

ARE THERE ODIIOUS EMOTIONS? PERSPECTIVIST AND REALIST ANALYSES

REFLECTIONS ON HATRED

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“I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. (...)

Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; (...) I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.”

Spinoza, B. *Ethics*. Part III,
On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions.

Introduction

Perspectivist and realist methods for defining emotions

We do not want to question the relevance of defining the Enlightenment starting point on the anthropological understanding of our emotions, and thus of focusing mainly on the intentional subject, and the possibility of doing as if there would be an easy choice between many object or value options. We call for a *perspectivist* view as we see situations where adding the madness of hatred to some frustration, is

part of an aggressive intervention in a situation, which is already emotionally loaded in a strong or negative ways. A heavy frustration seems a good candidate for a strong emotion as anger, although heavy frustration might not have one only object and deserve further ethical not only psychological healing. Consequently, in many situations, there is no single emotion of hatred but only a complex bundle of emotions called hatred.

We propose to try to conceptualise this hypothesis from the distinction between on the one hand, fully achieved state of affairs (or not), and adequate (or not) postures of the self, where reason redirects emotions through knowledge (and collective tools of emancipation). On the other hand, we would like to underline states of not fleeting but profound and/or visceral emotions. If we consider that *ressentiment* loaded hatred and wrath could have a common starting point in time, in our subjective experience: then we need to cut a string of heterogeneous things into distinctive entities. As shown in the above chapter on *ressentiment*, there could be a transformation in time both melting *ressentiment* and hatred in confusing ways.⁶³

If there is a process of fleeting sensations, it means there are incomplete objects or values, which over time develop into some more definable ones (or not). A house, which a worker has not completed is partially completed (or not), and therefore missing a degree of perfection, under the assumption that he wanted to fully realise it, not under the assumption that he wanted to carry the construction to a certain point. As we shall see below, some object or value, are either relative to reason as the thinking of a person who acts in a perspectivist

⁶³ Ivana Zagorac / Ignace Haaz, “Many Shades of *Ressentiment*”, Ch. 2 of this book, DOI: 10.58863/20.500.12424/4293062. Dr Ignace Haaz is Managing Editor at Globethics Publications. Mail: haaz@globethics.net DOI: 10.58863/20.500.12424/4293065 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International

view, they are called “mode” related with Spinoza, essentially depending on our experience or thinking. Others, very limited categories of objects or values can be considered as not depending on our perception or mental construction, but *sub species aeternitatis*. They are so to say out there, as a reality in itself. In this later case, an object or a value is beyond the limitations of individual or collective human experiences and time. In this case, such categories of objects are beyond the transient and subjective nature of human perception, as absolute and independent universals (e. g. *the substance* or *God*; and the *attributes* through which we define such independent entities)⁶⁴.

There are states of affairs that are good

Let us just start, along the line of Kuno Fisher’s analysis, by saying that if we follow Spinoza, then we shall exclude the category of personality from the notion of substance (God, Nature; see: Fischer, 1865, 207, 208). Spinoza thinks consequently that God can neither love nor hate. The qualities of personal nature are formed only by imagination, as are emotions (affects) and perceptions, which

⁶⁴ We shall leave aside the cardinal role of the concept of God, which would require a particular attention. For animals and reasonable living beings God keeps the interconnectedness of the underlying unity of existence, which is *an aspect of eternity* reflecting our deep presence to the world, as living beings, but also, and without yet elaborating a philosophy of life - as German idealist thinking will do -, God is also one, infinite, eternal, free and indivisible and unchangeable not simply with respect to our capacity to conceptualize it but in reality, which means its concept is self-existent. God is not purpose-related, contrary to all ethical and mental entities, as it would deny some of Gods fundamental attributes, following the Dutch Jewish philosopher. After Kant, some outfits of Kant’s idealistic heritage will be added by the French philosopher Guyau, melting Spinoza’s great concept of a non-sovereign subject, into the theory of evolution, and yet keeping some great lines of a Kantian subjective framework and anthropology. See Guyau, Jean-Marie. Spinoza – Synthèse de l’épicurisme et du stoïcisme, in : *La morale d’Épicure*, 318, op. cit.

contradicts the idea of Descartes, who does not admit God or Nature are the only true Being⁶⁵.

It is good that most of the time it is within the power of the human being to desire all sorts of things, for instance, to stand and not to fall, to conserve a sane mind. It is not central for ethics to define to which specific degree we have to take determinism as entry point, but it is, with thinkers as Spinoza (or later Einstein) to have an ethical point of view on emotions, affirming in the meantime the value of a strong causality in the world, and compatibilism with regards to decision making. It is good not to submit to unfavourable emotions, as they are sad, not worthy of esteem and finally just useless. Several emotions can easily be combined with compulsive habits, which would make us slaves to the highest degree. The intersection between emotions and addiction, if not derived from the monism of the system, is most plausibly accentuated by it.

⁶⁵ We can find a reduction *ad absurdum* of a stronger perspectivist view, that of a purely nominalist reason-based abstract perspective on emotions. Without any independent universal ground of reality, as distinction of level of reality not of reason, we would be living in a world entirely mastered by (more or less) perfect human beings, and their reflective power. This demonstration, found in B. Russell lectures on atheism, observes a causal chain of behaviours, which goes from us in our present situation, down to the behaviour of the “first Man”. Spinoza who indirectly questions the notion of sin and temptation to do evil actions, by claiming the *implausibility of a first perfect driver of the causal chain*, a person who tempts others but who is perfect enough not to fall, shows the first perfect man as absurd; unlimited and self-existent is the description of the conception of substance, “as that which is formed independently from any other conception”. See: Spinoza, B. *Treatise on Politics*, Ch. 1, VI, p.18, transl. William MacCall, London: Holyoake and Co. 1854. Our italic. On the medieval root of the distinction between reason and reality: MacKinnon, Flora Isabel. “The Treatment of Universals in Spinoza’s Ethics.” *The Philosophical Review* 33, no. 4 (1924): 345–59. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2179223>.

