Who controls East Asian corporations ?

The authors identify the ultimate ownership structure for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. They find that: A) More than half of those firms are controlled be a single shareholder. B) Smaller firms and older firms are more likely to be family-controlled. C) Patterns of controlling ownership stakes differ across countries. The concentration of control generally diminishes with higher economic and institutional development. D) In many countries control is enhanced though pyramid structures and deviations from one-share-one-vote rules. As a result, voting rights exceed cash-flow rights. E) Management is rarely separated from ownership control, and management in two thirds of the firms that are not widely held is related to management of the controlling shareholder. F) In some countries, wealth is very concentrated and links between government andbusiness are extensive, so the legal system has probably been influenced by the prevailing ownership structure.Small and Medium Size Enterprises,Microfinance,Small Scale Enterprise,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research,Microfinance,Private Participation in Infrastructure,Small Scale Enterprise,Rural Land Policies for Poverty Reduction,Economic Theory&Research

Expropriation of minority shareholders : evidence from East Asia

As many East Asian countries plunged into economic decline, the structure of concentrated ownership and associated corporate governance, along with weak corporate performance, have been blamed for the crisis. There is little empirical evidence, however, of the nature of ownership structures in East Asia and their relationship to corporate performance in the typical East Asian environment (where inefficient judicial systems, and weak property and shareholder rights are common). The authors examine evidence of the expropriation of minority shareholders for 2,658 corporations in nine East Asian countries in 1996. They distinguish control from cash-flow rights. They also distinguish between various types of ultimate owners, including family, state, widely held corporations, and widely held financial institutions. Higher cash-flow rights are associated with higher market values, consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976). In contrast, deviations of control from cash-flow rights - through the use of dual-class shares, pyramiding, and cross-holdings - are associated with lower market values. This is especially true for corporations under family control and, in Japan, under the control of widely held financial institutions. They conclude that the risk of expropriation is the major principal-agent problem for large corporations, as suggested by La Porta and colleagues (1999). The degree to which certain ownership structures are associated with expropriation depends on country-specific circumstances. These may include the quality of banking systems, the legal and judicial protection of individual shareholders, and the degree of financial disclosures required.Small Scale Enterprise,Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Labor Policies,Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Private Participation in Infrastructure,Microfinance,Economic Theory&Research,Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Small Scale Enterprise

Diversification and efficiency of investment by East Asian corporations

The East Asian financial crisis has been attributed in part to the corporate diversification associated with the misallocation of capital investment toward less profitable and more risky business segments. Much anecdotal evidence to support this view has surfaced since the crisis but there was little discussion of it before the crisis. Quite the contrary: The rapid expansion of East Asian firms by entering new business segments was viewed as contributing to the East Asian miracle. The authors examine the efficiency of investment by diversified corporations in nine East Asian countries, using unique panel data from more than 10,000 corporations for the pre-crisis period, 1991-96. They: 1) Document the degree of diversification in the corporate sector in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China), and Thailand, countries that have achieved enviable rates of economic growth over the past three decades. 2) Distinguished between vertical and complementary diversification and study the differences across nine countries. 3) Investigate whether diversification in East Asian has hurt economic efficiency. Their study tests the learning-by-doing and misallocation-of-capital hypotheses related to the types and degrees of diversification in East Asian countries. Firms in Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand appear to have suffered significant negative effects of vertical integration on short-term performance; the same countries gained significant short-term benefits from complementary expansion. The results suggests that the misallocation-of-capital hypothesis is appropriate for Korea and Malaysia; the learning-by-doing hypothesis for Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand. Firms in more developed countries succeed in vertically integrating and improve both short-term profitability and market valuation. Firms in more developed countries are ultimately more likely to benefit from such diversification (learn faster, to improve theirperformance). And diversification by firms in less developed countries is subject to more misallocation of capital.Microfinance,Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Economic Theory&Research,Small and Medium Size Enterprises,Small Scale Enterprise,Economic Theory&Research,Microfinance,Private Participation in Infrastructure,Small Scale Enterprise,Achieving Shared Growth

Anharmonic mixing in a magnetic trap

We have experimentally observed re-equilibration of a magnetically trapped cloud of metastable neon atoms after it was put in a non-equilibrium state. Using numerical simulations we show that anharmonic mixing, equilibration due to the collisionless dynamics of atoms in a magnetic trap, is the dominant process in this equilibration. We determine the dependence of its time on trap parameters and atom temperature. Furthermore we observe in the simulations a resonant energy exchange between the radial and axial trap dimensions at a ratio of trap frequencies \omega_r / \omega_z = 3/2. This resonance is explained by a simple oscillator model.Comment: 9 pages, 6 figure