Temporal Accumulation and Decision Processes in the Duration Bisection Task Revealed by Contingent Negative Variation

The duration bisection paradigm is a classic task used to examine how humans and other animals perceive time. Typically, participants first learn short and long anchor durations and are subsequently asked to classify probe durations as closer to the short or long anchor duration. However, the specific representations of time and the decision rules applied in this task remain the subject of debate. For example, researchers have questioned whether participants actually use representations of the short and long anchor durations in the decision process rather than merely a response threshold that is derived from those anchor durations. Electroencephalographic (EEG) measures, like the contingent negative variation (CNV), can provide information about the perceptual and cognitive processes that occur between the onset of the timing stimulus and the motor response. The CNV has been implicated as an electrophysiological marker of interval timing processes such as temporal accumulation, representation of the target duration, and the decision that the target duration has been attained. We used the CNV to investigate which durations are involved in the bisection categorization decision. The CNV increased in amplitude up to the value of the short anchor, remained at a constant level until about the geometric mean (GM) of the short and long anchors, and then began to resolve. These results suggest that the short anchor and the GM of the short and long anchors are critical target durations used in the bisection categorization decision process. In addition, larger mean N1P2 amplitude differences were associated with larger amplitude CNVs, which may reflect the participant’s precision in initiating timing on each trial across a test session. Overall, the results demonstrate the value of using scalp-recorded EEG to address basic questions about interval timing

Rubber Hands Feel Touch, but Not in Blind Individuals

Psychology and neuroscience have a long-standing tradition of studying blind individuals to investigate how visual experience shapes perception of the external world. Here, we study how blind people experience their own body by exposing them to a multisensory body illusion: the somatic rubber hand illusion. In this illusion, healthy blindfolded participants experience that they are touching their own right hand with their left index finger, when in fact they are touching a rubber hand with their left index finger while the experimenter touches their right hand in a synchronized manner (Ehrsson et al. 2005). We compared the strength of this illusion in a group of blind individuals (n = 10), all of whom had experienced severe visual impairment or complete blindness from birth, and a group of age-matched blindfolded sighted participants (n = 12). The illusion was quantified subjectively using questionnaires and behaviorally by asking participants to point to the felt location of the right hand. The results showed that the sighted participants experienced a strong illusion, whereas the blind participants experienced no illusion at all, a difference that was evident in both tests employed. A further experiment testing the participants' basic ability to localize the right hand in space without vision (proprioception) revealed no difference between the two groups. Taken together, these results suggest that blind individuals with impaired visual development have a more veridical percept of self-touch and a less flexible and dynamic representation of their own body in space compared to sighted individuals. We speculate that the multisensory brain systems that re-map somatosensory signals onto external reference frames are less developed in blind individuals and therefore do not allow efficient fusion of tactile and proprioceptive signals from the two upper limbs into a single illusory experience of self-touch as in sighted individuals

Sense of agency in the human brain

In adult life, people normally know what they are doing. This experience of controlling one's own actions and, through them, the course of events in the outside world is called 'sense of agency'. It forms a central feature of human experience; however, the brain mechanisms that produce the sense of agency have only recently begun to be investigated systematically. This recent progress has been driven by the development of better measures of the experience of agency, improved design of cognitive and behavioural experiments, and a growing understanding of the brain circuits that generate this distinctive but elusive experience. The sense of agency is a mental and neural state of cardinal importance in human civilization, because it is frequently altered in psychopathology and because it underpins the concept of responsibility in human societies

Evidence that endpoint feedback facilitates intermanual transfer of visuomotor force learning by a cognitive strategy

Humans continuously adapt their movement to a novel environment by recalibrating their sensorimotor system. Recent evidence, however, shows that explicit planning to compensate for external changes, i.e., a cognitive strategy, can also aid performance. If such a strategy is planned in external space, it should improve performance in an effector-independent manner. We tested this hypothesis by examining whether promoting a cognitive strategy during a visual-force adaptation task performed in one hand can facilitate learning for the opposite hand. Participants rapidly adjusted the height of visual bar on screen to a target level by isometrically exerting force on a handle using their right hand. Visuomotor gain increased during the task and participants learned the increased gain. Visual feedback was continuously provided for one group, whereas for another group only the endpoint of the force trajectory was presented. The latter has been reported to promote cognitive strategy use. We found that endpoint feedback produced stronger intermanual transfer of learning and slower response times than continuous feedback. In a separate experiment, we found evidence that aftereffects are reduced when only endpoint feedback is provided, a finding that has been consistently observed when cognitive strategies are used. The results suggest that intermanual transfer can be facilitated by a cognitive strategy. This indicates that the behavioral observation of intermanual transfer can be achieved either by forming an effector-independent motor representation or by sharing an effector-independent cognitive strategy between the hands.NEW & NOTEWORTHY The causes and consequences of cognitive strategy use are poorly understood. We tested whether a visuomotor task learned in a manner that may promote cognitive strategy use causes greater generalization across effectors. Visual feedback was manipulated to promote cognitive strategy use. Learning consistent with cognitive strategy use for one hand transferred to the unlearned hand. Our result suggests that intermanual transfer can result from a common cognitive strategy used to control both hands