Consequently, there are states of affairs, which are bad, because nobody ever had a perfect mastering over the mind, and everybody is equally subject to passions or emotions. If people are driven to actions that flatter their desires and passions, - or rather because they have an *appetite*, the situation is very different from either a transcendental free will based view, or a need based view on values. Einstein will write on the love that one ought to bear to his enemies, that hatred based on the accountability of the person should not leave aside vulnerability, submission, and the affective life, but as the substance as ultimate reality is not dependent for its meaning on purpose - as are the concepts of good and the evil, it is a kind of “supreme universal”, a notion found by medieval realists (MacKinnon, 1924, 354)⁶⁶.

By seeking the reasons (and probably seeking the causes) of actions and rules, for which a desire, which is no longer an original defect of human nature but property of it, belongs to the human nature itself, and enters in combined forms with other desires, following a succession or mode of definable “geometric” compositions, has as such an immense intellectual value⁶⁷. Exploring the human psyche analytically should be

⁶⁶ Einstein will write: “I cannot hate [him], because [he] must do what he does.’ [...] That is why there is also no sin for me”. Correspondence with Michele Besso, 1903-1955, Letter of 6 Jan. 1948, from the French transl. by P. Speziali, Hermann, Paris, 1972.

⁶⁷ Slightly on the nominalist side of the debate over the nature of reality, Gilles Deleuze in his *Anti-Oedipus* underlines the nature of all desires as “a set of different” very concrete things, which are desirable for a person, rather than having a desire for a given intentional object (he is not speaking of objectless emotions, at this stage, as some of those related to the perception of the environment or the world). G. Deleuze gives as example, “we desire a women in a given landscape”, “we never desire simply a women”. In the same vein H. Rosa attaches some special importance to an ideal place, “where the subject and the world touch and transform each other”. Rosa, Hartmut. 2018. *Resonance: A Sociology of Our Relationship to the World*, transl. J. Wagner, Polity, Wiley, 576p.

done “as it were lines, planes or solids⁶⁸”, with Spinoza. It does not follow that we use a geometric deductive method à la Descartes, only that we try to represent as solids our affective life, which means as something more than a variable flux. If there are complex emotions, they are rarely, for most of them, simply a question of orientation and binary opposition of valence (pleasure of pain), and therefore we are not engaged in a theory of emotions as a hedonistic search for happiness. The causal character, which may be seen as central, representing two or more solids in a three dimensional environment, as possibly mutually attracting (or repelling), bottom up aspects in tendencies, and most strong emotions such as fear or sexual arousal could be questioned as main affective basis or denominator.

Although the capacity of doing the good or the bad, grants our human dignity, and this freedom is key, it may be far more central for all desires to be desires, to be related to our conscious strive to persevere in ones being (*Ethics*, III, prop. 6). Only some of these desires have such an intentional personal mark, enduring in time as probably essential constitutive intentional element. For loving and for hating, at least an appearance of deliberate determination is important⁶⁹.

⁶⁸ Spinoza, *Ethics* III, Preamble.

⁶⁹ Spinoza’s view as that of an ethical egoist is not as clear as Guyau seems to pretend. Guyau paraphrases this idea by showing “an exclusive love of others, complete disinterestedness [as] only appearance, reality is self-love.” There are no general notions of love, desire or hatred for Spinoza, only general notions put together from particular things. (*Ethics*, II, 48 Schol.) See Guyau, J.-M. Spinoza, op. cit., 323-24. On one hand, Spinoza starts the building blocks of his *Ethics* by defining God, but on the other he is extremely cautious not to attribute God wisdom, mercy, goodness, as he sees these qualities as “modes of thought”, not what which be properly attributed to God. None of the two extremes that of the nominalist or the realist, if we refer to the dispute of the Scholastic thinkers is relevant, in finding in the “concrete” particular or the universal “global”, first ground for the reality.

When we love or hate we do all sorts of things necessary to make sure the other, who is concerned by our attitude, understands we engage around a precise set of sentiments, in a precise conceptual framework with the given person.

When we consider the relation of the affects to the community or society, we first need to set some sort of idealist perspective on the absolute, which becomes absolute experience in some historical time along the lines of Kant's Copernican revolution. As Newtonian science shows the way, the project of defining reality should be based on a priori *knowledge*, not essentially based on possible knowledge based on God's attributes. Later, in the line of Rousseau's "general will" appears a notion of collective consent, which occurs partly as spontaneous but organised product of emotions, partly as a reason-based balancing of interests. This methodological evolution is consistent with a growing interest for an empirical psychological interpretation, later evolutionary psychology, etc. It has also an existential meaning, as mutual affective transformation of the world and the individual, and cognitive ideation process of these sophisticated interrelations⁷⁰. The realist and reason-based view, as much as it enables to set the material affective ground of the essential structure and interplay of emotions, becomes important for an idealist axiology, but reality as experience and reality as ultimate thing out there should be as hypothesis distinguished.

It will follow that we can either depict the empirical ground of formation of emotions and construct empirically a credible overall picture of a psychodynamic of the emotions; or we can consider the very

⁷⁰ The Irish historian W. E. H. Lecky (1865) has well described the interplay between emotions and beliefs, on large collective and unconscious scale. Our not so ancient historiography shows occasions for collective responsibility, when large groups of people construct over time, about complex subject matters, very questionable belief and decision, such as defining collective life and death decisions.

nature of mental phenomena as obeying different rules from the bottom up empirical observation in the first place. In the first family, we find thinkers such as the sceptic Sextus Empiricus, Epicurus and the Greek empirical medical school, and later Hobbes, James, Spencer, Ribot; in the second, called the realist method, we have Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza and Brentano.

Empirical proto-realism and fictional emotions

If realism is about the good knowledge of our emotional life, what about “untrue emotions”, which function well and fulfil to considerable degree the conditions of being true emotions (but not totally!). We mainly focus on an empirical point of view, which observes the outburst of bodily emotions such as joy or sadness, and in particular cases, when emotions are mixed wholes of particular emotions, the growth or stop of development of an emotion, or some emotions, lead to some obvious consequence for the subject. An external bodily manifestation of some sort (as when we felt our tears running down our cheeks that we realize we are crying), is always given priority over a deductive or geometric way of looking at emotions such as we find in the rationalist school of Descartes and Spinoza.

