Varme mødesteder i Cold Hawaii?:Tillid, mødesteder og løsning af kollektive handlingsproblemer i et lokalsamfund

Civilsamfundet er en grundsten under det danske velfærdssamfund. Men hvordan løses kollektive handlingsproblemer i civilsamfundet? Hvordan undgå, at de lokale kører på frihjul? Hvordan tilskynde til aktiv deltagelse i civilsamfundet? Hvorfor lykkes det nogle steder, men ikke andre? Tilstedeværelsen af tillid i et samfund kan her være en måde, hvorpå free-riding eller gratisme kan minimeres. Dermed øges sandsynligheden for, at det kollektive handlingsproblem kan løses, og at selvregulering kan finde sted (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990). Dette gælder for alle kollektive handlingsproblemer, hvor to eller flere medlemmer i en gruppe er på tale, fx et fodboldhold som Hobro IK (Sørensen og Svendsen 2015)

Explaining the emergence of social trust: Denmark and Germany

"How does social trust emerge in a country? By comparing the cases of Denmark and Germany through six historical phases, the authors suggest that a plausible explanation is long run political stability. In Denmark, social trust was arguably allowed to accumulate slowly over time and was probably not destroyed up till the universal welfare state of the 20th century. In Germany, however, political instability since the first German state building hampered the emergence and maintenance of social trust, which is why social trust was never allowed to grow in this country." (author's abstract

Alleviating poverty: entrepreneurship and social capital in rural Denmark 1800-1900

Why do we find entrepreneurship within larger groups? This question has challenged the social sciences since Olson (1965) showed that it does not pay an individual to provide collective goods voluntarily, if the individual economic gain from doing this is negative. However, the fact that larger groups actually do organize in local areas cannot be explained in strict economic terms. In an attempt to fill this gap in literature, we offer another solution, namely the presence of social incentives called “social capital”. Social capital is derived from regular face-to-face, co-operative relations among larger groups in local areas. Such relations, we argue, are initiated by writing down formal “rules of the game”, which are sanctioned effectively. This suggestion seems to be confirmed by empirical evidence from rural Denmark 1800-1900. During this period, written rules in the form of the formal founding statutes of co-operative associations enhanced informal peasant co-operation and stocks of beneficial social capital of an inclusive nature. As an outcome of this process, entrepreneurs voluntarily organized larger groups which provided collective goods locally, thus contributing to economic growth in former poor, rural areas.Pourquoi l’entrepreneuriat est-il présent au sein de groupes assez importants? Cette question a posé problème aux sciences sociales depuis qu’Olson a montré, en 1965, qu’un individu n’a aucun intérêt à fournir des biens collectifs volontairement, si le bénéfice économique individuel qu’il en retire est négatif. Toutefois, le fait que des grands groupes s’organisent localement ne peut s’expliquer au sens strictement économique. Dans un effort pour combler cette lacune, nous offrons une autre solution, qui est l’existence d’incitants sociaux appelés “capital social”. Le capital social provient d’un face-à-face régulier et de relations de coopération parmi des groupes assez larges à l’échelle locale. Nous soutenons que de telles relations se forment en consignant par écrit des “règles du jeu” formelles, qui sont effectivement sanctionnées. Notre suggestion semble confirmée par la preuve empirique que représente le Danemark rural de 1800-1900. Au cours de cette période, les règles écrites sous forme de statuts fondateurs officiels des coopératives ont renforcé la coopération paysanne informelle et les réserves en capital social positif, de nature inclusive. Par conséquent, les entrepreneurs ont organisé de façon délibérée des groupes assez importants, qui ont fourni des biens collectifs localement, et ont ainsi contribué à la croissance économique dans des zones rurales auparavant défavorisées

Stort er velgjort – eller småt er godt? Folkeskolelukninger og social kapital

Does school closures affect the local social capital? Through a comparative study of school closures in the municipality of Tønder (Ballum and Bedsted), we argue that centralization and school closures can eliminate the positive externality of social capital. Centralization can thus lead to a loss in the form of less social capital, which the example from Ballum clearly shows. Thus, the local community is charged an additional and hidden cost. As the example from Bedsted shows, the establishment of a free school can maintain social capital where well-functioning social networks at the local level are allowed to survive and continue to flourish through widespread cooperation