LSA And State Library Agencies

To know where our state libraries are going, it is important first to know where they have been and where they are now. Without going into this exhaustively, let me develop with you for a few moments some of the things that have happened to us in the five years since the Library Services Act became the law of the land. I think we are all aware of the fact that the r improvement in our state library agencies is one of the principal accomplishments of the Library Services Act. The publication, State Plans under the Library Services Act. Supplement 2, A makes this quite clear. State after state reported strengthened state library agencies in all parts of the country. Idaho, for example, employed its first trained administrator and three more professional librarians in the state agency. Kansas and Mississippi added professional librarians and clerical assistants. It was not just the small state agencies that did this, however; even the New York State Library built on its existing strength by adding specialists in Young Adult, Reference, and Children's Services. In all, more than 115 field workers or consultants were added to state agency staffs, an increase of more than 100 per cent over the total field staffs in existence in 1956. In addition, 285 other professional librarians were added.published or submitted for publicatio

An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism

In a Federal system of government, each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide, and what types of taxes, and which tax rates, to use in funding the public goods. In this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision-making. In particular, we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents, through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions. The paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision-making.

Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World Economy: The Certainty Case

This paper explores the characteristics of individual portfolio holdings in a world economy with a unified securities market where there are many countries, each with its own tax rates and inflation rate. When nominal interest is taxable but income to equity owners is tax exempt in all countries, I show that the highest tax bracket investors specialize in equity and, among the remaining investors, those with lower tax rates buy bonds of countries with higher inflation rates. Because of the tax system, countries with a higher inflation rate must pay a higher real interest rate on their debt. This is necessary in equilibrium to compensate those who purchase the debt for their higher taxable income. This diversity of real rates of return in the world securities market has a variety of effects on the optimal tax policy of a small open economy. I also explore a model where there is a unified world market in bonds, but no international trade in equity. Here, I find a strong tax incentive for firms owned by investors in countries with high personal tax rates to become multinationals and invest abroad. If domestic investors do end up purchasing both bonds and domestic equity, then the optimal corporate tax rate on real corporate income in a small open economy would be quite high relative to the personal tax rate on nominal interest income, in order not to distort the portfolio composition of domestic investors.

Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies?

Recent theoretical work has argued that a small open economy should use residence-based but not source-based taxes on capital income. Given the ease with which residents can evade domestic taxes on foreign earnings from capital, however, a residence-based tax may not be administratively feasible, leaving no taxes on capital income. The objective of this paper is to explore possible reasons why capital income taxes have survived in the past, in spite of the above pressures. Any bilateral approach, such as sharing of information among governments or direct coordination of tax rates, suffers from the problem that the coalition of countries is itself a small open economy, so subject to the same pressures. Capital controls, preventing capital outflows, may well be a sensible policy response and were in fact used by a number of countries. Such controls have many drawbacks, however, and a number of countries are now abandoning them. The final hypothesis explored is that the tax-crediting conventions, used to prevent the double taxation of international capital flows, served also to coordinate tax rates. The paper shows that while no Nash equilibrium in tax rates exists, given these tax-crediting conventions, a Stackelberg equilibrium does exist if there is either a dominant capital exporter or a dominant capital importer, in spite of the ease of tax evasion. While the U.S. , as the dominant capital exporter during much of the postwar period, may well have served as this Stackelberg leader, world capital markets are now more complicated. These tax-crediting conventions may no longer be sufficient to sustain capital-income taxation.

Social Security and Labor Supply Incentives

Many provisions of the Social Security Program distort an individual's labor supply incentives. In particular, the payroll tax, the earnings test, the offsetting actuarial adjustment, and the dependence of the size of future benefits on the level of current earnings all affect the net return to extra work. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the size of the net tax rate on labor income in a variety of circumstances, taking into account all these provisions, as well as the personal income tax. We find that the Social Security Program on net in the past has provided a large subsidy to labor supply, which for many people effectively offset the personal income tax. This subsidy rate, however, has been declining steadily over time.