From the tradition we could call of empirical organic psycho physiologists (Hobbes, James, Ribot), it is in some modifications of our physiology that we discover at a later stage awareness (and conscious intentions, reason, calculus, intelligent strategies). A false emotion could also be an emotion for which the culmination of the realization of the kind of emotion as stake is not well perceived and leads to some sort of failure. We could think of an actor, or a literary work, which exposes emotions such as jealousy or anger, emotions which may be expressed in a complete and developed and successful manner, but which are, in this case, on the contrary expressed as doomed to disappear (as when they are badly written, sometimes badly translated, laboriously staged, or even badly acted). In any case, jealousy might be *de dicto* fictionally

true, when a good performance convinces us of Othello believing his wife, Desdemona, to be unfaithful. A given performance of the Shakespearian hero by an actor will never be, or should never be considered *de re* true⁷¹.

Ethics of emotions and hedonistic valence

A basic hedonistic or eudemonist ethics of emotions (based on the prevention of pain), starts by the awareness, to some important degree, that 1) by increasing or diminishing, (and so helping or hindering) the power of activity in our body, “the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.” (Spinoza, *Ethics*, III, Prop 11): we start to be aware of our appetites and desires and not only so, we instinctively (largely in unconscious ways) maximise the joy of reaching to the object of our desire, and bringing it actively to full completion, as all living beings. We primarily have as many sources of joy as we have senses, and could consider five natural sources of joy as the most basic ones⁷². Although some emotion as hatred are incomplete in some ways (otherwise we would call them

⁷¹ When we say Backer Street is the place where Sherlock Holmes was living, is true, we only mean a fictionally true statement.

⁷² Guyau (in: *La morale d'Épicure*, 1885), helps to discriminate basic hedonism and a sophisticated hierarchic system of very different levels of joy. There is on the one side a) the model of good life as simple as possible and different from b) a more sophisticated version of the good life such as found at the philosophical school of the Cyrenaics who were advocating the possible growth of desires. Guyau then from the very basic mode for all desires, which consequently does not lead to the seeking ever new ways of gratifying newest desires, proposed instead c) of observing the most natural and basic five ones. He writes that “we take for more consistent to say that most of the desires are related to the natural needs and desires of replenishment, as in the case of hunger or thirst. Some other desires may be less important in order, as related to movement for the expression of the bodily freedom and bodily activity, further the pleasure of hearing and seeing, etc.”

anger or disgust), they might for this reason as well, because of their composed character, not be completely painful, and paradoxically we could even consider them in the context of fictions as rather pleasant, overall hedonically positive⁷³.

The problem with the geometrical very gradual axiology from the painful to the joyful is of two kinds: first, that some hedonistic states seems to be composed of emotions and explaining them again by hedonistic states might become circular. Second, we may see hedonistic states appear positive in some circumstances and negative in others such as shame, which can be seen as related to a virtue, and seen as intention of the person to be disposed for moral improvement, as well as seen as painful, and linked to the notion of moral fault⁷⁴. We shall come back to an ambitious way of managing emotions top-down, but first we need to represent our object as we are simply affected by these emotions, as we see them on others facial and bodily expressions.

A great variety of expressions of emotions may be object of study, it is unlikely that hatred would not be captured, e. g., as facial expression. Furthermore hatred being a fundamental affective states as Spinoza showed it in his *Ethics* (III, XIII), it would be surprising that such important emotion/vice would not find a clear physiognomic expression.

If we would not find compelling expressive signs of it, consequently we might think that hatred does not manifest so much by

⁷³ Cappelli, Mathilde (2022). Pourquoi il est bon de vivre certaines émotions dites négatives. *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 114, 189-207. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rmm.222.0189>; *Les ombres de l'âme – Penser les émotions négatives*, Sous la direction de Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni et Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Recueil d'essais, Genève : Markus Haller, 2011, 216p.

⁷⁴ Teroni, Fabrice, « Plus ou moins : émotions et valence », in : *Les ombres de l'âme*, Tappolet Ch., Teroni, F. Konzelmann Ziv, A., p. 188-189. Konzelmann quotes Miller, William I. *The Anatomy of Disgust*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. 21-22.

facial expression but rather uses words, a much more sophisticated and powerful means of expression than facial expression. Indeed, as hatred will be depicted as expressivist in nature, contrary to envy (as pointed out by Saltel), which likes to hide, we might look for poetic works of art depicting this central emotion⁷⁵. We shall come back to this observation which, if confirmed is of great importance, as it would show partly based on experience why hate speech and not envy or disgust speech is so sensitive.

Semantic

The verb *to end* (*aboutir, zu etwas kommen*) means two things, that are close but quite different. There is, on the one hand, a good preparation that ends in a harmonious way, comes to some result or good development over time. There is also what has been carried out well, and which has succeeded. Many things might lead to some end, which do not have utility or any aspect related to success as collective support, but simply are fully developed state of affair of some sort.

We need to have in mind the richness of the vocabulary across cultures of a kind of evolutionary teleology of life, on the one hand, because emotions can be seen as engaging our life in a particular temporal plan, the plan of our biological life. On the other hand, emotions are precise sets of clear and correct type of intentions, as long

⁷⁵ It is worth reminding ourselves of Spinoza's definition of hatred as basic emotion. Spinoza, B. *Ethics*, Part III, Prop. XIII, Note, "We may clearly understand the nature of Love and Hate. Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We further see that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred." We are grateful for P. Saltel's work, which inspired not only the title of this book (Saltel, Philippe. *Odieuse passion*, 2007), but many of the good insights, as his refined analysis on envy, as opposed to hatred; we shall come back to these emotions, much closer, below.

as they are fitting the situation in the world to which they aim at answering.

Epistemology

Deductive and geometric methods

The history of deductive and geometric methods (by contrast to inductive), has proven to furnish a simple and very efficient functionalist structure what emotions reveal; it is instructive to note that there are either six or three of these emotional bricks, which constitute our fundamental emotional engagement as living being, in close contact to our environment for the Cartesian tradition.

