abundance and composition compared with natural ecosystems. These differences can affect pathogen transmission dynamics, thereby altering zoonotic pathogen prevalence and diversity. In this study, we screened small mammals from natural and urban areas in the Netherlands for up to 19 zoonotic pathogens, including viruses, bacteria, and protozoan parasites. Materials and Methods: In total, 578 small mammals were captured, including wood mice (Apodemus sylvaticus), bank voles (Myodes glareolus), yellow-necked mice (Apodemus flavicollis), house mice (Mus musculus), common voles (Microtus arvalis), and greater white-toothed shrews (Crocidura russula). We detected a wide variety of zoonotic pathogens in small mammals from both urban and natural areas. For a subset of these pathogens, in wood mice and bank voles, we then tested whether pathogen prevalence and diversity were associated with habitat type (i.e., natural versus urban), degree of greenness, and various host characteristics. Results: The prevalence of tick-borne zoonotic pathogens (Borrelia spp. and Neoehrlichia mikurensis) was significantly higher in wood mice from natural areas. In contrast, the prevalence of Bartonella spp. was higher in wood mice from urban areas, but this difference was not statistically significant. Pathogen diversity was higher in bank voles from natural habitats and increased with body weight for both rodent species, although this relationship depended on sex for bank voles. In addition, we detected methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, extended-spectrum beta-lactamase/AmpC-producing Escherichia coli, and lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus for the first time in rodents in the Netherlands. Discussion: The differences between natural and urban areas are likely related to differences in the abundance and diversity of arthropod vectors and vertebrate community composition. With increasing environmental encroachment and changes in urban land use (e.g., urban greening), it is important to better understand transmission dynamics of zoonotic pathogens in urban environments to reduce potential disease risks for public health

First Isolation of Hepatitis E Virus Genotype 4 in Europe through Swine Surveillance in the Netherlands and Belgium

Hepatitis E virus (HEV) genotypes 3 and 4 are a cause of human hepatitis and swine are considered the main reservoir. To study the HEV prevalence and characterize circulating HEV strains, fecal samples from swine in the Netherlands and Belgium were tested by RT-PCR. HEV prevalence in swine was 7–15%. The Dutch strains were characterized as genotype 3, subgroups 3a, 3c and 3f, closely related to sequences found in humans and swine earlier. The HEV strains found in Belgium belonged to genotypes 3f and 4b. The HEV genotype 4 strain was the first ever reported in swine in Europe and an experimental infection in pigs was performed to isolate the virus. The genotype 4 strain readily infected piglets and caused fever and virus shedding. Since HEV4 infections have been reported to run a more severe clinical course in humans this observation may have public health implications

Effectiveness of Passive and Active Surveillance for Early Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in Mink during the 2020 Outbreak in the Netherlands

Starting December 2019, a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) spread among humans across the world. From 2020 onward, farmed mink were found susceptible to the virus. In this paper, we describe the Dutch surveillance system and the added surveillance components for early detection of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks and their results in Dutch mink farms. In the Netherlands, a surveillance system was in place in which mink farmers could submit carcasses for postmortem evaluation and could contact a telephone helpdesk for veterinary advise. Through this system, the first SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in two mink farms was detected in April 2020. Immediately, the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture commissioned a consortium of statutory and research institutes to intensify the surveillance system. The program consisted of both passive surveillance, i.e., mandatory notifications and active surveillance components, i.e., serological screenings and weekly risk-based sampling of dead mink for early detection of new SARS-CoV-2 infections. When one of the surveillance components indicated a suspicion of a possible SARS-CoV-2 infection, follow-up samplings were conducted and at confirmation, all mink were culled. During 2020, 67 out of 124 mink farms that were under surveillance became infected with SARS-CoV-2 (54%). Of these, 31 were detected based on clinical signs (passive surveillance of clinical signs) and 36 were detected through active surveillance. From the mink farms with a new SARS-CoV-2 outbreak that was detected through the surveillance, in 19% of the farms (n = 7), the mink never showed any clinical signs of SARS-CoV-2 and might have been missed by the passive notification system. This study underlines the added value of a surveillance system that can quickly be intensified. The subsequent combination of both passive and active surveillance has shown to be effective in the early detection of emerging pathogens, which is important to minimize the risk of zoonotic spill-over

