Who needs a mind when you have thousands of fingers?

Mather’s target article aligns with a common tendency of granting the octopus a mind or consciousness. But what is the meaning of an octopus’s mind? Is it part of nature or is it observer-dependent, imputed to satisfy our own psychological needs? In this commentary, I build on my own experience with octopuses to challenge the notion that we can conclusively attribute a mind to an animal; and I question the scientific usefulness of doing so

Animal sentience? Neuroscience has no answers

Woodruff’s target article provides a detailed review of comparative studies on brain and behavior in teleosts. However, the relevance of the scientific data to the question of consciousness rests solely on the validity of a small set of so-called requirements for consciousness. I use the target article to demonstrate that the neuroscientific study of animal consciousness in general relies on external, highly questionable and unfalsifiable criteria, and therefore fails to resolve the question of which animal species are sentient. Fish behavior can be remarkably complex, but whether fish are conscious remains a matter of belief

Predicting and controlling the reactivity of immune cell populations against cancer

Heterogeneous cell populations form an interconnected network that determine their collective output. One example of such a heterogeneous immune population is tumor-infiltrating lymphocytes (TILs), whose output can be measured in terms of its reactivity against tumors. While the degree of reactivity varies considerably between different TILs, ranging from null to a potent response, the underlying network that governs the reactivity is poorly understood. Here, we asked whether one can predict and even control this reactivity. To address this we measured the subpopulation compositions of 91 TILs surgically removed from 27 metastatic melanoma patients. Despite the large number of subpopulations compositions, we were able to computationally extract a simple set of subpopulation-based rules that accurately predict the degree of reactivity. This raised the conjecture of whether one could control reactivity of TILs by manipulating their subpopulation composition. Remarkably, by rationally enriching and depleting selected subsets of subpopulations, we were able to restore anti-tumor reactivity to nonreactive TILs. Altogether, this work describes a general framework for predicting and controlling the output of a cell mixture

Responses of Tectal Neurons to Contrasting Stimuli: An Electrophysiological Study in the Barn Owl

The saliency of visual objects is based on the center to background contrast. Particularly objects differing in one feature from the background may be perceived as more salient. It is not clear to what extent this so called “pop-out” effect observed in humans and primates governs saliency perception in non-primates as well. In this study we searched for neural-correlates of pop-out perception in neurons located in the optic tectum of the barn owl. We measured the responses of tectal neurons to stimuli appearing within the visual receptive field, embedded in a large array of additional stimuli (the background). Responses were compared between contrasting and uniform conditions. In a contrasting condition the center was different from the background while in the uniform condition it was identical to the background. Most tectal neurons responded better to stimuli in the contrsating condition compared to the uniform condition when the contrast between center and background was the direction of motion but not when it was the orientation of a bar. Tectal neurons also preferred contrasting over uniform stimuli when the center was looming and the background receding but not when the center was receding and the background looming. Therefore, our results do not support the hypothesis that tectal neurons are sensitive to pop-out per-se. The specific sensitivity to the motion contrasting stimulus is consistent with the idea that object motion and not large field motion (e.g., self-induced motion) is coded in the neural responses of tectal neurons

Questions about sentience are not scientific but cultural

Abstract: The findings of complex cognitive-like behaviours in plants are surprising and exciting. However, they do not provide a scientific reason for ascribing sentience to plants. The target article, in trying to provide evidence for sentience in plants, exposes the weakness of the science of animal consciousness in general. In this commentary, I try to explain why the scientific method is incapable of resolving the question of which organisms or systems are sentient

Who needs a mind when you have thousands of fingers?

Mather’s target article aligns with a common tendency of granting the octopus a mind or consciousness. But what is the meaning of an octopus’s mind? Is it part of nature or is it observer-dependent, imputed to satisfy our own psychological needs? In this commentary, I build on my own experience with octopuses to challenge the notion that we can conclusively attribute a mind to an animal; and I question the scientific usefulness of doing so

Saliency mapping in the optic tectum and its relationship to habituation

Habituation of the orienting response has long served as a model system for studying fundamental psychological phenomena such as learning, attention, decisions, and surprise. In this article, we review an emerging hypothesis that the evolutionary role of the superior colliculus (SC) in mammals or its homolog in birds, the optic tectum (OT), is to select the most salient target and send this information to the appropriate brain regions to control the body and brain orienting responses. Recent studies have begun to reveal mechanisms of how saliency is computed in the OT/SC, demonstrating a striking similarity between mammals and birds. The saliency of a target can be determined by how different it is from the surrounding objects, by how different it is from its history (that is habituation) and by how relevant it is for the task at hand. Here, we will first review evidence, mostly from primates and barn owls, that all three types of saliency computations are linked in the OT/SC. We will then focus more on neural adaptation in the OT and its possible link to temporal saliency and habituation