There are six emotions for Descartes: *admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness*, and only three for Spinoza, who derives as a set of solid blocks, from the most general all the others considered an ingenious compositions of the following emotions: *desire, joy* and/or *sadness*. Proceeding by such sort of geometric ‘deduction’ from the most general to the most refined combination, leads rationalist and deductive proponents of emotions to abstract based on a physical reality: the emotion itself, which is recognized as bodily states (affects in Spinoza’s word, passions for Descartes), defined as a dynamic property which simply diminish or increase the capacity of the body for action⁷⁶. The second main difference between Descartes and Spinoza is the monist definition of one substance, or ultimate reality (Nature, God) for Spinoza. This ultimate foundation of existence has two attributes extension and thinking, which proceeds from the rejection of the idea of the human sovereignty found in Descartes’ view. This argument, derived from the idea that there are rather two substances in the *res extensa* and

⁷⁶ Descartes, René. 1649. *Passions of the Soul*. Trans. J. Bennett [Les passions de l’âme]. Part III. Spinoza, B. *Ethics*, III, On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions.

res cogitans, – not one – is an unacceptable proposition for the former, which invites, or should we rather say presumptuously claims, the human person to consider some closer similarity with the divine, as both can pretend: “I think therefor I am”. This metaphysical aspect of the question of who we are, and the importance of getting a closer contact with the overlapping and immersive collective nature of the world, - including the natural world -, will become clearer in the development of the difference between later empirical psychology and the early brilliant find of Spinoza on emotions.

The empirical tradition: emotions are exogenous

William James claims that there is a physical peripheral triggering of emotions, as immediate organic process, because emotions are grounded in the body rather than in the soul:

“Surprise, curiosity, rapture, fear, anger, lust, greed, and the like, become then the names of the mental states with which the person is possessed. The bodily disturbances are said to be the ‘manifestation’ of these several, emotions, their ‘expression’ or ‘natural language’; and these emotions themselves, being so strongly characterised both from within and without, may be called the standard emotions.

[...] Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that

we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be⁷⁷” (James, 1884, 189)

If emotions are primarily related to physical peripheral triggering of some sort of signal, subsequently interpreted by our conscious attention, most of the emotions should be considered exogenous, they are not *sui generis* productions of body but reactive attitudes of some sort.

Odious passions denoted by the words “hate” or “hatred” are perhaps quite recent products of human history, as little physiologically understandable has been developed for it (note their absence from the previous quotation by James). A compromise would be to say that psychologically, the concept of “hate” helps to tame anger and envy, etc. By contrast expressions of joy or fear and wrath, often simple gut feelings, as strong emotions have clear bodily expressions. We can assume, as Charles Darwin, that they may have existed before the human species. As early as 1872, Darwin proved that great apes also smile and that this gesture is as diverse in them as it is in humans. This is not to say that *blessedness*, the joy that accompanies virtue itself, not as a reward, but as most sophisticated equilibrium of all affects, can be experienced every day: “How monotonous are the external aspects of a life entirely devoted to contemplation!” (Fischer, 1882, 77)⁷⁸. We find in the great biographies of the Saints, with the great educators and outstanding political leaders, examples of both determination and aim oriented ethical values. In such living specimen of refined emotions,

⁷⁷ James, William, “What is an emotion?”, *Mind*, Apr., 1884, Vol. 9, No. 34.180-190. See for a detailed analysis Chap. 3 by Jakob Bühlmann Quero in this book.

⁷⁸ Darwin, Charles. 1872. *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, London: John Murray. Fischer, Kuno, “The Life and Character of Baruch Spinoza”, transl. F. Schmidt, In: *Spinoza; Four Essays*, Edited by Professor Knight, London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1882, 77.

mental life is far more important than any parallel physiognomic expression and study.

Words and the introduction of thematic embodied appraisals among other expressions of emotions

Although popular etymology tends to accept the distinction between emotion and passion as that between something that comes from meaning “to shake”, “to set in motion”, (from the Latin *movere*) while “passion” comes from the Greek *παθειν* (*pathein*) meaning “to undergo”, philosophical concepts seem to establish the opposite: passions are thematic motors of actions and emotions physical underpinnings, largely undergone. In a more technically language, the later are exogenously aroused “bodily states” (as hunger, thirst or sex drive, which represent types of *undernourishments*) in opposition to the former, to “thematic” valent relational representations or “embodied appraisals” (Prinz, 2004).

As Prinz (2004, 189, 192) points out in English by the words “love” and “hate” one can aim at a dispositional emotion or simply stay with the state of love or hatred. Only the former should be named sentiment. When we say “I hate rainy Mondays” we mean a large set of dispositional emotions. There might be second-order dispositional emotions when emotions experienced by sentiments derive associated with new emotions as emotional building blocks.

Many expressions of emotions are moderated by being object of inner contemplation: this is not to say that we can ad nauseam control by our will our beliefs. Simply, if we become aware of some signs of anger, at least can we try so see clearer the reasons and motives why our body shows some particular signs of the emotion. Vanity and pride seem even to automatically decrease by the simple fact of my awareness of the states of being proud and the relation of the emotion to some objects in the world, as well described by Saltel who shows, most interestingly, that none of these traits of being-aware as moderating factor work in the

case of hatred. Awareness of being contaminated by the odious passion may come directly by oneself or by the assistance of the other, our state might persist in time or be hidden to others by attempts of denial, the whole person remains as literally infected by the affection.

Shame, bad conscience, guilt: none of the usual moral reactions bring immediate healing. Right on the contrary hatred does not even allow directly a psychological reading based on face expression. If facial expression has a strong universality in case of some of the most basic emotion-related expressions, like wrath, composed emotions or culture based refined emotions might be on the contrary contextual and embedded in communication strategies. Although hatred can be considered as disgust, fear or anger for Saltel, and for this reason as leading to a preparation for violent action, the expressions of hatred as discussed in the previous chapter by Bühlmann Quero on hate speech is very particular, and we shall not repeat it here.

