Empirical Evidence for Constraint Relaxation Insight Problem Solving

Using a new developed task environment that allows to control for depth and width of problem space (Match Stick Algebra problems), three experiments were conducted to investigate the role of implicit constraints in insight problem solving. The first experiment showed that constraints caused by prior knowledge of common algebra lead to large differences in solution times, when they were encountered for the first time. No differences were found after the constraints had been relaxed. In the second experiment complimentary moves had to be applied in two different equation structures, one similiar to common algebra, one dissimiliar to common algebra. Consistent with our predictions different problem structures lead to a reversed order of task difficulty for the same moves depending on the activation of prior knowledge from real algebra. In the third experiment it was shown that a re-distribution of activation in a network causes the removing of constraints. Non-detectable priming of the solution lead to significantly more solutions in the experimental group as compared to a control group

How to investigate insight: A proposal

Abstract One of the most challenging issues in the Weld of creativity is Wnding an approach conducent to understanding the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying insight. We propose investigating the process of insight within the context of implicit learning paradigms. The training tasks in implicit learning paradigms are regularly constructed and, although participants are not informed about the existence of such a regularity, some of them gain insight into this regular pattern during training. This process of spontaneously arising explicit knowledge during an incidental learning situation strongly resembles the process of Wnding the solution for an insight problem. The main advantage of these incidental learning situations is the opportunity to investigate the process of insight on a trial-by-trial basis. This would be of particularly interest to researchers who want to relate the process of insight to neural activity. We begin with a description of our main Wndings concerning the emergence of explicit knowledge in implicit learning and continue with detailed descriptions of our implicit learning paradigm and data-analytic strategies

How we use what we learn in Math: An integrative account of the development of commutativity.

One of the crucial issues in mathematics development is how children acquire mathematical concepts and procedures. Most researchers now agree that this knowledge develops iteratively (e.g., Resnick, 1992). However, little is known about how well this knowledge is integrated into a more abstract concept and how children come to spontaneously apply such concepts. Expertise research suggests that spontaneously spot and use a principle whenever it applies requires well-integrated conceptual and procedural knowledge. Here, we report a method allowing to asses procedural and conceptual knowledge about the commutative principle in an unobtrusive manner. In two different tasks, procedural and conceptual knowledge of second and third graders as well as adult students were assessed independently and without any hint concerning commutativity. Results show that, even though second graders according to our measures already possessed procedural and conceptual knowledge about commutativity, the knowledge assessed in these two tasks was unrelated. An integrated relation between the two measures first emerged with some of the third graders and was further strengthened for adult students

Parallel and serial task processing in the PRP paradigm: a drift–diffusion model approach

Even after a long time of research on dual-tasking, the question whether the two tasks are always processed serially (response selection bottleneck models, RSB) or also in parallel (capacity-sharing models) is still going on. The first models postulate that the central processing stages of two tasks cannot overlap, producing a central processing bottleneck in Task 2. The second class of models posits that cognitive resources are shared between the central processing stages of two tasks, allowing for parallel processing. In a series of three experiments, we aimed at inducing parallel vs. serial processing by manipulating the relative frequency of short vs. long SOAs (Experiments 1 and 2) and including no-go trials in Task 2 (Experiment 3). Beyond the conventional response time (RT) analyses, we employed drift–diffusion model analyses to differentiate between parallel and serial processing. Even though our findings were rather consistent across the three experiments, they neither support unambiguously the assumptions derived from the RSB model nor those derived from capacity-sharing models. SOA frequency might lead to an adaptation to frequent time patterns. Overall, our diffusion model results and mean RTs seem to be better explained by participant’s time expectancies

Lesetest für Berufsschüler/innen LTB-3. Handbuch

Klassenarbeiten, Klausuren und Fachprüfungen dauern oft mehrere Stunden,sowohl in ihrer Dauer wie in ihrer Auswertung. Die Dauer der Prüfungen ist in Prüfungsordnungen vorgegeben. Der vorliegende Test ermöglicht es, auf ökonomische und objektive Weise die Lesekompetenz von Schülerinnen und Schülern zu erfassen. Er ist einfach handzuhaben, Testdurchführung und -auswertung nehmen nur wenig Zeit in Anspruch und ermöglichen eine problemlose Integration in den Schulalltag. Ein Test kann nicht von einer Person entwickelt werden und so stehen als Autoren und Berater mehrere Personen auf der Titelseite. Neben den genannten Mitwirkenden waren noch unzählige Personen beteiligt, die hier und da konstruktiv an einer Frage „herumkritisierten“

Behavioral/Systems/Cognitive Functional Dissociation of Hippocampal Mechanism during Implicit Learning Based on the Domain of Associations

