Allocative Efficiency and an Incentive Scheme for Research

In this paper we examine whether an incentive scheme for improving research can have adverse effect on research itself. This work is mainly motivated by the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and the Research Excellence Framework (REF) in UK. In a game theoretic framework we show that a scheme like RAE/REF can actually result in deterioration of the over-all research in a country though it may create a few isolated centres of excellence. The central assumption behind this result is that high ability researchers produce positive externalities to their colleagues. We assume these externalities have declining marginal benefit as the number of high ability researchers in a department increases. Because of this declining marginal benefit an incentive scheme like the RAE or REF may lead to over concentration of the high ability researchers in a few departments.RAE, REF, coalitions, strong nash equilibrium

Chaotic Planning Solutions in the Textbook Model of Labor Market Search and Matching

This paper demonstrates that cyclical and chaotic planning solutions are possible in the standard textbook model of search and matching in labor markets. More specifically, it takes a discretetime adaptation of the continuous-time matching economy described in Pissarides (1990, 2001), and computes the solution to the dynamic planning problem.The solution is shown to be completely characterized by a first-order, non-linear map with a unique stationary solution.Additionally, the existence of a large number of periodic and even aperiodic non-stationary solutions is shown.Even when the well-known Li-Yorke and three-period cycle conditions for chaos are violated, we are able to verify the new Mitra (2001) su.cient condition for topological chaos.The implication is that even in a simple economy characterized by search and matching frictions, an omniscient social planner may have to contend with a fairly robust and bewildering variety of possible dynamic paths.labour market;planning;matching;chaos;job search

Reliance, composition, and inflation

In this article Joydeep Bhattacharya and Joseph Haslag explore the effect of fiscal policy actions on long-run prices and the inflation rate. They study a model economy in which the central bank is not independent. Indeed, the government explicitly relies on the central bank for a predetermined amount of its revenue. Despite the absence of independence, the central bank does unilaterally control the composition of government paper. Bhattacharya and Haslag show that changes in reliance and composition have long-run impacts on prices and inflation. They conduct two separate policy experiments that suggest how a subservient central bank can retain substantial control over the inflation rate and still meet its revenue requirements set by the government.

A Differentiation Theory for It\^o's Calculus

A peculiar feature of It\^o's calculus is that it is an integral calculus that gives no explicit derivative with a systematic differentiation theory counterpart, as in elementary calculus. So, can we define a pathwise stochastic derivative of semimartingales with respect to Brownian motion that leads to a differentiation theory counterpart to It\^o's integral calculus? From It\^o's definition of his integral, such a derivative must be based on the quadratic covariation process. We give such a derivative in this note and we show that it leads to a fundamental theorem of stochastic calculus, a generalized stochastic chain rule that includes the case of convex functions acting on continuous semimartingales, and the stochastic mean value and Rolle's theorems. In addition, it interacts with basic algebraic operations on semimartingales similarly to the way the deterministic derivative does on deterministic functions, making it natural for computations. Such a differentiation theory leads to many interesting applications some of which we address in an upcoming article.Comment: 10 pages, 9/9 papers from my 2000-2006 collection. I proved these results and more earlier in 2004. I generalize this theory in upcoming articles. I also apply this theory in upcoming article

Money, output and the payment system: Optimal monetary policy in a model with hidden effort

We propose a new explanation for the observed difference in the cost of intraday and overnight liquidity. We argue that the low cost of intraday liquidity is an application of the Friedman rule in an environment where a deviation of the Friedman rule is optimal with respect to overnight liquidity. In our environment the cost of overnight liquidity affects output while the cost of intraday liquidity only redistributes resources between money holders and non-money holders. We show that it is optimal to set a high overnight rate to reduce the incentives to overuse money. In contrast, intraday liquidity should have a low cost to provide risk-sharing.Friedman rule; monetary policy; random-relocation models