We shall later come back and explore hatred as related to grimacing strategies with the artist Franz Xaver Messerschmidt. He has been both depicting how avoiding the outburst of partly unconscious but strongly repressed motives, exploring the boundary between facial experience of emotions and their concealment, - a refined strategy for understanding, miming instead of expressing, and repelling the negative sentiment.

Hatred, as we saw with Spinoza, is based on the desire of the negation of the existence of another person, accompanied with all sorts of ways of feeling sadness for another person's joyful experiences, as in envy and jealousy. This is the ultimate consequence of the idea that there is an external cause to our sadness and deep concern. Saltel adds to this picture the idea of a possible bright and positive and utopic aim, hidden behind disgust and wrath, as response to why a tendency for disgust or wrath appears in the first place. There could be a dialectical unfolding, based on three ground assumptions. 1) There is a feeling of repulsion distinct from a passion of aggression, as two different aspects

of a mixed emotion, which ends as hatred, but which entails two further dimensions. 2) All “negative way of looking at the world” “entails logically a positive project”. 3) Repulsion is based largely on assessment, instead of a first describing and comprehending of some possible risk or harmful object.

The judgment of the existence of a harmful object or the motive of a disadvantageous object come to awareness from a painful experience which chronologically precedes the manifestations of aversion and allows to justify a pejorative sentence (Saltel, 2001, 26-27). It is based on this first step that we imagine a better world without the object of aversion. This later impression may present the possibility of eliminating painful affects. There might even be a joy of overcoming the object of disgust, with Spinoza, but this positive impression is only incomplete as suffering might always be entailed on this line of unfolding hatred, as hatred entails sadness and the assumption of an external cause to it.

The psychological compensation model of an arrest of development

Compensation entails a “natural method of transition from the simple to the complex” a) evolution, b) arrest of development, c) composition: i. e., mixture and combination (following Sibbern's *Psychologie* (1856) quoted by Ribot, see ref. below). Hatred has a dual character which restrains the active impulsion producing a modification of the original affirmative and active tendency:

“the civilised form of anger. [...] hatred, envy, resentment, rancour, etc. We have here two antagonistic forces confronting one another: on one side the aggressive instinct which urges forward, on the other, reason and calculation, which obstruct and restrain the tendency to attack. *The result is an arrest of development.*” (T. Ribot, *The Psychology of Emotions*, 1897, our italic)

The modified tendency takes the form of a highly contagious disease of the personality: Contagion of emotions or “transference by contiguity”, a process where “intellectual states have co-existed and formed a complex by contiguity, and one of them has been accompanied by a special sentiment, any one of these states has a tendency to excite the same sentiment.” As example, he describes in his *Psychology of Emotions*:

“We can find numerous and simple examples in common life. [...] hatred and jealousy vent their rage on inanimate objects belonging to the enemy.”⁷⁹

Jealousy is a good example of the binary and combined type of emotion. For Ribot there is:

“the representation of some good, possessed or denied - a pleasurable element acting by way of excitement and attraction \ and, secondly, the idea of dispossession or privation (e.g., [...]) the rejected candidate against his fortunate rival, and in general, of any who fail against all who succeed), an element of vexation which acts depressively ; and, thirdly, the idea of the real or imaginary cause of this dispossession or privation, awakening, in various degrees, the destructive tendency (anger, hatred, etc.). (Ribot, op. cite. 1897, 269⁸⁰)

By contrast to hatred, which is most of the time “an abortive form of anger”, disgust shares with anger the fact of being of simple active character:

⁷⁹ See also: Frezzatti Jr, Wilson Antonio “Apresentação: A Função da Psicologia em Théodule Ribot e Nietzsche”, in: Ribot, Théodule, *As doenças da personalidade*, trad. Wilson Antonio Frezzatti Jr, São Paulo: Editora Unifesp, 2020.

⁸⁰ Ribot, T. *The Psychology of Emotions*, New York: Walter Scott Publishing Co., 1897, 269.

“What is primary is an instinctive, unconscious movement of retreat, of aversion (in the etymological sense), but this is no more the emotion of hatred than the instinctive and unconscious movement of attraction is the emotion of love” (Ribot, 1897, op. cite, 266.)

Culturally informed approaches on emotions

Limits of facial expression of hatred

There is a limited number of very basic emotions, but no sign of hatred despite the fact that hatred is largely considered as one of the most fundamental emotions of the human species. As consequence, no universally accepted facial expression of hatred is found in current research about the physical expression studies of emotions (Ekman, 2003, Solomon, 2004, Prinz⁸¹).

New boundaries for the facial artistic expression of hatred

We find in poetry, extremely refined emotions such as of aesthetical ecstasy, but we might be surprised to discover as well, sometimes not far from very positive values negative ones. It is as if the feeling of the strict social and moral code reserved an unexpected playground for finding ways for enriching expressions of these emotions, in works of art and literature.

Depicting emotions in art and literature has largely been confronted to the observance of strict social codes, which artists and free spirits creatively challenged. The famous but controversial self-portrait and

⁸¹ See the Ekman and Friesen experience in: Ekman, Paul (2003): “From Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and Facial Movement in the Expression of Emotions”, quoted in: Solomon, Robert C. 2003. *What is an Emotion?* Oxford: UP, 119-124; with further discussion in: Prinz, Jesse J. 2004. *Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotions*, Ch. 5, Evidence for Reductionism, New York: Oxford University Press, 106-07.

smile of Le Brun remains a paradigmatic example⁸². The artist looks at the viewer with her daughter on her lap and smiles charmingly, showing her white teeth. The paradox is that basic facial expressions such as smile, disgust or fear although they are very recognizable facial expressions are considered rude and rustic and therefore often hidden for societal and cultural reasons⁸³.

The disruptive and innovative artist's grimace

A discrete case in 18th century sculpture, Franz Xaver Messerschmidt's heads (1736-1783), found at the Szépművészeti Múzeum in Budapest, are on the one hand attractive with their classical beauty in the perfect working out the material, but the sculptures are also very impressive as strongly disruptive, when we consider the content of the work of art. Two grimacing faces are placed there, in the 18th century collections, which for unprepared spectator seems some cataloguing error; neither the style nor the expression are very timely with the very demonstrative facial expression of grimacing wrath (Cf. Messerschmidt, #5).

