Nietzsche’s transcription of the early European counterfeit

An inter-disciplinary enquiry concerning Europe, Europeans and Europeanity across time, based on proceedings of the 10th world congress of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas convened at the University of Malta. Originally published in: Frendo, Henry (2010): The European Mind: Narrative and Identity : Proceedings of the X World Congress of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, University of Malta, 24th-29th July 2006. International Society for the Study of European Ideas. Malta University Press

Litotes, Irony and other Innocent Lies

In the following text we would like to present the philosophical discussion on untrusting lies, which introduces a space for innocent lie understood as figurative manipulation of the speech: a poetic trope that we would argue could not only be generously used to help us tolerating our sometime deceiving human condition—which is global and universally ours, that of the finitude of human capacity of knowledge and ethical action—but also to maximise our capacity for knowledge formation and adaptation to values. Concepts formation and communication relates to a collective interplay of different interiorized images, before it comes to the exterior in some well-chosen expressions, in self-mastered way; their origin remain in a mentally latent process of selection of content and ideas, as possible solutions of in a games of compatible propositions. These unconscious materials of our life relies on our capacity to identify and quickly switch between different spans, that enable us to focus on complex sets data, all depending very much on figurative manipulations, that should not be confounded with blameworthy and misleading representations

The Bright Lights on Self Identity and Positive Reciprocity: Spinoza’s Ethics of the Other Focusing on Competency, Sustainability and the Divine Love

The claim of this paper is to present Spinoza’s view on self-esteem and positive reciprocity, which replaces the human being in a monistic psycho-dynamical affective framework, instead of a dualistic pedestal above nature. Without naturalising the human being in an eliminative materialistic view as many recent neuro-scientific conceptions of the mind do, Spinoza finds an important entry point in a panpsychist and holistic perspective, presenting the complexity of the human being, which is not reducible to the psycho-physiological conditions of life. From a panpsychist point of view, qualities and values emerge from the world, in a situation similar to what could be seen in animism, or early childhood psychology, where the original distance between the mind and the exterior thing is reduced ad minima, and both can even interrelate in a confusing manner. Human reality is nevertheless a social reality, it supposes a basis for shared competencies, that we will present as grounded on the one hand of the sustaining character of the essence of the animal-man as will-to-power. Negatively speaking we all share same asocial tendencies and affects. This aspect is not only negative but it is also a will to develop and master the environment, because values have an onto-metaphysical immanent dimension in nature, not because there is an individual bottom-up will to survive, but rather a will to live in harmony with the surrounding world. On the other hand, we shall see that Spinoza understood and described perfectly the power of the mind over the power of the affects, as a co-constituting dimension, which is alienating natural dependencies, leaving an inner space for the objectification of ethical values, not related to mere compensation mechanisms

Empathy and indifference : philosophical reflections on schizophrenia

The professional application of ethics often lacks the necessary conceptual tools to construct adequate theoretical foundations that can be used for practical enterprise. Health care professionals, such as psychologists and sociologists, education institution administrators and teachers (among others) , are all, broadly speaking, supposed to be able to take responsibility for other people’s personal development. This makes the relative lack of attention given to theoretical foundations for knowledge on mental development and cognitive sciences all the more puzzling. This book focuses on an anthropological approach to mental illness, describing how schizophrenia can distort one’s experience of empathy and of the presence in the world through pathological indifference. It describes factual and phenomenological perspectives on a case of schizophrenia, based on the method of Eugène Minkowski

Revue du livre : Diangitukwa et Siadous, Les prisons sont-elles utiles?

Le contexte des prisons africaines offre amplement matière à revisiter l’idée classique de l’inutilité de certaines criminalisations. Dans un monde plus que jamais dominé par le spectacle des châtiments et des modèles de justice expéditives, il est bienvenu de replacer le rôle de l’éducation dans la prison, puisque tout détenu emprisonné, aussi démuni et à plaindre soit-il, est riche de son temps, et capable de résilience et de perfectionnement. Encore faut-il, sous peine de paraître très idéaliste, dessiner de manière convaincante les lignes directrices de la rédemption par la formation et les études dans le cadre de la prison. Les prisons ne sont pas des mouroirs, tel est le leitmotiv de l’entretien passionnant entre sept spécialistes des prisons dans l’enceinte de la prison de Libreville et le truchement de l’œuvre de Diangitukwa et de Siadous

Inclusive Education and Epistemic Value in the Praxis of Ethical Change

IIn many universities and related knowledge transmission organisations, professional focus on empirical data shows as in vocational education that preparation for real life technical work is important, as one would expect from “career education”. University is as the name shows on the contrary focusing on the universality of some sort of education, which is neither a technical one, nor much concerned by preparing oneself for a career. The scope of this chapter is to propose an analysis of inclusion as the very essence of an ethics of reformation of education, which in our opinion cannot come from the institution of education as much as from a common basis between everyday learning capacities and curriculum based learning methods. Inclusive vision and values should be theoretically explained by philosophers in order to be refined and adapted into our current experience of values, pointing out issues about method and knowledge parameters. In particular a focus on epistemic values should bring good indications on how to empower others, and leave a more inclusive life, assuming the somehow paradoxical and surprising idea that knowledge is as important in real life outside the university as it is in the classroom, being the real universal value and currency across disciplines, times and contexts. University learns from being inclusive, i. e. by bringing not only a higher point of view on technical education but also a wider view on the human being

Solidarity : enlightened leadership

Solidarity could be defined in the broad sense either as a means or as an end. Considered as an end, solidarity is the motive of any virtuous action based on altruistic reasons, such as helping others to rescue someone in order to prevent a harmful situation. E. g. contributing to lift and rescue a heavy person, lying unconscious in the street on the floor, who is being handled by rescuers, but who might be needing an additional person, could express the value of solidarity as an end, since an answer to others request for help is given in the situation of emergency and risk, without having a particular obligation to help. Solidarity as a means (to an end, not an end), could be understood as a property of dependency of a set of parts to a whole (in solidum), as when in a family or a professional group, individual and collective roles and responsibilities are melt together to some extent.This idea of benefiting others could be understood either as a way of sharing together moral sentiments as love, social virtues as friendship and shared commitments and common economic and educational interests, in a limited community circle, that of the family. Even if the division of labour is not simply based on patriarchal authority, mutual consent of family members to rules and to a common circle of interests, those of the family, resemble to a egoism of the group, and not yet to truly social and altruistic values. Solidarity as cohesion of human beings, by the means of "interchangeability of ideas, services, goods, of workforce, virtues and vices", is solidarity limited to the constitution of a process of exchange that is a means that could be used to different ends