Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types of Multi-Level Governance. IHS Political Science Series: 2003, No. 87

The reallocation of authority upwards, downwards, and sideways from central states has drawn attention from a growing number of scholars in political science. Yet beyond agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensus about how it should be organized. This article draws on several literatures to distinguish two types of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, non-intersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of governance conceives of task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtues of each type of governance

Types of Multi-Level Governance

The reallocation of authority upwards, downwards, and sideways from central states hasdrawn attention from a growing number of scholars in the social sciences. Yet beyondagreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensusabout how it should be organized. This paper draws on several literatures to distinguish twotypes of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to a limitednumber of levels. A second type of governance conceives of a large number of functionallyspecialized, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtues ofeach type of governance.multilevel governance; multilevel governance

The European Commission in the 21st century: core beliefs on EU governance

What lives in the European Commission at the beginning of the 21st Century? This paper charts Commission officials’ views on the governance, ideological direction, and policy scope of the European Union, employing data from a large survey conducted in Autumn 2008. First, the Commission is not a hothouse for supranationalism. True, supporters of a supranational Union with the College of Commissioners as the government of Europe and member states in the back seat are the largest minority, but they are outnumbered two-to-one by state-centric, pragmatist, and ambivalent officials. There are striking differences in distribution by nationality, gender, and department. Second, where do Commission officials stand on ideology? The answer is that the Commission is broadly representative of European societies, at least on traditional economic left/right issues, though decidedly more socio-liberal. Ideological views are not randomly distributed across services, with social DGs significantly more social-democratic than DGs handling market integration. Officials from new member states are more market-liberal than their ‘western’ colleagues. Finally, are Commission officials indeed bureau-maximizers? We find that, on the whole, Commission officials want more EU authority in the eleven policy areas that we asked them to evaluate, but their desire to centralize is selective and measured. It seems driven by functional imperatives – centralization where scale economies can be reaped – and by values and ideology rather than by a generalized preference for maximal Commission power. In short, the bureaucratic politics argument has been overstated

core beliefs on EU governance

1\. Introduction 5 2\. Commission Officials and EU Governance 5 2.1 Explaining Beliefs on EU Governance 9 2.2 Beliefs about the Future 12 3\. Commission Officials and Politics 14 3.1 Understanding Ideological Variation in the Commission 15 3.2 The Meaning of the “Political“ 18 4\. Commission Officials and Policy Scope 21 4.1 Centralization Across the Board? 22 4.2 Bureau- maximization? 24 5\. Conclusion 26 References 28 Appendix: Multivariate Analyses 31What lives in the European Commission at the beginning of the 21st Century? This paper charts Commission officials’ views on the governance, ideological direction, and policy scope of the European Union, employing data from a large survey conducted in Autumn 2008. First, the Commission is not a hothouse for supranationalism. True, supporters of a supranational Union with the College of Commissioners as the government of Europe and member states in the back seat are the largest minority, but they are outnumbered two-to-one by state- centric, pragmatist, and ambivalent officials. There are striking differences in distribution by nationality, gender, and department. Second, where do Commission officials stand on ideology? The answer is that the Commission is broadly representative of European societies, at least on traditional economic left/right issues, though decidedly more socio-liberal. Ideological views are not randomly distributed across services, with social DGs significantly more social-democratic than DGs handling market integration. Officials from new member states are more market-liberal than their ‘western’ colleagues. Finally, are Commission officials indeed bureau-maximizers? We find that, on the whole, Commission officials want more EU authority in the eleven policy areas that we asked them to evaluate, but their desire to centralize is selective and measured. It seems driven by functional imperatives – centralization where scale economies can be reaped – and by values and ideology rather than by a generalized preference for maximal Commission power. In short, the bureaucratic politics argument has been overstated

