45 research outputs found
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Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India’s Scheduled Areas
Does political affirmative action undermine or promote development, and for whom? We examine Scheduled Areas in India, which reserve political office for the historically disadvantaged Scheduled Tribes. We apply a new theoretical framework and dataset of 217,000 villages to evaluate the overall impact of affirmative action on development, as well as its distributional consequences for minorities and non-minorities. Examining effects on the world’s largest employment program, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, we find that reservations deliver no worse overall outcomes, that there are large gains for targeted minorities, and that these gains come at the cost of the relatively privileged, not other minorities. We also find broader improvements in other pro-poor policies, including a rural roads program and general public goods. Contrary to the expectations of affirmative action skeptics, our results indicate that affirmative action can redistribute both political and economic power without hindering overall development
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Information, Candidate Selection, and the Quality of Representation: Evidence from Nepal
How do we improve the quality of representation in new democracies? This paper studies candidate selection by party leaders and asks whether poor information about public preferences can lead elite choices to diverge from mass opinion. Working with a political party in Nepal, we show that while elites value voter preferences, these preferences only explain one third of elite candidate selection. Next, we embed an experiment in actual candidate selection deliberations for this party and find that party leaders not only select different candidates when polling data are presented to them, but that their updated decisions also improve the party’s vote share. By opening the black-box of candidate selection, this paper demonstrates that closing the information gap between elites and voters has the power to improve the quality of representation
Do Campaign Contribution Limits Curb the Influence of Money in Politics?
Over 40% of countries around the world have adopted limits on campaign contributions to curb the influence of money in politics. Yet, we have limited knowledge on whether and how these limits achieve this goal. With a regression discontinuity design that uses institutional rules on contribution limits in Colombian municipalities, we show that looser limits increase the number and value of public contracts assigned to the winning candidate’s donors. The evidence suggests that this is explained by looser limits concentrating influence over the elected candidate among top donors and not by a reduction in electoral competition or changes in who runs for office. We further show that looser limits worsen the performance of donor-managed contracts: they are more likely to run over costs and require time extensions. Overall, this paper demonstrates a direct link between campaign contribution limits, donor kickbacks, and worse government contract performance
Can political alignment be costly?
Research on the benefits of political alignment suggests that voters who elect governing party politicians are better off than those who elect other politicians. We examine this claim with regression discontinuity designs that isolate the effect of electing a governing party politician on an important publicly provided service in Pakistan: health. Consistent with existing research, governing party constituents receive a higher quantity of services: more doctors are assigned to work in governing party areas. However, despite many more assigned doctors, there is no increase in doctor attendance. These findings contrast with the literature on political alignment by showing that alignment to the governing party affects voters’ welfare ambiguously: higher potential quantity of services may come at the cost of lower quality
How Campaigns Respond to Ballot Position: A New Mechanism for Order Effects
An established finding on ballot design is that top positions on the ballot improve the electoral performance of parties or candidates because voters respond behaviorally to salient information. This article presents evidence on an additional unexplored mechanism: campaigns, that can act before voters, can also adjust their behavior when allocated a top position on the ballot. We use a constituency-level lottery of ballot positions in Colombia to establish, first, that a ballot-order effect exists: campaigns randomly placed at the top earn more votes and seat shares. Second, we show that campaigns react to being placed on top of the ballot: they raise and spend more money on their campaign, and spending itself is correlated with higher vote shares. Our results provide the first evidence for a new mechanism of ballot-order effects examined in many previous studies
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Does Revolution Work? Evidence from Nepal’s People’s War
In 2015, after a decade-long conflict and nine years of negotiation, Nepal promulgated a constitution that replaced its 240-year-old monarchy by a federal republic. The subsequent 2017 local elections ushered more than 30,000 first-time politicians into office. Using a census of 3.68 million Nepalis (2.56 million of whom are of voting age) covering eleven districts, party nomination lists and party candidate selection committee surveys, electoral data and information on conflict incidence, we document that castes that were historically excluded from political representation achieved representation without a significant representation-ability trade-off: improved social representation among politicians is accompanied by positive selection on education and income. Triangulating across multiple data sources, we show that the entry of the revolutionary Maoist group as a post-conflict mainstream party played an important role. Finally, political representation of non-elite castes improved their policy inclusion as measured by individual access to earthquake reconstruction transfers. These gains, however, vary with the extent of social connections to the elected mayor and point to a continuing need to balance power by supporting institutions that provide all citizens political voice
Inaccurate forecasting of a randomized controlled trial
We report the results of a forecasting experiment about a randomized controlled trial that was conducted in the field. The experiment asks Ph.D. students, faculty, and policy practitioners to forecast (1) compliance rates for the RCT and (2) treatment effects of the intervention. The forecasting experiment randomizes the order of questions about compliance and treatment effects and the provision of information that a pilot experiment had been conducted which produced null results. Forecasters were excessively optimistic about treatment effects and unresponsive to item order as well as to information about a pilot. Those who declare themselves expert in the area relevant to the intervention are particularly resistant to new information that the treatment is ineffective. We interpret our results as suggesting that we should exercise caution when undertaking expert forecasting, since experts may have unrealistic expectations and may be inflexible in altering these even when provided new information
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Choosing Ungoverned Space: The Removal of Pakistan’s Frontier Crimes Regulation
Why do administratively competent states sometimes leave substantial swathes of their territory ungoverned? We explore this question in the context of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in Pakistan, a British Colonial law only abrogated in 2018, that left legal decisions up to local customary councils. This contrasts with areas where the British and Pakistani state built modern political and bureaucratic institutions. Using primary legal documents we create a dataset of when and where FCR applied between 1901 and 2012. Exploiting spatial variation in the Green Revolution’s impact in the 1960s, we show that governance was preferentially extended to places where the state stood to benefit the most in terms of land revenue. Our results show that technological changes which shift the returns to control influence where states choose to govern
Political identity: experimental evidence on anti-Americanism in Pakistan
We identify Pakistani men’s willingness to pay to preserve their anti-American identity using two experiments imposing clearly specified financial costs on anti-American expression, with minimal consequential or social considerations. In two distinct studies, one-quarter to one-third of subjects forgo payments from the U.S. government worth around one-fifth of a day’s wage to avoid an identity-threatening choice: anonymously checking a box indicating gratitude toward the U.S. government. We find sensitivity to both payment size and anticipated social context: when subjects anticipate that rejection will be observable by others, rejection falls suggesting that, for some, social image can outweigh self-image
Inaccurate forecasting of a randomized controlled trial
Published online: 22 November 2023We report the results of a forecasting experiment about a randomized controlled trial that was conducted in the field. The experiment asks Ph.D. students, faculty, and policy practitioners to forecast (1) compliance rates for the RCT and (2) treatment effects of the intervention. The forecasting experiment randomizes the order of questions about compliance and treatment effects and the provision of information that a pilot experiment had been conducted which produced null results. Forecasters were excessively optimistic about treatment effects and unresponsive to item order as well as to information about a pilot. Those who declare themselves expert in the area relevant to the intervention are particularly resistant to new information that the treatment is ineffective. We interpret our results as suggesting that we should exercise caution when undertaking expert forecasting, since experts may have unrealistic expectations and may be inflexible in altering these even when provided new information