4,147 research outputs found
Foreword: Of Lawyers, Leaders, and Returning Riddles in Sovereign Debt
This volume contains the research and recollections of more than a doze
Restructuring Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina
The decade and a half of litigation that followed Argentina’s sovereign bond default in 2001 ended with a great disturbance in the Force. A new creditor weapon had been uncloaked: The prospect of a court injunction requiring the sovereign borrower to pay those creditors that decline to participate in a debt restructuring ratably with any payments made to those creditors that do provide the country with debt relief.
For the first time holdouts succeeded in fashioning a weapon that could be used to injure their erstwhile fellow bondholders, not just the sovereign issuer. Is the availability of this new weapon limited to the aggravated facts of the Argentine default or has it now moved permanently into the creditors’ arsenal? Only time (and future judicial decisions) will tell.
In the meantime, however, sovereigns will occasionally find themselves in financial distress and their debts will occasionally need to be restructured. Venezuela already casts this chilly shadow over the sovereign debt market.
If, in a galaxy not too far away, sovereign debt workouts are to have any chance of an orderly completion, a method must be found to neutralize this new weapon. Judging by the secondary market prices of different series of Venezuelan sovereign bonds, large amounts of money are being wagered that it cannot be done
Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will
The purpose of this study was to enrich the environment for llama (Lama glama) and alpaca (Vicugna pacos) in a zoo. The zoo is located in northern Sweden (Umeå, Mickelträsk). The llama herd consists of three individuals of breed qara, two males and one female and the alpaca herd consists of six individuals of breed huacaya, one male, four females and one foal. The species lived in separate enclosures, they lived outside all year round and they had a shelter for wind and rain protection. They feed on pasture and were fed hay and pellet concentrate. A behavioral-study was carried out in April 2014, a five-day study where each of the species were observed 3 h a day, 1,5 h in morning and afternoon. The behavioral of llama and alpaca were observed individually and each behavior was observed in terms of duration and frequency. The study observed if the animals had a possibility to implement their natural behaviors in their enclosures and whether they showed any abnormal- or stereotypical behaviors that can occur in captivity. The questions I wanted to answer were: (1) what behaviors are occurring, (2) Is it possible to indicate from the behaviors if the animals are doing well or not, (3) Is there a difference in behaviors in the morning and afternoon? (4) Is there a difference between the sexes? (5) What actions should be undertaken to enrich and improve the habitat for llamas and alpacas in a zoo? The results from the study show that llamas and alpacas show many normal and natural behaviors, no abnormal-or stereotypical behaviors were visible. Some behaviors were more common in morning and some in afternoon and there were differences in behaviors between the sexes. Example for some environmental enrichment for the llamas and alpacas in the zoo was to add logs, trees, shrubs and sand piles to the enclosure
Talking One\u27s Way Out of a Debt Crisis
The policy of Euro-area officialdom in the period 2010-2011 was to avoid, at all costs, a default and restructuring of the sovereign debt of a member of the monetary union. This policy was motivated principally, but not exclusively, by a fear that the international capital markets, if forcibly reminded of the precarious position of overindebted, growth-challenged members of a monetary union, might recoil generally from lending to European sovereigns. In short, they feared contagion.
The only alternative to permitting a debt restructuring, of course, was an official sector bailout. The afflicted countries -- Greece (until 2012), Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus -- received loans from official sector sources sufficient to allow them to repay in full their maturing bond indebtedness. Whenever and wherever the crisis erupted, contagion was thus held in check by the blunt technique of smothering the outbreak -- in money.
The proponents of this policy argued at the time, and argue now, that many European sovereigns in 2010 were far too fragile to endure a bout of market contagion. They argued that an acute crisis needed to be averted in order to buy time for the implementation of a gradual but more durable remedy. Had the intervening eight years been used to reduce the debt vulnerabilities of the peripheral (and even some core) states, this argument would now be powerful, indeed invincible.
Unfortunately, the opposite happened. Average state indebtedness in Europe today is about one-third larger than it was in 2008. Both the member states and the market saw the reprieve as spreading a reliable official sector safety net under their exposure. So they kept on borrowing and lending. Only the zero interest rate policies of the world’s major central banks during this period have kept debt servicing costs at tolerable levels
Restructuring Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina
The decade and a half of litigation that followed Argentina’s sovereign bond default in 2001 ended with a great disturbance in the Force. A new creditor weapon had been uncloaked: The prospect of a court injunction requiring the sovereign borrower to pay those creditors that decline to participate in a debt restructuring ratably with any payments made to those creditors that do provide the country with debt relief.
For the first time holdouts succeeded in fashioning a weapon that could be used to injure their erstwhile fellow bondholders, not just the sovereign issuer. Is the availability of this new weapon limited to the aggravated facts of the Argentine default or has it now moved permanently into the creditors’ arsenal? Only time (and future judicial decisions) will tell.
In the meantime, however, sovereigns will occasionally find themselves in financial distress and their debts will occasionally need to be restructured. Venezuela already casts this chilly shadow over the sovereign debt market.
If, in a galaxy not too far away, sovereign debt workouts are to have any chance of an orderly completion, a method must be found to neutralize this new weapon. Judging by the secondary market prices of different series of Venezuelan sovereign bonds, large amounts of money are being wagered that it cannot be done
Courts of Good and Ill Repute: Garoupa and Ginsburg’s Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg have published an ambitious book that seeks to account for the great diversity of judicial systems based, in part, on how courts are designed to marshal the power of a high public opinion of the judiciary. Judges, the book posits, care deeply about their reputations both inside and outside the courts. Courts are designed to capitalize on judges’ desire to maximize their reputation, and judges’ existing stock of reputation can affect the design of the courts which they serve. We find much to like in this book, ranging from its intriguing and ambitious positive claims to its masterful use of comparative case studies from around the globe. However, we also have questions about the ability of the theory to hang together in a unified manner and to do the work assigned to it
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