Europe divided? Elites vs. public opinion on European integration

'Dieser Artikel vergleicht Präferenzen von europäischen Eliten, nationalen Eliten und öffentlicher Meinung hinsichtlich der Europäisierung von dreizehn Politikfeldern. Eliten sind eher bereit, nationale Autorität in Souveränitätsbereichen abzugeben, aber Bürgerinnen und Bürger sind aufgeschlossener gegenüber europäischer Sozialpolitik. Arbeiten hier kontrastierende Logiken? Die Antwort ist zweischichtig. Eliten und öffentliche Präferenzen sind sich insofern ähnlich, als sie beide am wenigsten enthusiastisch auf die Europäisierung von kostenintensiven Politikfeldern reagieren. Dies ist eine verbreitete Verteilungslogik: eine Autoritätsverschiebung könnte Eigeninteressen destabilisieren. Da der Binnenmarkt jedoch Arbeitsmarktfluktuation intensiviert, strebt die Öffentlichkeit danach, dieses Verteilungsrisiko durch selektive Europäisierung von marktflankierenden Regelungsbereichen einzudämmen. Dagegen zeigen sich die Präferenzen von Eliten konsistent mit einem funktionalen Prinzip, welches europäische Integration als die optimale Lösung für die Internalisierung von Externalitäten über den Nationalstaat hinaus versteht.' (Autorenreferat)'This article compares preferences for Europeanizing thirteen policies among European elites, national elites, and public opinion. Elites are more willing to cede national authority in sovereignty areas, but citizens are more favorable to EU social policies. Are there contrasting logics at work? The answer is two-sided. Elites and public preferences are similar in that both are least enthusiastic about Europeanizing high-spending policies. Here is a common distributional logic: shifting authority could de-stabilize vested interests. However, as the single market intensifies labor market volatility, the public seeks to contain this distributional risk through selectively Europeanizing market-flanking policies. In contrast, elite preferences are consistent with a functional rationale, which conceives European integration as an optimal solution for internalizing externalities beyond the national state.' (author's abstract)

European Integration and the State

European Commission; implementation; integration theory; multilevel governance; national interest; Nation-state; neo-functionalism; polity building; Single Market; Treaty on European Union

National identity and support for European integration

This paper takes up the familiar question of how one can explain support for European integration. One line of explanation builds on trade theory to theorize a calculus of economic costs and benefits. A second explanation draws on cognitive and social psychology to assess how individuals use political cues - grounded in ideology or elite communication - as a guide to complex issues. A third line draws on the psychology of group membership to consider how group identities, above all, national identities, bear on support for European integration. We use multi-level analysis to evaluate these explanations, and we conclude that perceptions of national identity are by far most powerful in structuring views on European integration. We find that the particular perception of national identity matters, as well as how identity is mobilized in national contexts. Thus, while strong national identity is consistent with support for European integration, exclusive national identity is a powerful brake on support. The effect of exclusive national identity varies across countries. It is strongest in countries where referenda on European integration have taken place. Referenda exacerbate conflicts within and among elites and empower single-issue anti-European protest movements, and this mobilizes exclusive national identity in an anti-European direction.Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit der bekannten Frage, wie sich die Unterstützung für die europäische Integration erklären lässt. Ein Erklärungsstrang stützt sich auf die Handelstheorie und zieht theoretische Schlüsse aus einer wirtschaftlichen Kosten-Nutzen- Analyse. Ein anderer Erklärungsansatz basiert auf der kognitiven Psychologie und der Sozialpsychologie und untersucht, wie sich Individuen in komplexen Themenfeldern an politischen Voreinstellungen orientieren, die sie aus Weltanschauungen oder Elitendiskursen gewinnen. Ein dritter Ansatz geht von der Gruppenpsychologie aus und fragt danach, wie sich Gruppenidentitäten, vor allem nationale Identitäten, auf die Unterstützung für die europäische Integration auswirken. Wir evaluieren diese Erklärungsansätze mit Hilfe der Mehrebenenanalyse und kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass unterschiedliche Vorstellungen von nationaler Identität mit Abstand die stärkste Auswirkung auf Einstellungen zur europäischen Integration haben. Die individuelle Auffassung von nationaler Identität spielt dabei genau so eine Rolle wie die Bedeutung, die nationaler Identität im nationalen Kontext beigemessen wird. Während eine starke nationale Identität mit der Unterstützung der Europäischen Union einher geht, wirkt sich eine ausschließlich nationale Identität stark bremsend auf die Unterstützung aus. Der Einfluss ausschließlich nationaler Identität variiert von Land zu Land. Am stärksten ist er in den Ländern ausgeprägt, in denen Referenden zur europäischen Integration stattgefunden haben. Referenden verschärfen Konflikte innerhalb der und zwischen den Eliten und stärken monothematische, antieuropäische Protestbewegungen. Das wiederum mobilisiert ausschließlich nationale Identitätsgefühle, die sich gegen die europäische Integration richten