Indeed, grimacing heads are often ambiguous. Thus, in Head #5 (in Budapest), entitled "Yawn", we can just as easily see a cry of anger. Looking at the full collection of heads, one could say that the suppression of emotional outbursts are being staged.

Messerschmidt #1 the smiling self-portrait with the peasant hat fits the same unconventional posture of unreasonable laugh as accentuated in the grimacing #20, as if the artist focused specially on showing his teeth. Head #5 is displaying the negative emotion of wrath with apparent teeth (the only three faces showing the teeth, in the whole collection).

⁸² Vigée Le Brun, Élisabeth Louise, *Self-portrait*. Brüssels, 1782.

⁸³ Colin Johns, "Warum sich der Vernünftige das Lächeln früher verkneifen musste und seit wann wir dabei Zähne zeigen dürfen", NZZ 2022 August.

Various attempts in art to transcribe first moderate critique of the societal codes on facial expression and auto portrait existed before 18th century, but Messerschmidt is a very demonstrative example, which biographer relate, at the end of the artist's career, to a personal obsession and depression, a forced removal and distancing from previous teaching position at Austrian academy.

Special case of self-hatred

Later in the 19th century we find elaborate social critique, called "art of the decadence". From a tolerated counter-culture, social critique becomes a dominant attitude. Literary forms depicting self-hatred as the contemplation of the spectator's own sins and finitude, embrace dark narratives exploring the shadows of the human condition, contrasting from the early figure in Plato.

Plato's view on self-hatred (*Republic*, IV) is based on the duality and tension between a physiological expression of some sort of the emotions, and our essential rational nature as human beings. Plato features a character who feels a just aversion to hateful things, such as our fascination with the ugliness of death and the display of corpses after the death penalty, in communities that practice such punishments (see Saltel, 2009).

By placing hatred against one's self, there is always an attempt of downplaying some dominant cultural values. In her analysis, Konzelmann Ziv presents disgust as coming not from a content or value belief, which we would see associated with body-reappraisals such as backing up, positive valence-related ones, such as our contemplation of the physical beauty of a human body, may also push us to step back:

"positive valence" is also "within certain limits of quantity, intensity and duration. Caresses, chocolate, music, work and rest are pleasant, but we get tired of too much work, just like too much rest or caresses. This 'downward reappraisal' is likely to go

from boredom to disgust [...] this kind of disgust functions as a punishment, [...] a barrier indicating when “enough is enough”⁸⁴.

As a kind of mirror experience of the spectator, similar reappraisals of imperfections can come from all sorts of experiences of extraordinary beauty.

Baudelaire describes the scene of an imaginary conversation, between an erotic love, a woman who does a theatrical performance of being a perfect beauty in a restaurant, but who fails to understand that, as Aristophanes’ myth in Plato’s *Symposium* describes well, a central part of our unconscious desire in love is that we do not like the thought that others love us for different reason from *us*, just being the perfect soulmate.

“[...] every one admired her as much as I. [...] She ate, chewed, ground, devoured, swallowed up, but with the lightest and most careless air imaginable. In this way she kept me for a long time in ecstasy⁸⁵.”

“Imagine a person incapable of making an error, from feeling or from design; imagine a provoking serenity of mind, a devotion without sham and without parade, a softness without weakness, an energy without violence. The story of my love is like an endless voyage on a surface as pure and polished as a mirror, dizzily monotonous, reflecting all my feelings and my movements with the ironic exactness of my own conscience, so

⁸⁴ Konzelmann Ziv, A « Beau à vomir », in: *Les ombres de l'âme*, Tappolet Ch., Teroni, F. Konzelmann Ziv, A., p. 188-189. Konzelmann quotes Miller, William I. *The Anatomy of Disgust*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997, 110.

⁸⁵ Baudelaire, Ch. *Mistresses' Portraits*, Poems in Prose. Translated by Joseph T. Shipley, in: *Baudelaire: His Prose and Poetry*, Edited by T. R. Smith, Boni and Liveright Publishers New York, 1919. On Plato’s *Symposium* and Aristophanes: Blackburn, Simon. 2004. *Lust*, Oxford: UP, 103-4.

that I could not allow myself an unreasonable move or emotion without immediately beholding the dumb reproach of my inseparable spectre.”

“[...] How many times have I not held myself from leaping at her throat, crying: 'Be imperfect, wretch! so that I can love you without uneasiness and wrath!' For several years I wondered at her, my heart full of hate. [...]”

It is, however, not necessarily true that ambivalent emotional reactions follow initial attraction and the ecstasy of the sight of beauty. The reason for the paradoxical negative feedback of a positive experience is related to the overall imbalance between emotions of everyday life, and extraordinary and artificial construction of the aesthetical experience following Konzelmann Ziv. I think this is only part of the whole experience though. Human dignity and the idea that reason invites us to search for deep human realities beyond the surface, as impressive as the beauty of the surface could possibly be, is also unquestionably right and true. This problematic episode reminds us of the Aristophanes's type of unity in love, which remains questionable, if the reaction of nausea, when one saturates the degree of experience, even positive, as in the tantalizing admiration of a beautiful silhouette can be transposed to it.

Baudelaire's autobiographic interpretation of the idea that we see unbalance in the way we try to form an original unity with a partner, and thus if some of the partners have different constitution, or seem less attracted, it may either end tragically (as depicted by Baudelaire remaining part of the “Portrait”), or it may lead to the idea of a progression of “low and small minded-slavery”, to a “great sea of beauty”, and a religious transformation, in which the soul catches sight of the beauty itself (Blackburn, 2004. 36). Following the way Socrates preferred to see the end of the story, similar question could be asked. Both progressions or fall have in common to function under condition

that we admit that we do not really know what we want. The aim of artistic contemplation, or simply of having dinner in a good company does not mean the project of fully occupying the mind of the other or abolishing it, as nicely concluded by Blackburn, but some balanced experience of enjoying giving, the feeling of the relief from pain and, why not some shared imagined pleasure.

