On Preferences and Promises: A Response to Harsanyi

John C. Harsanyi sketches an entire normative and metaethical theory in under twenty pages. Combining breadth and brevity, his essay is useful and interesting. It reveals the interrelations between Harsanyi\u27s positions on various issues as no longer work or series of articles could do. But by virtue of its programmatic nature, the essay creates a dilemma for a commentator, at least for one who finds many things to disagree with. If I responded to Harsanyi in the same sweeping terms in which he argues, we would end up with little more than opposing assertions. At the other extreme, I could point out what seem to me particular defects in Harsanyi\u27s arguments as they stand. But that would seem pedantic and ungenerous if my particular objections could be avoided by spelling out his arguments at greater length, as some of them surely could. (I am especially troubled by this possibility because I am persuaded that in the past I once misinterpreted an argument of Harsanyi\u27s and treated it unjustly.) Constraints of space prevent me from first spelling out Harsanyi\u27s arguments as best I can and then criticizing them. Accordingly, I shall limit myself to two topics, chosen partly because I think the observations I shall make are worth making whether or not they represent points of ineliminable disagreement between Harsanyi and myself

Gewirth on Necessary Goods: What Is the Agent Committed to Valuing?

In this chapter I shall be concerned with stage I of Gewirth\u27s argument, in which he argues that the agent must value her freedom and well-being as necessary goods. Stage I has attracted less criticism over the years than stages II and III, but even so, a good deal has been written about it. I do not claim to have found any brand new objection to Gewirth\u27s argument. The core of my objection occurred to me during my first reading of Reason and Morality, and it obviously occurred to a number of other people as well. 3 But it is clear that there is not yet universal agreement on the merits of Gewirth\u27s argument, and the argument is important enough so that it is worth trying to establish definitively whether or not it succeeds

What a Sensible Natural Lawyer and a Sensible Utilitarian Agree about and Disagree about: Comments on Finnis

Before I start, let me say two things. First of all, to the extent that John Finnis is entering a plea for more attention to what is a relatively neglected tradition (in the narrow his message a hundred percent. And you courd learning about the natural law tradition than by reading his book, Natural Law and Natural Rights. My second introductory observation is that Finnis and I agree about many more things than you might expect if you just think of him as a natural law theorist and me as a utilitarian. I am very eccentric as a utilitarian. He is, not eccentric, at least unusually advanced as a natural law theorist. actually agree about quite a lot (although of course we also disagree about some important things)

Rewriting Roe v. Wade

Roe v. Wade is one of the most controversial cases the Supreme Court has decided. The result in the case - the establishment of a constitutional right to abortion - was controversial enough. Beyond that, even people who approve of the result have been dissatisfied with the Court\u27s opinion. Others before me have attempted to explain how a better opinion could have been written. It seems to me, however, that the most promising argument in support of the result of Roe has not yet been made. This essay contains my suggestions for rewriting Roe v. Wad

A Gambling Paradox: Why an Origin-Neutral \u27Zero-Quota\u27 Is Not a Quota Under GATS Article XVI

In US-Gambling, the Appellate Body held that an origin-neutral prohibition on remote gambling (which is how they mostly viewed the United States law) was in effect a zero-quota , and that such a zero-quota violated GATS Article XVI:2. That holding has been widely criticized, especially for what critics refer to as the Appellate Body\u27s effects test . This article argues that the Appellate Body\u27s in effect analysis is not an effects test and is not the real problem. The real mistake is regarding a so-called zero-quota as a quota under Article XVI. That is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the word quota in such a context; it is at odds with the object and purpose of Article XVI; and it is likely to reduce Members\u27 willingness to make concessions