Externally-Imposed Institutions and Regional Growth Differences: Evidence from France and Germany

This paper provides a critical examination about the effect of externally-imposed French Revolution institutions on regional economic development variations in the 19th century by focusing on the experience of France where the Revolution originated. Acemoglu et al. (2011) take advantage of the “natural experiment” provided by the imposition of French institutions on a number of German states by the invading Napoleonic armies. The argument that the differences in the long-run economic performance of German states stem from the differences in externally-imposed French and domestic German institutions needs to be investigated further. In order to achieve this purpose, first the variation in historical urbanization rates across the French departments is examined statistically. Then a difference-in-difference estimation is used to identify a treatment effect causing growth differences between border and interior departments. The proposed treatment effect is the faster industrialization due to intensified minerals mining and railway construction in north and northeast France after 1850. It is shown that the border departments experienced higher economic growth primarily after 1850 even though the Revolution institutions and reforms were imposed uniformly across the French departments. Therefore, all the variation in economic development across German polities cannot be attributed to the externally-imposed French institutions and reforms

Externally-Imposed Institutions and Regional Growth Differences: Evidence from France and Germany

This paper provides a critical examination about the effect of externally-imposed French Revolution institutions on regional economic development variations in the 19th century by focusing on the experience of France where the Revolution originated. Acemoglu et al. (2011) take advantage of the “natural experiment” provided by the imposition of French institutions on a number of German states by the invading Napoleonic armies. The argument that the differences in the long-run economic performance of German states stem from the differences in externally-imposed French and domestic German institutions needs to be investigated further. In order to achieve this purpose, first the variation in historical urbanization rates across the French departments is examined statistically. Then a difference-in-difference estimation is used to identify a treatment effect causing growth differences between border and interior departments. The proposed treatment effect is the faster industrialization due to intensified minerals mining and railway construction in north and northeast France after 1850. It is shown that the border departments experienced higher economic growth primarily after 1850 even though the Revolution institutions and reforms were imposed uniformly across the French departments. Therefore, all the variation in economic development across German polities cannot be attributed to the externally-imposed French institutions and reforms

Cost-efficient approximation of linear systems with repeated and multi-channel filtering configurations

It is possible to obtain either exact realizations or useful approximations of linear systems or matrix-vector products arising in many different applications, by synthesizing them in the form of repeated or multi-channel filtering operations in fractional Fourier domains, resulting in much more efficient implementations with acceptable decreases in accuracy. By varying the number and configuration of filter blocks, which may take the form of arbitrary flow graphs, it is possible to trade off between accuracy and efficiency in the desired manner. The proposed scheme constitutes a systematic way of exploiting the information inherent in the regularity or structure of a given linear system or matrix, even when that structure is not readily apparent

Symptomatic asymmetry in the first six months of life: differential diagnosis

Asymmetry in infancy is a clinical condition with a wide variation in appearances (shape, posture, and movement), etiology, localization, and severity. The prevalence of an asymmetric positional preference is 12% of all newborns during the first six months of life. The asymmetry is either idiopathic or symptomatic. Pediatricians and physiotherapists have to distinguish symptomatic asymmetry (SA) from idiopathic asymmetry (IA) when examining young infants with a positional preference to determine the prognosis and the intervention strategy. The majority of cases will be idiopathic, but the initial presentation of a positional preference might be a symptom of a more serious underlying disorder. The purpose of this review is to synthesize the current information on the incidence of SA, as well as the possible causes and the accompanying signs that differentiate SA from IA. This review presents an overview of the nine most prevalent disorders in infants in their first six months of life leading to SA. We have discovered that the literature does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the incidence, characteristics, signs, and symptoms of SA. Knowledge of the presented clues is important in the clinical decision making with regard to young infants with asymmetry. We recommend to design a valid and useful screening instrument

Interest Groups and Political Economy of Public Education Spending

This paper examines the relationship between the lobbying power of different interest groups and public education spending in a panel data estimation during the period 1996-2009 for 132 countries. The resource rents, manufacture exports, and agriculture value added are used as proxy variables for the lobbying power of the natural resource owners, manufacturers, and landowners, respectively, in order to substantiate the definition of the lobbying power of the interest groups more with economic fundamentals. As lobbying power is mediated through political institutions, different governance indicators are used individually and in interaction terms with the proxy variables in the estimations. It is found that when the country is more politically stable and the more the rule of law applies, the negative (positive) effect of the lobbying power of natural resource owners (manufacturers) on public education spending intensifies. The negative effect of landowners’ lobbying power diminishes as institutional quality as measured by governance indicators improves.   &nbsp