As concluding note the Spinozian therapy and lessons learned on close relatives to the odious emotion

As Jaquet rightly shows Spinoza has presented in his *Ethics* Part III the nature of our emotional life or “affects”; in IV he presents what brings us to increase our dependency toward them. In Part V we find what should be done in order to liberate, to cure ourselves from the alienating nature of some sad type of affects. There should be religious practices playing a stronger role in these contexts, but as Cartesian philosopher Spinoza would invite to think religiosity in a philosophical way, as deepening and opening of the mind, through a collective philosophical practice. Let us consider the later first.

There are reasons to present anger, fear or disgust as active pressures, against which the person's decision to balance and compensate with motives more under the control of reason, in a psychodynamic and circular way. To succumb to emotions as the incontinent do, when they indulge in anger but immediately realize the excessiveness of their attitude differs from extreme cases as when Spinoza shows that anger is desire or “an effort to cause harm to the one we hate”; he who hates strives to remove and destroy the object of his hatred (Sc. P13, III⁸⁶) or to sadden him (P23, III) that is to say to cause him to suffer harm.

⁸⁶ B. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Sc. Cor. 2 Prop. 40, Part 3. Sc. Prop. 13, Part 3.

We must suppose a tension and a struggle against the internal disorder that is anger, which leads to living remorse, after realizing that we have been under the yoke of such a disorder. No evil person, however bad, can become without regret and remorse because the emotion of anger is an imbalance of proper coordination in pursuit of the individual's and community's own ends (Aristotle, NE, 1166b5–29).

Self-hatred results from the observation of the lasting imbalance and the lasting inability to resist the irascible inclinations that are in the making in each of us. When we reverse this perspective centered on balancing reason and claim to place on an unconscious made up of desires the right balance of the requirements of a social and natural environment, the regret and the feeling of having permanently lacked a right balance of subject's powers is expressed by the idea of moral debt and shame and its opposite is collectively shared esteem.

We understand, and above have analysed in detail (See ch. 2), how regret, remorse, bad conscience and resentment can be linked to anger and hatred, when this anger represents itself as an emotion having its own unity of character in the personality.

Descriptively and as intentional mental reality, the formation of hatred for a given object is always linked to various painful causes, which are all factors of dependence vis-à-vis a situation deemed unjust or unacceptable, which can, in the absence of a generous and enlightened ethical commitment, lead to tragic consequences.

Aristotle's views are just and crucially important on the virtue of the greatness of soul or generosity. Unfortunately, his simplistic views on the world, based on a poor understanding of the physical reality of the world which he sees depending on deep teleological aims are false. The whole world, may well be better seen as a supreme reason-based Being with Epicurean philosophers such as Democritus and Spinoza. It is as much a balanced chaos as a balanced harmony of perfections, and overall justifies, in our sense, a Spinozist transformative ethics of social

order, pondered by a civil religion, oriented towards unity and against hatred, or as the close cousin the Neokantian-Epicurean vitalist view of J.-M. Guyau, who keeps transcendental philosophy of the reality, instead of simply accepting the rationalist monism with Spinoza⁸⁷.

Transcendental philosophy encourages the *agapist* solution to hatred, which is based on spreading a solidarity and love-based ethics, strengthens it with the Kantian principle of the Golden rule, and completes it with a partly Christian, partly purely philosophical ethics of the hope (J. Moltmann, G. Marcel)⁸⁸. This solution is ultimately considering positively unworldly solutions, which is considered providing the right balance of values and virtues, and thus preventing the irruption of evil and hatred. Our research on hatred and other negative emotions (disgust and envy), shows the problem of the indirectness and inherently mixed character of hatred, which is prone to use the catalyst of regret, bad consciousness, the feeling of the moral fault, resentment, which all have in common a deeply internalized and sophistically represented versions of disgust and wrath.

We could, on the contrary, propose with Spinoza to better understand and organize our emotional life, to prevent negative emotions.

The therapy against hate-based social practices can be founded on the fact that hate speech could be seen as contrary to the self-respect, not only of the victim but also of the hate speaker with Seglow, who grounds the parade against hatred on the assumption of a non-deterministic autonomous subject, ready to start a new autonomy-based course of actions, immune of any contamination with hatred.

⁸⁷ Guyau, Jean-Marie. *La morale d'Epicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines*, Encre Marine; 2002; first ed. 1878.

⁸⁸ Moltmann, Jürgen, *Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology*, Fortress Press, 1993. Marcel, Gabriel, *Homo Viator; Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope*, Hassell Street Press, 2021.

Spinoza's primary concern is sustaining our being at maximum level of perfection, which logically entails to not self-deny our own value and power. To do so, and in defending a strong resistance against negative affective intrusions in our life, we better take care about physical manifestations of the harm than morally objectionable communication practices.

It is by diving deep in the psychosomatic layers and causal relations to the body, as e. g., the spatial proximity of the objects of hatred or the temporal proximity of hatred-loaded episodes of life, which can all be described and understood in a very precise analytic manner. Concrete therapies can be outlined on the model of Spinoza's understanding, focusing on the problem of preventing not only hatred related intoxication but any negative or sadness-related obstacle for real rational and high-level joy in life⁸⁹.

Lessons learned a) Mixed feelings are situations of our life

Knowing what hatred, wrath or crying is about is part of the experience of life. Ambivalent or dissonant reactions of crying when we are happy, smiling when we are angry and laughing when we are nervous exist. On the one side, there are basic correlations between emotions, as real-values related, partly intentional mental acts. We observe an overall similar unique facial expression across cultures, which show how an emotion can be recognized and expressed. On the other side, there is a thin space for a more sophisticated mix of emotions, where what is taken prima facie to be wrong or unpleasant, is associated with a pinch of salt with some positive value: smiling when

⁸⁹ Jaquet, Chantal, *Les remèdes aux affects chez Spinoza*, YouTube video, 2016, based on the 7th European Congress of AEPEA, Bruxelles, 8-10 May 2014. Dr Jaquet, French historian of philosophy and Prof. at Paris Sorbonne, has written extensively on Spinoza's ethics and psychology; one of her latest in English being: *Affects, Actions and Passions in Spinoza: The Unity of Body and Mind*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018.

you receive a bad news, by empathy and compensation strategy (Brogaard, *Hatred*, 2021, 10).