Adaptation, spread and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in farmed minks and associated humans in the Netherlands

In the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic (April 2020), SARS-CoV-2 was detected in farmed minks and genomic sequencing was performed on mink farms and farm personnel. Here, we describe the outbreak and use sequence data with Bayesian phylodynamic methods to explore SARS-CoV-2 transmission in minks and humans on farms. High number of farm infections (68/126) in minks and farm workers (>50% of farms) were detected, with limited community spread. Three of five initial introductions of SARS-CoV-2 led to subsequent spread between mink farms until November 2020. Viruses belonging to the largest cluster acquired an amino acid substitution in the receptor binding domain of the Spike protein (position 486), evolved faster and spread longer and more widely. Movement of people and distance between farms were statistically significant predictors of virus dispersal between farms. Our study provides novel insights into SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink farms and highlights the importance of combining genetic information with epidemiological information when investigating outbreaks at the animal-human interface

SARS-CoV-2 infection in cats and dogs in infected mink farms

Animals like mink, cats and dogs are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. In the Netherlands, 69 out of 127 mink farms were infected with SARS-CoV-2 between April and November 2020 and all mink on infected farms were culled after SARS-CoV-2 infection to prevent further spread of the virus. On some farms, (feral) cats and dogs were present. This study provides insight into the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2-positive cats and dogs in 10 infected mink farms and their possible role in transmission of the virus. Throat and rectal swabs of 101 cats (12 domestic and 89 feral cats) and 13 dogs of 10 farms were tested for SARS-CoV-2 using PCR. Serological assays were performed on serum samples from 62 adult cats and all 13 dogs. Whole Genome Sequencing was performed on one cat sample. Cat-to-mink transmission parameters were estimated using data from all 10 farms. This study shows evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in 12 feral cats and 2 dogs. Eleven cats (18%) and two dogs (15%) tested serologically positive. Three feral cats (3%) and one dog (8%) tested PCR-positive. The sequence generated from the cat throat swab clustered with mink sequences from the same farm. The calculated rate of mink-to-cat transmission showed that cats on average had a chance of 12% (95%CI 10%–18%) of becoming infected by mink, assuming no cat-to-cat transmission. As only feral cats were infected it is most likely that infections in cats were initiated by mink, not by humans. Whether both dogs were infected by mink or humans remains inconclusive. This study presents one of the first reports of interspecies transmission of SARS-CoV-2 that does not involve humans, namely mink-to-cat transmission, which should also be considered as a potential risk for spread of SARS-CoV-2

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 on mink farms between humans and mink and back to humans

Animal experiments have shown that nonhuman primates, cats, ferrets, hamsters, rabbits, and bats can be infected by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). In addition, SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been detected in felids, mink, and dogs in the field. Here, we describe an in-depth investigation using whole-genome sequencing of outbreaks on 16 mink farms and the humans living or working on these farms. We conclude that the virus was initially introduced by humans and has since evolved, most likely reflecting widespread circulation among mink in the beginning of the infection period, several weeks before detection. Despite enhanced biosecurity, early warning surveillance, and immediate culling of animals in affected farms, transmission occurred between mink farms in three large transmission clusters with unknown modes of transmission. Of the tested mink farm residents, employees, and/or individuals with whom they had been in contact, 68% had evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Individuals for which whole genomes were available were shown to have been infected with strains with an animal sequence signature, providing evidence of animal-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within mink farms

SARS-CoV-2 infection in farmed minks, the Netherlands, April and May 2020

Respiratory disease and increased mortality occurred in minks on two farms in the Netherlands, with interstitial pneumonia and SARS-CoV-2 RNA in organ and swab samples. On both farms, at least one worker had coronavirus disease-associated symptoms before the outbreak. Variations in mink-derived viral genomes showed between-mink transmission and no infection link between the farms. Inhalable dust contained viral RNA, indicating possible exposure of workers. One worker is assumed to have attracted the virus from mink