Traditionally, the medial temporal lobe (MTL) was linked to explicit or declarative memory in associative learning. However, recent studies have reported MTL involvement even when volunteers are not consciously aware of the learned contingencies. Therefore, the mechanism of the MTL-related learning process cannot be described sufficiently by the explicit/implicit distinction, and the underlying process in the MTL for associative learning needs a more functional characterization. A possible feature that would allow a functional specification also for implicit learning is the nature of the material that is learned. Given that implicit memory tasks often comprise a combination of perceptual and motor learning, we hypothesized that implicit learning of the perceptual but not the motor component entails MTL activation in these studies. To directly test this hypothesis, we designed a purely perceptual and a purely motor variant of the serial reaction time task. In two groups of human volunteers, behavioral results clearly showed that both variants were learned without awareness. Neuronal recordings using fMRI revealed that bilateral hippocampal activation was observed only for implicit learning of the perceptual sequence, not for the motor sequence. This dissociation clearly shows that the functional role of the hippocampus for learning is determined by the domain of the learned association and that the function of the medial temporal lobe system is the processing of contingencies between perceptual features regardless of the explicit or implicit nature of the ensuing memory

Investigating the characteristics of not responding'': backward crosstalk in the PRP paradigm with forced vs. free no-go decisions

Have you ever thought about what it means not to act? Basically, most people think about nonactions (or not responding'') as depending on the existence of a pre-activated response which is then inhibited. The main problem when investigating the characteristics of such no-go responses is that they do not provide reaction times. Importantly, Miller (Psychol Res 70: 484-493, 2006) recently showed that in a dual-task paradigm, forced go/no-go decisions in the secondary task lead to a backward crosstalk effect (BCE) in the reaction times of the primary task. Based on this experimental setup, we conducted three experiments to investigate the characteristics of not responding.'' The goal of Experiments 1 and 2 was to compare forced-choice and free-choice no-go responses. In both experiments, we only found a BCE when participants were forced not to respond. We interpret these findings as a first hint that the BCE is not due to an active inhibition of a pre-activated response tendency. Rather, we assume that it is caused by an automatic activation of specific response features when merely perceiving the secondary stimulus (Hommel, J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 24: 1368-1384, 1998). In the forced-choice condition, the stimulus unambiguously announces a no-go response. By contrast, this is not the case in the free-choice condition as here the stimulus only signals participants to freely decide to go''or not to go.'' Therefore, we tested in Experiment 3 rather directly if merely perceiving a stimulus unambiguously announcing a no-go'' causes a BCE. The results confirmed this. Overall, our results suggest that no-go responses do not differ conceptually from go responses

The Emergence of Explicit Knowledge in a Serial Reaction Time Task: The Role of Experienced Fluency and Strength of Representation

The Serial Reaction Time Task (SRTT) is an important paradigm to study the properties of unconscious learning processes. One specifically interestingand still controversially discussed topic are the conditions under which unconsciously acquired knowledge becomes conscious knowledge. The different assumptions about the underlying mechanisms can contrastively be separated into two accounts: single system views in which the strengthening of associative weights throughout training gradually turns implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge, and dual system views in which implicit knowledge itself does not become conscious. Rather, it requires a second process which detects changes in performance and is able to acquire conscious knowledge. In a series of three experiments, we manipulated the arrangement of sequential and deviant trials. In an SRTT training, participants either received mini-blocks of sequential trials followed by mini-blocks of deviant trials (22 trials each) or they received sequential and deviant trials mixed randomly. Importantly the number of correct and deviant transitions was the same for both conditions. Experiment 1 showed that both conditions acquired a comparable amount of implicit knowledge, expressed indifferent test tasks.Experiment 2 further demonstrated that both conditions differed in their subjectively experienced fluency of the task, with more fluency experienced when trained with mini-blocks. Lastly, Experiment 3 revealed that the articipants trained with longer mini-blocks of sequential and deviant material developed more explicit knowledge. Results are discussed regarding their compatibility with different assumptions about the emergence of explicit knowledge in an implicit learning situation, especially with respect to the role of meta cognitive judgements and more specifically the Unexpected-Event Hypothesis

Preparatory adjustment of cognitive control in the task switching paradigm

In this article, the authors investigate the assumption that preparation while switching between cognitive tasks is dynamically adjusted to the current task demands. Performance in high-shift blocks (75% shifts) was compared with performance in high-repetition blocks (75% repetitions). This probability information was given either at the beginning of a block (global condition) or by specific probability cues before every trial (local condition). The authors report strong preparation effects (activation of the probable task and inhibition of the improbable task) in high-shift blocks, especially when specific probability cues were provided. In high-repetition blocks, however, the preparation effects were less pronounced. The results support the assumption that preparation is dynamically adjusted to the expected task requirements

The Theatre in Austria

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