Lesson b) Hatred from an ironical point of view

Socrates used irony very efficiently. Irony entails emphasizing a meaning by the deliberate use of language which states the opposite.

Ironically, in order to spread *love* and *peace*, following Socrates, you better ask on the value of *hatred* and *war*. “The man who does not feel himself defective has no desire for that whereof he feels no defect.” (Plato, *Symp.* 203e-204a).

Lesson c) Hatred is harmless as it is limited in time

Small children experience it; hatred is not part of the enduring family of emotions as are care, attachment and concern. Hatred is related to shorter episodes of emotions such as anger and thrill (Mulligan, 2022). Even before speaking a baby is not so innocent as it seems to be, and experiences wrath and envy, as any other complete human being. (Saltel, *Odieuse passion*, Intro., 2007)

Lesson d) Knowing hatred to better not use it

The worst manifestation of hatred is anger accompanied by revenge. This attitude of reaction vis-à-vis a suffering of which one is the victim induces the temptation, “to cast out devil by Beelzebub” (Matt. 12: 27), to return to others the same degree of suffering that one has even suffered. This is retaliation for injuries or damages or retribution. The biblical law of talion was retribution of the “eye for an eye” a law of retaliation which had at least a normative advantage, that of the proportionality of the response to the evil, as it was intended to limit the spread of private retaliation. Without a retribution of rights, that is a process of mutual recognition, retribution remains infected with hatred.

Lesson e) Aesthetic value of wrath and hatred

Hatred mixed with excessive wrath is fury. As a cocktail of emotions, wrath warms the body, conveys exaggerations, masks the transparency of intentions, and through the general chaos generated by grogginess, entertains the viewer from the seriousness of life. Romantic poetry with Victor Hugo questions, as the early Moderns did well before, our tendencies for disgust as he sees human nature and early forms of child cruelty as real social problems, and *raison d'être* of an education of some colonising affects. In two famous fables, he reveals the difficulty of living and the necessity to tolerate differences⁹⁰. The French poet is as well considering compassion towards ugly, and event deformed forms of life and his critic of vanity becomes a metaphysical clair-obscur scheme of creation of aesthetical new forms of values, as described in *Les Contemplations*. There he invites us to move from the darkness where some forms of life are being imprisoned, in virtue of our lack of care and sensibility, to the light of a more balanced contemplation of nature and art, by a poetic and creative process:

« Pour peu qu'on leur jette un œil moins superbe,
Tout bas, loin du jour,
La vilaine bête et la mauvaise herbe
Murmurent: Amour! »

(V. Hugo, 1842)

Art allows us to transform the dream of life into a nightmare, to present a model of the human that is cruel and wicked for no reason, to stage in the center of the painting, next to an old beaten donkey weakened by the burden it carries, a toad, a rather ugly animal, dying in the mud, surrounded by children who laugh in a cynical and shameful manner. From this nightmare and the encounter that arises between these

⁹⁰ Victor Hugo. 1842. « J'aime l'araignée et j'aime l'ortie », *Les Contemplations*, XXVII, Nelson, 1911, 192-193 ; 1859. « Le crapaud », *La Légende des siècles*, Hetzel, 2, 175-182.

two animals, we realize the subtle change in the course of things, establishing a connection that Victor Hugo suggests between the animals and a divine principle of solidarity and transformation. It is through the efforts of these two unloved beings that goodness emerges, which the narrator of Hugo's "Toad", a small child, realizes, along with the virtues of courage in adversity and the role of faith in a God who alone can amend human nature⁹¹.

Lesson f) Buddhist and other spiritual and philosophical ways of transcendentally transmuting wrath

As quoted from Thurman, anger is "the most destructive of the seven deadly sins. It can ruin families, wreck one's health, destroy peace of mind and, at its worst, lead to murder, genocide, and war". And yet, "transmuted by wisdom, it can become the most powerful force in freeing us from human suffering." (2004) On the other side with Wolf (2014), hatred being at the core of evil, we should not try to enter in fight against hatred as it plausibly means adding a second evil through revenge⁹². The prevention of hatred by distinguishing small and big evils, the problem of minor and profound offenses based on hatred, opens the risk of the red line and of escalation and suggests the question of the limits of free speech⁹³. It may also show the usefulness of "Offense principles", duly clarified, as class of morally relevant reasons for prohibitions (Feinberg, *Offense to Others*, 1984, x).

Willing to interrupt the vicious circle by renunciation of retaliation, forgiveness, "love of enemies" are possible solutions but mostly they do not work either. Finally, the evil manifested as hopelessness should as

⁹¹ Commentary based on Victor Hugo's toad, see: « Le crapaud », op. cit.

⁹² Thurman, R. 2004. *Anger*; Oxford: UP. Wolf, J.-C. *Das Böse – alte und neue Gedanken*. Bamberg, 2014: Was ist das Böse? Preprint.

⁹³ Spinoza's Argument for Toleration, In: Steinberg, J., "Spinoza's Political Philosophy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2022.

pilgrim be resisted, and it can be done step by step with G. Marcel or S. Kierkegaard.

The hubris of hatred can be the manifestation of the absence of reason, as depicted visually very manifestly in the etching of Francisco de Goya, “The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters” (1799, see on page 2 of this book). As described in the Prado, the work is “intended to excoriate the ignorance of the common people, the vices of clergy and the stupidity of the great. [...] [As] the world of nightmares: Goya does not convert reason into truth, and he refrains from judging the monsters. He simply shows them, presenting the world of the night [...] a reversal of the day”. By doing this, he does as the great geometer of the affective life Benedictus Spinoza, who understands these monsters; “and thus [he has] contemplated human passions, such as love, hatred, anger [...], not as defects in human nature, but as properties which belong to it, in the same way as to the nature [...]” (op. cit.).

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